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Abstract 
This dissertation discusses initial public offering (IPO) and its two major phenomena: 
underpricing and underperformance. The dissertation reviews existent literature from 
both finance and psychology, from the perspectives of the three major parties in an IPO 
process: issuers, underwriters and investors. In each perspective, the context is unfolded 
according to either a logical decision making process or a sequential order of an IPO 
event. The results indicate that underpricing and underperformance should be perceived 
as joint results affected by all three parties via various parameters throughout the IPO 
process. Financial factors include asymmetric information and information accuracy; 
psychological factors include cognitive, affective and social factors. Financial and 
psychological factors impact underpricing and underperformance to different extents. 
Keywords: initial public offering (IPO), underpricing, underperformance, 
asymmetric information, cognitive bias, affective bias, social influence, investor 
psychology  
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Introduction 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are the first time that a company sells equity shares 
on a security exchange (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). After the issuance of IPOs, in most 
circumstances, a company changes from privately owned to publicly owned, and thus 
the process of IPO issuance is often referred to as going public (Deeds, Decarolis, & 
Coombs, 1997). In recent years, the amount of capital aggregated by IPOs has increased 
consistently. According to statistics from Ritter (2014c), for IPOs with an initial price 
above $5 per share, the capital raised in the U.S. stock market reached $354.10 billion 
over the period from 2001 to 2013, which is approximately more than six times the 
$53.45 billion observed from 1980 to 1989. Although IPOs have consistently produced 
shares worth over $20 billion per year since 2010, investors’ demand for IPOs continues 
to exceed supply, as demonstrated by the observation IPOs are generally 
oversubscribed by investors before the initial date (Bertoni & Giudici, 2014). Moreover, 
not only have IPO shares have captured significant attention from stock market 
investors market, but the phenomena that they have brought about have attracted 
considerable interest among scholars in both finance and psychology. A substantial 
body of research has been conducted on IPO-related topics from both the financial 
perspective (e.g., R. K. Aggarwal, Bhagat, & Rangan, 2009; Pagano, Panetta, & 
Zingales, 1998; Ritter & Welch, 2002) and the psychology perspective (e.g., Chiang, 
Hirshleifer, Qian, & Sherman, 2011; Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). 
This dissertation will review both the finance and psychology literatures. From 
finance, concepts such as the short-term underpricing phenomenon, the long-term 
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underperformance phenomenon, the going public process, and the tasks of the three 
main parties (issuers, underwriters and investors) in the going public process will be 
introduced. From psychology, the interactions among these main parties, the cognitive 
biases that might affect the going public process by influencing these main parties, and 
the incentives affecting these main parties will be discussed. Because the discussion 
will focus on the main parties that mentioned repeatedly above, this dissertation will 
structured in three parts based on the roles of the main parties in the IPO process: the 
issuers (providers of IPOs), the underwriters (distributors of IPOs), and the investors 
(purchasers of IPOs). All of the three parties influence the entire going public process 
in significant ways. For instance, issuers determine the time of the issuance and the 
amount of capital they wish to raise through an IPO (Ritter & Welch, 2002); issuers 
and underwriters jointly determine the initial price of the IPO shares (Ljungqvist & 
Wilhelm, 2003); underwriters choose investors to whom the IPO shares will be 
allocated (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009b); and issuers’ performance, investors’ demand, 
and investors’ trading patterns affect the long-term performance of IPO shares in the 
secondary market (Fama, 1998; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). 
Issuers are often the top executives of companies and generally have full authority 
to determine whether the company will go public, and if so, when. For instance, the 
timing of going public is one of the essential factors that influence the initial prices of 
IPO shares and whether the issuance will be successful (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; 
Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975; Ritter & Welch, 2002). In most cases, an IPO is considered 
successful when the market price on the initial date (first day of issuance) in the 
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secondary market is higher or significantly higher than the initial price (Babich & Sobel, 
2004; Murrell, 2014). For instance, the IPO of Alibaba China on 18 September, 2014 
was considered a huge success not only because it raised the largest amount of capital 
($21.76 billion) in IPO history (Renaissance Capital, 2015a) but also because the peak 
of the market price on the initial date was $99.70 per share, while the initial price was 
$68 per share (Dohmen, 2014). On the contrary, the IPO of Facebook was considered 
less successful, or sometimes even a case study of IPO failure. This is because the 
underwriters of Facebook’s IPO (Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs) had 
to purchase shares worth a total of $11.76 billion to maintain the market price on the 
initial date above the initial price of $38 per share (Worstall, 2012).  
Indeed, when the gap between initial price and market price is considered the main 
determinant of a successful IPO, the timing of going public will be considered one of 
the crucial factors for a successful IPO. This is the case because empirical evidence 
indicates that hot issues and cold issues tend to both appear in a relatively compact 
period of time (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). Specifically, hot issues refer to the IPOs that 
have higher market prices on the initial date than their initial prices, i.e., successful 
IPOs. Cold issues refer to IPOs that have lower market prices on the initial date than 
their initial prices, i.e., unsuccessful IPOs. Furthermore, a hot issue market refers to a 
period of time in the stock market when many companies go public and investors 
exhibit considerable demand for these IPOs. Conversely, a cold issue market exhibits 
the opposite traits (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). Statistics from Ritter (2014c) indicate that 
over 800 companies went public during the internet bubble period (1999 to 2000), with 
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an average first-day return of over 50 percent; by contrast, approximately 60 companies 
went public from 2008 to 2009, with an average first-day return of less than 10 percent. 
These are typical examples of a hot issue market (1999 to 2000) and a cold issue market 
(2009). The abovementioned first-day return is calculated as the closing price after the 
first trading day divided by the initial price minus one (Loughran & McDonald, 2013). 
For instance, a 50 percent first-day return rate means that when an investor invests $10 
in an IPO share before it begins to trade in the stock market, his or her investment will 
worth $15 by the end of the first trading day once this IPO is available to public 
investors. Hence, the larger a first-day return is, the “hotter” the related IPO is. 
Moreover, the first-day return is also used to measure the extent of IPO underpricing 
(Derrien & Womack, 2003), which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, where basic 
IPO concepts will introduced. In brief, underpricing describes the situation in which 
most IPOs have lower initial prices than their prices in the secondary market (Derrien 
& Womack, 2003).  
In the short run, issuers influence decisions such as the timing of going public, 
which has a significant impact on the success of an IPO. In the long run, issuers also 
play an important role in company performance on both strategic and operational 
factors, both of which are closely related to the stock price fluctuations in the secondary 
market (Alavi, Pham, & Pham, 2008; Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2010). 
As a result, during the entire IPO process, the timing of going public, the extent of 
underpricing, and a stock’s after-market performance are all direct results of executives’ 
decisions. Moreover, the decision-making process of issuers can be perceived as a 
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combined output of interactions among executives’ risk attitudes, likelihood of 
overconfidence, possible cognitive biases and the effects of other psychological 
elements (Alavi et al., 2008; Barry, 1989; Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988; 
Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012). All of which will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation.  
Underwriters help issuers to sell IPOs to the investors. In addition to issuers, 
underwriters are another main party that has a significant influence on the going public 
process. Underwriters are also referred as the underwriter syndicate in which a group 
of investment banks or commercial banks collaborate to sell an IPO’s shares in the stock 
market (Puri, 1999). An underwriter syndicate exercises combined functions as a 
consultant or an advisor throughout the going public process, a salesman for the IPO 
shares, and sometimes even a wholesaler that purchases a large number of new shares 
when necessary (R. Aggarwal & Conroy, 2000; Lin & McNichols, 1998). Among all 
its tasks, one of the most important functions of an underwriter syndicate is to suggest 
the initial price for an IPO to issuers. Under most circumstances, the initial prices are 
lower than the closing price on the initial date, after the shares begin to trade in the 
stock market (Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Lowry & Schwert, 2004). For reasons that will 
be discussed in Chapter 4, underwriters are always held to be responsible for 
underpricing.  
Studies have long focused on the correlations between underwriter characteristics 
and the extent of underpricing. For instance, a recent empirical study focusing on the 
underwriter’s network as an independent variable showed that lead underwriters that 
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maintain a reciprocal relationship with their peers tend to underprice more than those 
that maintain a diverse peer relationship. This is likely because the partners involved in 
a reciprocal relationship tend to compensate one another with underpricing (Chuluun, 
2015). Early studies from the 1990s focusing on the underwriter’s reputation as an 
independent variable showed that underwriters with better reputation underprice 
significantly less. This is likely due to the reputational concerns of the underwriters 
(Michaely & Shaw, 1994). In practice, underwriters tend to encourage underpricing. 
They take measures such as establishing personal accounts for venture capitalists (who 
are the potential purchasers of IPO shares) and executives of issuing companies, which 
are allocated hot issues (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Thus, both empirical studies and 
anecdotal evidence show that underwriters are correlated with underpricing from 
various perspectives, which is one of the examples of all of the influential functions 
underwriters fulfill during the going public process. Chapter 4 provides further details 
on underwriters’ functions, including the functions of analysts, in the going public 
process, and the possible ethical problems affecting underwriters and cognitive biases 
such as overconfidence of analysts will also be presented. 
From the perspective of investors, one of the reasons that IPOs attract so much 
attention is because issuers and underwriters typically leave large amount of money on 
table through underpricing. Hence, profits can be generated in a rapid and relatively 
easy way, especially for speculators who engage in flipping activities (immediately 
selling the IPO shares in the secondary market) (Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Ritter, 
2014c). This can cause phenomena such as over subscriptions of IPOs in the primary 
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market, flipping activities after the initial date, and increased trading volume after the 
lockup period (Field & Hanka, 2001; Geczy, Musto, & Reed, 2002). These phenomena 
can be attributed to investors’ cognitive or affective biases, such as the disposition 
effect, or attributed to social factors such as media influence or interpersonal 
communication (Ang & Schwarz, 1985; Dungore, 2011). For instance, the disposition 
effect encourages investors to sell winning stocks too soon and hold losing stocks for 
too long (Kaustia, 2004; Weber & Camerer, 1998). The media might influence investors 
to be net purchasers of stocks that attract greater attention, specifically IPOs (Barber & 
Odean, 2008). Interpersonal communication is likely to influence investors who follow 
the investment decision of others, especially in ambiguous situations such as IPOs 
(Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Rook, 2006). These biases or factors have strong 
effects on non-professional individual investors, which will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 5 
This dissertation will be divided into 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 will introduce basic 
IPO concepts, such as means of raising public equity, reasons for going public, and the 
IPO process; it will also describe noted IPO phenomena, such as underpricing, flipping 
activities, and underperformance. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the multiple 
agency relationships involving the three main parties in the IPO process, namely, are 
issuers, underwriters, and investors. The various interests among them will be stated 
and possible interest conflicts will be analyzed. Chapter 3 will highlight possible 
psychological factors affecting IPOs and top executives that might influence the latter’s 
decisions throughout the IPO process, such as overconfidence and founder status. 
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Chapter 4 will present the relationship between IPO companies and underwriters, 
including the functions of the underwriter syndicate, the influence of underwriter 
reputation, and psychological effects on analysts and underwriters, such as herd 
behavior and reputational concerns. Chapter 5 will introduce the psychology and 
behaviors of various investors involved in the IPO process. Three types of investors 
will be discussed according to the time they enter the IPO process, namely, are venture 
capitalists, institutional investors and individual investors. The main focus will be 
placed on individual investors for the reason that this group of investors is usually 
considered more likely to exhibit cognitive or affective biases and be influenced by 
social factors. Chapter 6 will present the conclusions and highlight the contributions of 
this dissertation. 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive view and 
a thorough understanding of IPOs, to serve as a bridge linking psychology and finance 
in the field of IPO studies, and to identify gaps in the field and potential avenues for 
future studies. In particular, two of the most significant IPO phenomena that concern 
both of the short-term (underpricing) and long-term (underperformance) performance 
of IPO stocks will be explained in depth from the perspectives of issuers, underwriters 
and investors. Additionally, underpricing and underperformance will be analyzed from 
a psychological perspective, with a particular focus on when individuals are involved 
in important decision making related to IPOs. By explicitly highlighting cognitive, 
affective and social factors, this dissertation will hopefully be of use to investors to help 
them adopt a rational approach to trading in IPOs.   
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Chapter 1 General introduction to IPOs 
How investors generally perceive the stock market and trade stocks might vary 
significantly across individuals. For instance, some people regard the stock market as a 
giant slot machine and essentially trade stocks as if they were gambling (Kumar, 2009). 
There are various theories that offer different methods intended to predict stock market 
trends. There are also theories arguing that trends may not be predictable at all.  
Generally, these theories can be classified into three categories. The first category 
is supported by scholars who believe in market efficiency and contend that a stock 
market index should follow a random walk, whereby the prices of individual stocks 
change independently and patterns of price changes are unlikely to be repeated because 
such changes are memoryless (Fama, 1995; Perron, 1988). The second category is 
generally supported in practice by analysts who focus on the intrinsic value of a stock 
by estimating a firm’s future income, an industry outlook, and general economic 
development. This method is called fundamental analysis, which assumes that the price 
of a stock is a representative of its intrinsic value and the future profitability of the firm 
(Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997; Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, & Sloan, 2001). The third 
category is supported by other analysts who employ a method called technical analysis, 
which is based on historical price data and does not consider the intrinsic value of a 
given stock (Taylor & Allen, 1992). With the development of computer science and 
learning algorithms, scholars from the third category have created computer systems 
based on a modular neural network, which managed to accurately predict Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Indexes (Kimoto, Asakawa, Yoda, & Takeoka, 1990), or even models 
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based on the movements of bacteria on a micro level, which were able predict stock 
market trends one day ahead and fifteen days ahead from 1998 to 2008 (Y. Zhang & 
Wu, 2009).  
Although there are various theoretical categories, the future trend of the stock 
market is a hot topic for both scholars and investors. As a result, it is important to 
understand how each individual stock initially comes into circulation in the market, 
which makes IPOs and the going public process significant. 
In addition to IPOs, there are other methods to raise public equity capital, i.e., 
selling stocks to public investors in the stock market. Together with two major issues 
that need to be considered before going public, i.e., why to go public and when to go 
public, this chapter will provide an introduction from the following four perspectives: 
1) methods of raising public equity, 2) reasons for raising public equity, 3) the IPO 
process, and 4) IPO phenomena. Such basic concepts and introductions are important 
because they help to structure an overview of the different parties and how these parties 
collaborate, and they also may help to provide the reader with a further understanding 
of the following chapters.  
1. IPO and Other Methods of Raising Public Equity 
Going public by issuing IPO has likely received the most scholarly attention of all 
the methods that companies use when raising public equity for the first time. To provide 
an overview of public equity raising methods, two other approaches, i.e., direct public 
offering (DPO) and reverse merger (RM), will be introduced together with IPOs in this 
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subchapter.  
1.1 IPO: initial public offering 
As mentioned in the Introduction, IPOs are the first time that a company sells 
shares in the stock market (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Issuing shares for public 
investors is one way of raising public equity, which means a company is selling shares 
of control of the company to public investors in exchange for capital (M. J. Brennan & 
Franks, 1997). From the perspective of constructing assets, raising equity capital 
contrast with raising debt capital: the former grants investors rights to vote and to 
receive dividends according to the company’s dividend policy and profit in a given 
fiscal year; the latter grants the creditors fixed interest payments regardless of the 
company’s profit in a given fiscal year (Frank & Goyal, 2003). In an IPO, because 
public investors buy shares conferring control over a company, after the new shares are 
issued, the company’s ownership status changes, for instance, from privately owned to 
publicly owned (Deeds et al., 1997).  
Additionally, as stated in the Introduction, there are three parties involved in the 
IPO process: issuers, underwriters, and investors. In short, the IPO process can be 
described as issuers recruiting underwriters to organize and sell the shares, while the 
shares are ultimately allocated to investors in the primary or secondary market 
(Jenkinson & Jones, 2009b). With respect to their activities over time, these three 
parties are active in three phases and two markets throughout the IPO process. These 
three phases and two markets include: 1) preparing to go public, 2) allocating IPO 
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shares in the primary market, and 3) trading the shares in the secondary market (Alavi 
et al., 2008). During the preparation phase, issuers and underwriters are the most active 
parties. During this stage, the main tasks for issuers are preparing their companies both 
financially and strategically for the IPO. For instance, adopting audited financial 
statements in accordance with IPO regulations, establishing anti-takeover strategies, 
and so forth (Lipman, 2008). The main tasks for underwriters include preparing relevant 
documents, such as filling the S-1 Form to secure approval from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), in the U.S. (Loughran & McDonald, 2013), and 
preparing the preliminary prospectus that discloses necessary information on the issuer 
(Bhabra & Pettway, 2003). After the preparation is completed and the SEC approves 
the IPO, the focus of the IPO process shifts to share allocation, which takes place in the 
primary market. During this phase, issuers and underwriters allocate the IPO shares to 
investors (mostly institutional investors) before the shares become publicly tradable in 
the secondary market (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009b). In other words, the allocation phase 
lasts until the initial offering date or in some cases before the expiration of the lockup 
period (Field & Hanka, 2001). The market in which the IPO shares are allocated is 
known as the primary market (Spindt & Stolz, 1992). After the primary market ends, 
IPO shares are made available to the public investors, and this is when the secondary 
market becomes active. In the secondary market, shares can be freely traded among 
public investors, and typically when people refer to the stock market, they are referring 
to this secondary market (Mauer & Senbet, 1992). This is the third phase, and investors 
are the most active party among here (Figure 1). The various functions and main tasks 
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of the issuers, underwriters and investors during these three phases will also be 
highlighted in detail in Chapters 3 through 5.  
Figure 1. Timeline of the IPO process, where three main parties (issuers, underwriters 
and investors) and two markets (primary market and secondary market) are involved. 
The shadows of the three parties demonstrate in which stage they are active, and the 
overlapping shadows mean that more than one party are involved.  
1.2 DPO: direct public offering 
The main difference between a direct public offering (DPO) and an IPO is whether 
underwriters are involved in the going public process. As its name implies, a DPO 
describes a process in which issuers directly sell their stocks to investors without 
assistance from underwriters (Sjostrom Jr, 2001). Wendt (2008) suggested two main 
scenarios when companies would prefer to conduct a DPO: first, when underwriters are 
unwilling to cooperate with issuers that do not meet their standards, for instance, when 
the issuers have small firm size, poor performance in the pre-offering years, or 
insufficient potential for future development; second, when the cost of hiring 
underwriters exceeds the issuer’s budget. A further conclusion that can be drawn based 
on these two scenarios is that when a company raises capital through a DPO, both its 
current financial situation and its future potential development could be less appealing 
compared with companies that choose to conduct IPOs. This might be due to 
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unappealing features such as the observation that, from 1995 to 1999, nearly 40 percent 
of DPOs that attempted to raise capital through the internet were unable to attract any 
capital (Jones, 1999, as cited in Sjostrom Jr, 2001). Additionally, according to Anand 
(2003) less information is published during DPOs because fewer documents are subject 
to disclosure compared with IPOs. Thus, due to information asymmetry, it is difficult 
for investors to determine the quality of a new DPO. Under such circumstances, 
investors always demand a risk premium, and thus companies usually have to issue 
DPOs at discounts (Wendt, 2008). 
While there are disadvantages, DPOs also offer several advantages. For instance, 
compared with conducting an IPO, a DPO is less costly (no need to hire underwriters), 
faster (the firm can typically go public within a month), and easier (fewer documents 
are required, there are fewer regulatory restrictions, and the going public process is 
simpler) (Anand, 2003). Hence, Anand (2003) argued that when the underwriting fee 
exceeds the additional transaction costs required in a DPO and when a proper 
information revealing system can be created for investors, conducting a DPO can be 
more efficient than conducting an IPO.  
The development of DPOs has been relatively slow and uneven. The first DPO 
conducted through the internet was launched in March 1996 by a company named 
“Spring Street Brewing” (Rosenbloom, 2004). After approximately two decades of 
disuse, the DPO began to be adopted again in the U.S. in 2012. This reemergence was 
due to the passage of the JOBS Act (the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) in 2012 
in the U.S., after which a new method of funding called crowdfunding has burgeoned 
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(Stanberry & Aven, 2014). Crowdfunding allows issuers to raise capital directly 
through the internet, by issuing an open announcement (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2014). Though some scholars perceived it as “a new version of IPO” 
(Stanberry & Aven, 2014, p. 1383) or regarded it as “putting the ‘I’ in the IPO” (Walker, 
2013, p. 88), in my opinion, crowdfunding should be considered a DPO for the 
following reasons: 1) crowdfunding raises capital directly from potential investors, 
which matches the concept of a DPO; 2) the entire funding process is carried out 
without underwriters; and 3) similar to most DPOs from the 1990s, the fundraising 
process is highly reliant on the internet (Sjostrom Jr, 2001; Wendt, 2008). 
Practical evidence shows that crowdfunding, and DPO trading more generally, is 
usually conducted by small companies through online advertising (Stanberry & Aven, 
2014). The crowdfunding boom, in my opinion, buffers the extra demand of individual 
investors for investing in developing companies or industries because most IPOs are 
distributed to institutional investors in the primary market (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009b). 
I introduced DPOs primarily to provide background information on raising public 
equity and not as the main focus of the dissertation, the topic will not be further 
discussed.  
1.3 RM: reverse merger 
In addition to conducting a DPO, a reverse merger (RM) is another way to go 
public without involving underwriters. It helps companies going public by merging 
with a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), i.e., a shell public company (Datar, 
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Emm, & Ince, 2012). A shell public company essentially exists to be taken over; hence, 
it has only nominal operations but almost no nominal assets, or if it has any, they are 
mainly cash equivalents (Sjostrom Jr, 2007). After the merger, the newly formed 
company will obtain the assets and liabilities of both the shell company and the original 
operating company, which is the firm that starts the merger. The name of the new 
company, the executives and the officers will be obtained directly from the operating 
company, and the shell company’s shares continue to be traded publicly as they were 
before the merger. In this way, the operating company succeeds to the SPAC’s position 
in the stock market, and thus becomes publicly owned (Adjei, Cyree, & Walker, 2008; 
C. M. Lee, Li, & Zhang, in press; Sjostrom Jr, 2007).  
According to Brenner and Schroff (2004), under most circumstances, going public 
through an RM is considered faster than both DPOs and IPOs, lasting for only a few 
weeks, because it does not have to go through all of the procedures required in a DPO 
or an IPO. It is more expensive than a DPO but still less costly than an IPO. Additionally, 
this approach can be less vulnerable to the stock index fluctuations than an IPO because 
in the stock market, merger activity is always perceived by investors as favorable news 
(Adjei et al., 2008). Aydogdu, Shekhar, and Torbey (2007) provided empirical support 
for this suggestion and demonstrated that trading activity increased immediately after 
the announcement of a merger. 
The research on RMs has become increasingly popular in recent years (Feldman, 
2012; Floros & Sapp, 2011). Additionally, in the U.S., SEC regulations on RMs have 
become stricter since 2004 (Aydogdu et al., 2007). In my opinion, the increased 
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restrictions, rules and laws could be perceived as a sign that RMs might begin to attract 
more capital in the stock market than they have previously. Hence, from another 
perspective, becoming an SPAC could be one of the reasons why a company pursues 
an IPO. In other words, shell companies conduct IPOs only to be taken over through an 
RM in the future, and thus reverse mergers and SPACs will be further discussed as 
reasons for raising public equity through IPOs in the following subchapter. 
2. Reasons for Raising Public Equity Through IPOs 
There are several ways to raise capital other than raising public equity, such as 
borrowing from creditors, seeking investment from venture capitalists, typically a 
single, large institutional investor, or from angel investors, generally groups of small 
investors (Covas & Haan, 2011; Hellmann & Thiele, 2014). Thus, one might ask, given 
the various financing options available, why would a company favor public equity 
financing over other methods?  
This question can be answered from both financial and non-financial perspectives. 
From the financial perspective, one of the conventional answers would be these 
companies are willing to raise equity capital from a public market to allow their 
stockholders to freely exchange shares for cash in the future (Woojin Kim & Weisbach, 
2005; Ritter & Welch, 2002). From the nonfinancial perspective, raising public equity 
might provide several benefits, such as enhancing companies’ reputation (Bancel & 
Mittoo, 2009), improving the influence in the industry (Pagano et al., 1998), and 
increasing publicity (Ritter & Welch, 2002). Additionally, a DPO or crowdfunding 
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might even increase brand loyalty or the number of consumers because investors will 
be more likely to become active consumers after being involved in the investment 
(Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012). 
Of the various methods for raising public equity, IPOs have attracted the greatest 
amount of attention from both investors and scholars, which can be supported by 
evidence such as the constant excessive demand for IPOs during the subscription period 
and the numerous IPO related studies that have been conducted (Brau, Li, & Shi, 2007; 
Chuluun, 2015; Ritter & Welch, 2002; Shen, Coakley, & Instefjord, 2013). Although 
launching IPOs means that issuers have to wait for approval from regulators, complete 
sophisticated IPO procedures, and pay large commissions to underwriters, over $25 
billion has been raised annually through IPOs in the U.S. since 2010 (Ritter, 2014a).  
Studies have been conducted from different perspectives in an effort to illustrate 
the reasons that issuers are scrambling to raise capital through IPOs. From the stock 
market perspective, positive correlations have been observed between the general 
market valuation and the number of IPOs issued in the market. For instance, as 
previously noted, in a hot issue market, many companies issue IPOs (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 
1975). Additionally, the relationship between a hot issue market and hot issues can be 
reciprocal: hot issues (significantly underpriced IPOs) are more likely to encourage 
investors to purchase IPOs in the secondary market and increase the market price in 
general, which then generates a hot issue market. In return, the hot issue market tends 
to encourage more companies to conduct IPOs because this market condition increases 
the likelihood of conducting successful IPOs (considerably underpriced IPOs) (M. 
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Baker & Wurgler, 2007; Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh, 2006). This can be perceived as 
a period when the major investors are irrational about IPOs, and such irrationality has 
driven IPO prices higher in the secondary market than their intrinsic value warrants. In 
this scenario, low-quality firms might have seek to exploit the irrational market and 
issue low-quality IPOs at potentially inflated prices (Lowry & Schwert, 2002; Yung, 
Çolak, & Wang, 2008). Such free-riding behaviors by low-quality firms might only 
become evident in the long term. Statistics have revealed that during the internet bubble 
(1999 to 2000), 858 companies issued IPOs, which is 50 percent higher than the total 
number of firms that issued IPOs (1,547) in the subsequent 14 years, from 2001 to 2014 
(Ritter, 2014a). However, after the bursting of the internet bubble, the entire market 
crashed, with the Dow Jones Index losing one third of its value and the NASDAQ 
Composite experiencing a sharp decline, from over 5,000 to 1,000 (Morrissey, 2004). 
As a result, from the stock market perspective, issuers, especially speculative issuers, 
might be eager to raise capital by issuing an IPO during specific periods such as in a 
hot issue market. This can prevent an unsuccessful issuance, although it might also 
create disasters in the stock market in the long term. 
From the perspective of an individual company, few empirical studies can be 
found concerning why and when companies are willing to conduct IPOs. One 
explanation for this limited number of studies is the unavailability of pre-IPO firm-level 
financial data, which makes it difficult to compare the differences in companies’ 
financial situations before and after the IPO. One of the few studies addressing this 
issue was conducted by Pagano et al. (1998), using the ex ante and ex post IPO financial 
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data from Italy. This study was possible because Italy is one of the few countries in the 
world where financial data on privately owned companies, such as financial statements 
and bank credit records, are publicly accessible. By comparing the ex ante and ex post 
financial characteristics (including profitability, financial leverage, cost of credit, etc.) 
of companies that went public, firm size and market-to-book ratio in the industry were 
found to have a positive effect on the likelihood that a firm will conduct an IPO. The 
market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market price of a stock divided by book value 
of a stock, and it is usually interpreted as measuring future growth or the investors’ 
confidence in a company or an industry (L. Chen & Zhao, 2006). Interestingly, Pagano 
et al. (1998) noted that companies were more likely to conduct an IPO due to financial 
structure considerations and less likely to do so to raise capital. In other words, 
companies conduct IPOs to rebalance the proportion of debt and equity. Their empirical 
results showed that, after an IPO, the cost of credit decreased and managerial turnover 
increased (Pagano et al., 1998). 
In addition to using data on financial characteristics in empirical studies on this 
topic, Brau and Fawcett (2006) conducted a survey on companies’ reasons for going 
public. Their sample consisted of 336 chief financial officers (CFOs) from three types 
of firms: 1) firms that completed IPOs, 2) firms that withdrew their applications before 
the IPOs were completed, and 3) firms that were considered large enough to conduct 
IPOs but remained privately owned. Their survey included questions concerning the 
motives for conducting IPOs, the timing of going public, reasons for remaining private 
and other attitudes toward IPOs.“To facilitate acquisitions” (p. 399) was found to be 
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the most important motivation for conducting an IPO (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). In other 
words, most of the CFOs in the sample issued IPOs to take over other firms in the future. 
In their follow-up study focusing on the cases of mergers and acquisitions, they found 
that conducting an IPO significantly increases the likelihood of a company taking over 
other firms than the possibility of it been taken over. Additionally, in such acquisition 
activities, public shares were used as payment in purchases of other firms (Brau & 
Fawcett, 2006).  
Based on the empirical studies and other literature related to the reasons for issuing 
an IPO, Brau (2012) summarized all possible reasons into 13 opinions (Table 1). All of 
these opinions were supported by at least one peer-reviewed article. In this dissertation, 
based on the work of Brau (2012) and my understanding, three main perspectives on 
reasons to conduct an IPO are summarized from 1) the capital structure perspective, 
which is based on the notion that IPOs are conducted to increase equity and thus change 
the firm’s capital structure; 2) the acquisition perspective, which is based on the notion 
that conducting an IPO increases the likelihood that a company becomes an acquirer or 
an acquiree; and 3) the insider group’s perspective, which is based on the interests of 
the insider group, especially those who might benefit from an IPO, such as CEOs or 
CFOs.  
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Table 1 Reasons for conducting an IPO  
Reasons for conducting an IPO  
1. To minimize the cost of capital and optimal the capital structure 
2. To overcome borrowing constraints or increase bargaining power with banks  
3. To follow the pecking order theory of financing: equity > retained earnings > debt 
4. To create a public market and use shares as a payment method for subsequent 
acquisitions 
5. To establish a market price for subsequent sell-out 
6. To create an analyst following, where IPO firms will experience favorable analyst 
following on average 
7. To take the first-mover advantage and increase publicity 
8. To use the window of opportunity, where IPOs might underperform after other 
IPOs 
9. To herd because other firms in the same industry have gone or are going public 
10. To allow more dispersion of ownership 
11. To offer stock-based compensation after the IPO 
12. To cash out, especially for venture capital backed IPOs 
13. To pursue the personal interest of the CEO or CFO, such as in the case of 
Netscape  
Adapted from “Why Do Firms Go Public”, by J. C. Brau, 2012, The Oxford 
Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance, pp. 18-19.  
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2.1 Capital structure perspective 
The main focus of this perspective is determining a company’s optimal capital 
structure. In essence the literature on corporate capital structure discusses the 
proportion of equity and debt in a company’s total amount of capital (DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988). How the optimal capital 
structure should be defined has been contested in traditional finance, and the main 
arguments include: 1) the optimal capital structure should maximize firm value, a 
position exemplified by Modigliani and Miller (1958); 2) the optimal capital structure 
should minimize the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), as argued by E. 
Solomon (1963) or Chambers, Harris, and Pringle (1982); and 3) the process of raising 
capital should follow a certain order, such as pecking order theory, as argued by Myers 
and Majluf (1984). All three theories will be explained below.  
The study of the corporate capital structure can be traced back to the 1950s. For 
example, Modigliani and Miller (1958) supported the theory that the capital structure 
should maximize firm value and stated that in a perfect market, the relative proportions 
of debt and equity should be irrelevant to corporate value because in a perfect market, 
one share of debt (bond) and one share of equity (stock) are perfect substitutes, and 
hence should be sold at the same price.  
However, in reality, tax is calculated based on income after the payment of 
interests to creditors but before the payment of dividends to shareholders. The different 
timing of these payments from a tax perspective generates a tax shield effect, which 
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benefits companies with capital structures that are highly reliant on debt (Kane, Marcus, 
& McDonald, 1984; Miles & Ezzell, 1980). An extreme example to explain the function 
of a tax shield would be the following. Assume that both Company A and Company B 
have 1) the same amount of year-end income before paying interest, tax and dividends 
($10,000), 2) the same amount of total capital ($80,000), 3) the same tax rate (30 
percent), and 4) the same dividend and interest rate (5 percent each). The only 
difference is that the capital of Company A only consists of equity, while the capital of 
Company B only consists of debt. Company A has to pay $3,000 in tax ($10,000 *30 
percent) and $4,000 in dividends ($80,000 *5 percent). Hence, the income after paying 
interest ($0, as it has no debt), tax and dividends is $3,000 ($10,000 - $0 - $3,000 - 
$4,000). Company B it has to pay $4,000 in interest ($80,000 *5 percent) before paying 
tax, then $1,800 in tax after the interest is subtracted from income (($10,000 - $4,000) 
*30 percent). Hence, the income after paying interest, tax and dividends (which is $0) 
is $4,200 ($10,000 - $4,000 - $1,800). As a result, the tax shield generated in this 
example is $1,200 ($4,200 - $3,000) (Table 2). 
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Table 2 The result of a tax shield  
 Company A Company B 
Capital structure  $80,000, equity only $80,000, debt only 
Year-end income $10,000 $10,000 
Interest (5% interest rate) $0 $4,000 
Income after interests  $10,000 $6,000 
Tax (30% tax rate) $3,000 $1,800 
Dividends (5% dividend rate) $4,000 $0 
Net Income $3,000 $4,200 
The difference between Company A and Company B created by the tax shield is $1,200. 
Own illustration based on "How big is the tax advantage to debt?" by A. Kane, A. 
Marcus, and R. L. McDonald, 1984, The Journal of Finance, 39(3). 
As in the example, when the tax shield is considered, the larger debt is relative to 
total assets, the more benefit a tax shield can create. A company reaches its maximized 
value when its capital is 100 percent debt. Additionally, the higher the tax rate is, the 
more a company can benefit from a tax shield (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Thus, under 
this assumption, a company will not pursue an IPO because issuing equity shares would 
prevent it from benefiting from a tax shield. 
The notion of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) was introduced by E. 
Solomon (1963), who held that the cost of capital should be calculated in separate 
categories according to their proportional weights, i.e., calculate the cost of debt and 
equity separately. This theory, in my opinion, can be interpreted as another perspective 
on maximizing a company’s value, using the approach of minimizing the cost of capital. 
Solomon (1963) argued this from two perspectives. From the perspective of creditors, 
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when the debt in a company reaches an excessive level, they are likely to demand 
additional interest, as operating risk is positively correlated with the amount of debt. 
From the perspective of equity shareholders, when the interest rates increase, the 
amount of earnings per share (EPS) will decrease. EPS describes a company’s net 
income per share, and hence can be used as an indicator of a company’s profitability. 
As EPS was found to have a significant influence on a company’s stock price (Patell, 
1976), when EPS decreases, equity shareholders are likely to demand a risk premium 
for their dividends. As a result, increased debt leads to an increased total capital cost 
(Figure 2). Additionally, the tax shield benefit generated by increased debt will be 
counterbalanced by increased capital costs. E. Solomon (1963) provided an important 
approach for measuring capital costs, and it has been used as one of the discount rates 
for calculating the present value of assets (Arnold & Crack, 2004; Tham & Vélez-Pareja, 
2002). Additionally, many empirical studies have been conducted based on WACC 
(Kaplan & Ruback, 1995; Kyriazis & Anastassis, 2007; Miles & Ezzell, 1980; Nantell 
& Carlson, 1975). Thus, based on the theory that optimizing a firm’s capital structure 
entails minimizing the cost of capital, the amount of IPO issuance should be increased 
accordingly to generate the smallest amount of WACC.  
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Figure 2 The influence of increase debt to capital cost, from the perspectives of both 
creditor and equity shareholder. Own illustration based on “Corporate Forecasts of 
Earnings per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Test”, by J. M. Patell, 1976, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 14(2). 
Baxter (1967) advocated for a similar theory of capital costs. According to this 
theory, the cost of bankruptcy should be considered part of the cost of capital because 
a high proportion of debt increases the likelihood that a firm will go bankrupt. As a 
result, the value of a firm decreases as debt increases. Further studies supporting this 
theory held that a cost of bankruptcy, similar to taxes, is the result of market 
imperfections. When both taxes and cost of bankruptcy are unavoidable due to an 
imperfect market, they should be both considered when determining the optimal capital 
structure (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Stiglitz, 1969). Consequently, similar to the 
above, when the cost of bankruptcy is considered, IPOs should be issued in an amount 
that creates the lowest capital cost when cost of bankruptcy is included in capital costs.  
The third and last theory argues that the capital-raising process should follow a 
certain order because the cost of acquiring information also influences firm value 
(Frank & Goyal, 2003). Pecking order theory was hence developed based on 
asymmetric information and the cost it generates. By assuming that entrepreneurs have 
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superior information on the firm than do outside creditors and investors, the order in 
which a firm raises capital should follow a pecking order: beginning with internal equity 
such as retained earnings, then using debt, and finally using external equity (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). This is because in the presence of asymmetric information, the more 
information one needs to make investment decisions, the more return one requires on 
this investment. When the cost of obtaining required information is considered, 
outsiders will demand greater interest or dividends due to their inferior information. 
Thus, internal financing is considered less costly than external financing. Of the two 
approaches to external financing, issuing debt is considered to reflect more favorably 
on the firm than issuing equity because outsiders perceive the issuance of debt as an 
indicator of strong confidence in the board and that the firm’s value is underestimated; 
hence issuing bonds is less costly than issuing stocks (Myers, 1984). Consequently, 
based on this theory, conducting an IPO would be the least desirable means of obtaining 
financing and should be used when no other option is available. 
The theories mentioned above focusing on constructing the optimal capital 
structure tend to perceive each firm as an independent, individual entity and the industry 
and the market as a simple aggregation of independent firms. Hence, theories based on 
these hypotheses only focus on internal measurers, such as the cost of capital or the 
pecking order. However, firms no longer exist as separate entities. Hence, theories 
considering interactions, such as purchasing, mergers or takeover activities, between 
firms are categorized as the acquisition perspective and are introduced in the following 
subchapter.  
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2.2 Acquisition perspective 
The explanations for conducting an IPO from the acquisition perspective focus on 
the takeover activities related to going public. Firms involved in an acquisition can be 
either acquirers (companies that take over other firms) or acquirees (companies that are 
taken over). Specifically, acquirers can be firms that have already issued IPOs and use 
their shares as payment to acquire other firms, i.e., conducting an IPO in preparation 
for acquiring other companies in the future (Celikyurt, Sevilir, & Shivdasani, 2010), or 
firms that use acquisition as a way of going public, i.e., going public by acquiring public 
companies, as introduced in Subchapter 1.3 (Sjostrom Jr, 2007). Acquirees in this 
context have already conducted IPOs with the aim of being taken over in a reverse 
merger, as the shell companies, i.e., conducting IPO in preparation for being acquired 
by other companies in the future (C. M. Lee et al., in press). 
For acquirers, as previously stated, empirical evidence from a survey of 336 CFOs 
from companies with different IPO status showed that the main motivation for firms 
going public is to acquire other firms (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). Additionally, a follow-
up study was conducted focusing on the 87 companies (of the 336 surveyed) that 
successfully conducted IPOs from 2000 to 2002. Prior to July 2004, 159 acquisitions 
took place, and in 141 of those cases, IPO companies were the acquirers. When 
comparing these IPO companies to the benchmark companies in the industry, the results 
showed that IPO companies were more likely to be either acquirers or acquirees relative 
to the benchmark companies: IPO companies were the acquirers in 141 cases, while the 
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corresponding figure for the benchmark companies was 96; IPO companies were 
acquirees in 18 cases versus 17 for benchmark companies. Thus, it can be assumed that 
conducting an IPO might encourage involvement in acquisition activities, on either side 
of the transaction. Conducting an IPO helps potential acquirers to facilitate a new type 
of payment in addition to the traditional payment, such as cash or fixed assets. 
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003; Travlos, 1987). Empirical findings have indicated that, 
indeed, the shares raised during IPOs are usually used as payment in acquisitions (Brau, 
Francis, & Kohers, 2003).  
Regarding potential acquirees, Zingales (1995) was the first to suggest that an IPO 
is preparation for a future sale. He argued that going public could help the owners to 
establish a market price for the company, thereby maximizing the proceeds from an 
acquisition. Further statistical evidence on companies issuing IPOs in preparation for 
being purchased is presented by Pagano et al. (1998). Using a sample of 12,528 Italian 
IPO companies from 1982 to 1992, they found that three years after the IPO, 13.6 
percent of their sample sold the controlling stake in the company to an outsider, and the 
turnover rate in the control over IPO companies was twice that for Italian companies in 
general from 1980 to 1990.  
To conclude, the acquisition perspective provides important reasons for 
conducting an IPO because the IPO makes companies more likely to take over another 
company or be taken over. Statistical evidence provided by Brau, Couch, and Sutton 
(2012) showed that engaging in acquisitions might be one of the main explanations for 
the IPO underperformance phenomenon, which has also been explained by many other 
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scholars from different perspectives (see Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Loughran 
& Vijh, 1997). Specifically, their sample consists of 3,574 firms that completed IPOs 
from 1985 to 2003; for firms that acquired other firms in the first year after an IPO, the 
mean three-year adjusted abnormal return is -15.6 percent, compared to 5.9 percent for 
IPO firms that were not involved in acquisitions (Brau et al., 2012). One conventional 
explanation for this result is the hubris hypothesis advanced by Roll (1986), which 
argues that decision makers in acquiring companies tend to be overconfident and thus 
overpay for target companies, which directly leads to underperformance post 
acquisition. This hypothesis indicates that executives’ psychological factors are vital to 
a company’s performance in the long run, and related psychological mechanisms such 
as overconfidence will be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
2.3 Insider group perspective 
In addition to the reasons proposed by the capital structure perspective and the 
acquisition perspective, many studies suggest that firms pursue an IPO to advances the 
interests of insider groups, and these studies can be regarded as advancing as the insider 
group perceptive. As Brau (2012) noted, these interests can be: to cash out (X. Liu & 
Ritter, 2010), to increase compensation (Beatty & Zajac, 1994), or to simply 
accumulate personal fortune and prestige (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010).  
The insider group includes investors who obtain inside information on an IPO firm, 
such as institutional investors (e.g., venture capitalists and investment banks), 
individuals (e.g., top managers and executives), or interest groups (e.g., shareholders 
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and board members) (Bradley, Jordan, Yi, & Roten, 2001; Brav & Gompers, 2003).  
Venture capitalists invest in small startup firms that have limited historical 
performance information (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Findings have indicated that many 
IPO companies have been supported by venture capitalists; for instance, from 2001 to 
2013, an average of 41 percent of IPOs were supported by venture capitalists (Ritter, 
2014b). Going public has been considered an exit strategy for venture capitalists, 
especially at the stage when a firm only consumes instead of generates capital (B. S. 
Black & Gilson, 1998). Specifically, evidence has been found that insiders attempt to 
sell IPO shares in the secondary market to cash out (Ang & Brau, 2003). Other than 
stock prices, the main difference between selling IPO shares in the primary market and 
the secondary market is that the net proceeds from selling in the primary market go 
directly to the issuing firm, while the net proceeds from selling in the secondary market 
go directly to the shareholders who sell the shares (Ang & Brau, 2003). Selling IPO 
shares in the secondary market can be considered one of the most effective ways to cash 
out (I. Lee, 1997). Because insiders possess prior information on the company in 
question, outsiders typically regard their selling behaviors as a signal that the shares are 
opportunistically overpriced (Brau et al., 2007). As a result, insiders’ cash-out 
behaviors are often perceived as a negative signal for potential investors, especially 
when the selling comes from individuals such as top managers and executives. 
Statistical evidence indicates that during 1980s and 1990s, 23 percent of German IPO 
shares and 67 percent of Portuguese IPO shares were sold by insiders in the secondary 
market as a way to cash out (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001b). This empirical evidence 
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supports the notion that the cash-out behavior exists in different countries, and thus will 
be considered one of the reasons for conducting IPO according to the insider 
perspective. Furthermore, insiders’ selling behaviors have been found to be correlated 
with long-term IPO underperformance (Brau et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, conducting IPO can benefit top managers and executives who do not 
want to cash out while simultaneously benefitting interest groups such as shareholders 
and board members. For top managers and executives, if their commissions are 
correlated with stock performance, they might benefit from strong stock performance. 
This is because, from the conventional finance perspective, stock prices can objectively 
reflect firms’ intrinsic value (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Wruck, 1989). On the one hand, 
going public is considered an additional way for the board to measure executives' 
performance; on the other hand, stocks are usually used as a means of incentivizing 
executives, such as through stock options (Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000). Furthermore, 
a previous study has shown that stock prices are directly correlated with executives’ 
compensation (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993). This compensation scheme was argued to 
be an effective method to increase executives’ performance (Murphy, 2010) and as a 
means of reducing agency costs (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Hence, from the perspective 
of board members and shareholders, conducting an IPO is beneficial because it 
incentivizes executive performance and decreases agency costs; from the executives’ 
perspective, conducting an IPO creates an alternative means of measuring their 
performance and increases the likelihood of increasing their personal wealth.  
To conclude, based on all of the reasons for conducting an IPO according to above 
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three perspectives, the importance of IPO issuance has changed over time. Beginning 
from the conventional capital structure perspective, which argues that the level of equity 
does not necessarily influence a firm’s value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), to the 
position that external equity financing should be considered the option of last resort 
when raising capital (Myers & Majluf, 1984), to the internet bubble when the IPO 
market boomed (1999 to 2000), and finally, to the studies showing that conducting an 
IPO facilitates acquisitions (Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Brau et al., 2003), these 
developments indicate that conducting an IPO has become increasingly important in 
mainstream opinion. An IPO involves the interests of many parties, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. As IPO-related laws and regulations become increasingly 
stringent, the interests of all parties will also be better protected, despite the speculative 
intentions and desires on the part of some inside group members to cash out. The 
following subchapter offers a brief introduction of the IPO process and how other 
parties’ interests are protected from speculative insiders. 
3. IPO Process and Lockup Period 
The IPO process begins with preparing for the issuance and continues until shares 
are made available to public investors in the stock market; underwriters and issuers are 
active parties throughout the process (Shefrin, 2002). The details of the 7 phases of IPO 
issuance will be introduced in Subchapter 2.3 of Chapter 4. Hence, only four key steps 
will be presented here, using the IPO process in the U.S. as an example. First, issuers 
and underwriters apply to the SEC to secure approval of the IPO. The application 
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includes a preliminary prospectus containing the anticipated initial price, number of 
shares, and other information on the company’s business (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015c). Second, underwriters conduct the main task, namely, launching 
a market campaign, or roadshow. The purpose of this step is to create a market for the 
new shares and acquire information on investors’ willingness to buy the shares (Ritter, 
2011). Third, a quiet period takes place, during which the issuer and underwriters are 
not allowed to publish any information on the issuer (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015d). Fourth, underwriters and issuers issue the final prospectus 
containing the offering price and allocation of shares (Shefrin, 2002). Thereafter, new 
issues become effective and are sold in the secondary market.  
After IPO shares begin to trade in the secondary market, as previously mentioned, 
some IPO-related laws and regulations protect the interests of different parties from 
speculative insider groups. Additionally, because most investors who receive a large 
number of initial shares are insiders, such as top executives, board members, and 
institutional investors, such as investment bankers and venture capitalists, the concept 
of the lockup agreement was created as a restriction to prevent large shareholders from 
engaging in flipping activities for a certain period of time (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015b). This pre-specified period is called the lockup period, which lasts 
from 90 days to 365 days beginning from the issuance of an IPO (Field & Hanka, 2001).  
However, studies have shown that the market consistently reacts negatively during 
the lockup period. Significant negative abnormal returns were observed after the 
expiration of the lockup period using a sample of 2,529 firms from 1988 to 1997; the 
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negative abnormal returns were concentrated among IPO firms supported by venture 
capitalists (Bradley et al., 2001). A similar result of significant negative returns around 
the time window of the expiration of the lockup period was found by Brau, Carter, 
Christophe, and Key (2004) using a sample of 5,720 IPOs from 1988 to 1998. This 
result, in my opinion, might be the result of deviations between the original intention 
of establishing the lockup agreement and the investors’ interpretation of the lockup 
agreement. The lockup agreement was created to protect outside investors from bearing 
the risk created by inside investors’ flipping activities due to information asymmetry 
(Brav & Gompers, 2003; Hölmstrom, 1979). However, investors might be prone to 
perceive the lockup period as a signal of adverse selection, whereby inside investors in 
low-quality firms are likely to cash out once the lockup period has expired (Brau, 
Lambson, & McQueen, 2005). As a result, it is considered likely that the price of IPOs 
will decline as the end of lockup period approaches (Brav & Gompers, 2000). Thus 
Brau et al. (2005) proposed that the lockup period should be shorter for firms that are 
more risky and more transparent. 
To conclude, the abovementioned four steps primary describe the part of the IPO 
process during which issuers and underwriters are the most active parties, and the 
lockup period was originally designed to protect all parties’ interests. The details of 
how underwriters and issuers collaborate in each step, how each step might be related 
to IPO phenomena, i.e., underpricing and underperformance, and an extended 
discussion of the lockup period will be further presented in Chapter 4. 
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4. IPO Phenomena 
There are several phenomena that emerge with the appearance of an IPO, and these 
phenomena have attracted considerable attention from investors and scholars. These 
phenomena include severe underpricing of the initial shares in the short term, frequent 
flipping activities after the initial date and the general underperformance of IPO 
companies in the long term. (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Asquith, Jones, & Kieschnick, 1998; 
Boehmer & Fishe, 2000; Field & Hanka, 2001; Ritter & Welch, 2002; Zheng & Li, 
2008). Of these three phenomena, in my opinion, underpricing and underperformance 
should be considered as the drivers of flipping activities, for two reasons. First, 
underpricing creates a large amount of wealth in a short period of time because stock 
prices in the secondary market are significantly higher than the initial prices, especially 
for IPO shares with considerable underpricing. This rapid surge of wealth encourages 
investors to sell the IPO shares and realize the gains. Hence, flipping activities occur 
due to the urge to realize gains. Second, underperformance leads to the decline in long-
term stock prices, and such declines provoke fear among IPO shareholders and make 
them reluctant to hold IPO shares for long. Hence, flipping activities occur due to the 
fear of future loss. Moreover, they can be understood to be driven by the basic IPO 
phenomena, underpricing and underperformance, which affect IPO performance in 
both the short and long term. As a result, this dissertation will focus on the IPO 
phenomena of underpricing and underperformance. On the one hand, how issuers, 
underwriters and investors contribute to underpricing and underperformance during the 
IPO process will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively; on the other hand, 
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these phenomena will be further explained from both the financial and psychological 
perspectives throughout this dissertation. 
4.1 Short-term underpricing 
IPO underpricing describes the phenomenon whereby the short-term return on IPO 
shares, especially the first-day return, is generally positive (Ibbotson, 1975). The first-
day return, which is calculated as the percentage change between the closing price on 
the initial date and the initial price, is the most frequently used method for measuring 
the extent of underpricing (Loughran & McDonald, 2013). The underpricing 
phenomenon was first documented in 1970, where the appearance of underpricing was 
reported as taking place in a “systematic fashion” (p. 320) among newly issued shares 
(Stoll & Curley, 1970). Thereafter, underpricing became increasingly pronounced and 
reached its peak during the internet bubble (1999 to 2000). Specifically, from 1998 to 
2000, the average first-day return in a sample of 389 U.S. IPO companies was 81.85 
percent (Ritter & Welch, 2002). From 1986 to 2003, which covers the internet bubble, 
the average first-day return in a sample of 797 U.S. IPO companies was 46.2 percent 
(Cai, Lee, & Valero, 2010). Updated results indicate that the average first-day return in 
a sample of 1,343 U.S. IPO companies was approximately 13 percent from 2001 to 
2013 (Ritter, 2014c). One of the canonical examples of underpricing is the case of 
Netscape Communication Corp. Within 18 months of founding the company, the top 
executives conducted an IPO on 9 August, 1995 at a price of $28 per share. On that 
same day, the closing price was $58 per share, yielding a first-day return of 107 percent 
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(DeLong & Magin, 2006).  
Underpricing might have several side effects on the newly issued shares and thus 
on the issuing companies. Speculators from both inside and outside the company are 
highly likely to flip the initial shares. The term flip, sometimes also referred as spin, 
describes the immediate selling of shares that have been received before the IPO is 
made publicly available in the stock market. (R. Aggarwal, 2003; X. Liu & Ritter, 2010). 
In the case of Netscape, flipping or spinning would be initial stockholders selling the 
shares, which they received before the initial day (August 9, 1995), shortly after 
Netscape went public. Instances with such high first-day returns are typically observed 
when the prices of the shares increase rapidly. For the initial shareholders of IPOs, a 
high first-day return creates the opportunity to obtain considerable returns in a short 
period of time, which incentivizes initial shareholders to flip the shares (DuCharme, 
Rajgopal, & Sefcik, 2001). Mild flipping activities can increase the trading volume in 
the secondary market, increase the liquidity of the initial shares, and may even boost 
the price of the initial shares (Boehmer & Fishe, 2000; Fishe, 2002). However, when 
flipping activity becomes excessive, there will be more supply than demand of IPO 
shares in the secondary market (R. Aggarwal, 2003). Additionally, widespread flipping 
activities are likely to be amplified by an information cascade or herd behavior. In an 
information cascade, late investors make their decisions based on those of early 
investors (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). Herd behavior describes the 
phenomenon whereby individuals make decisions according to the decision of the 
group, regardless of their own information or intentions (Shiller, 1995). Both the 
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information cascade and herd behavior are more likely to occur when there is little 
available information in the market. Hence, in the case of an IPO, where little historical 
information can be used as a reference and massive flipping activities combine with an 
information cascade and herd behavior, the fragile new issues are highly likely to be 
undermined by the normal price performance occurring in the secondary market. 
Details on information cascades and herd behaviors among investors will be further 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Long-term underperformance 
Long-term underperformance indicates that IPO shares tend to exhibit worse 
performance relative to non-IPO shares in the long term (P. Schultz, 2003). Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) documented the poor performance of IPO companies from 1970 to 
1990, with a 5-percent average annual return 5 years after an IPO. Holding all other 
factors constant, an equal investment in non-IPO companies would generate an average 
compound annual return of 12 percent. Another example of the underperformance 
phenomenon is that a three-year investment in IPOs at the end of the initial date would 
leave an investor 83 cents on the dollar, relative to what he or she would have earned 
by investing in a group of matching non-IPO firms over the same period of time (Ritter, 
1991). Scholars have attempted to explain underperformance from various perspectives. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) argued that underperformance is not specifically an IPO 
effect but also exists in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), or secondary equity offerings, 
which are offerings issued by already publicly owned companies (Marquardt & 
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Wiedman, 1998; Mola & Loughran, 2004; Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 1995).  
One of the explanations for underperformance is that it results from asymmetric 
information and irrational investors; low-quality firms exploit the hot issue market 
created by high-quality IPO firms, as previously stated (Ritter, 1991). Brav and 
Gompers (1997) provided other empirical evidence for underperformance, reporting 
IPOs that supported by venture capitalists did not significantly underperform; in 
contrast, small IPOs that were not supported by venture capitalists generally 
experienced significant underperformance. Details of this study will be discussed in 
Subchapter 1.1.1 of Chapter 5, which introduces the role of venture capitalists.  
Other explanations of underperformance have also been offered. For instance, 
frequent acquisitions have been regarded as a reason for long-term underperformance 
(Brau et al., 2012). Interestingly, Gompers and Lerner (2003) argued that observations 
of underperformance were due to differences in calculation methods. They stated that 
underperformance was no longer observed when using cumulative abnormal returns 
instead of event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns, suggesting that 
underperformance is potentially an artifact of calculation, rather than a fact.  
To conclude, the primary contribution of this chapter was to introduce basic 
concepts involved in public equity funding and IPO issuance. It began with a general 
introduction to the methods used to raising public equity, which include IPOs, DPOs 
and RMs. It also described the reasons for raising public equity through IPO from the 
perspectives of capital structure, acquisition and insider group interest. Then, the IPO 
process was presented together with the lockup period, after which the two key IPO 
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phenomena were discussed.  
When companies consider financing in general, especially thorough an IPO, the 
decision-making process they employ is described by the flowchart in Figure 3, which 
also depicts the main structure of this chapter. The next chapter will present further 
analysis on the interplay among the three main parties involved in IPOs from the 
finance perceptive. Specifically, it will introduce concepts from agency theory; it will 
analyze the interests of issuers, underwriters, and investors and their impact on IPO 
phenomena; and, finally the asymmetric information among these three parties will be 
explained. 
 Figure 3 General decision making process of financing.  
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Chapter 2 The interplay of parties involved in IPOs 
As stated in Chapter 1, the entire IPO process involves three parties, namely, 
issuers, underwriters and investors (Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006). These parties not 
only act separately but also interact with one another in different phases of the IPO 
process, especially in the stage around the initial date, i.e., in the short term of the IPO 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002). The mechanism describing the interplay among these parties 
aligns with agency theory and can be specifically explained by multiple agency theory 
(Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008). In this chapter, traditional agency 
theory will be first explained as the theoretical basis, and multiple agency relationship 
will be then discussed together with the IPO process. Second, the interests of different 
parties will be described to allow for further interpretation. Third, the asymmetric 
information between these parties, which is believed to be one of the important factors 
influencing certain IPO phenomena, such as underpricing (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 
1989), will be elaborated. The overall goal of this chapter is, on the one hand, to create 
the concept that each party is not acting alone and, on the other hand, to clarify the 
structure of interactions among these parties. Such clarifications are also necessary to 
further understand IPO phenomena. 
1. Agency Theory in IPOs 
In an initial public offering process, different parties are involved in various 
agency relationships. For instance, the underwriter, on the one hand, can be the agency 
of issuers while issuing new shares, and on the other hand, can be the agency of 
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institutional investors while distributing new shares (Arthurs et al., 2008; Kosnik & 
Shapiro, 1997). It is necessary to disentangle all the possible agency relationships in 
order to analyze the interplay between the three parties, and to interpret their further 
influence on the IPO process and specific IPO short-term phenomena.  
1.1 Traditional agency theory 
An agency relationship is defined as a contract involving an agent making 
decisions on behalf of a principal in a specific domain (Jensen & Meckling, 1979; S. A. 
Ross, 1973). When both parties in an agency relationship, namely the agent and 
principal, have the tendency to maximize their own utilities, divergences between the 
agent’s behavior and the principal’s best interests arise, thereby generating agency 
problems and conflicts (Edelen, Evans, & Kadlec, 2012; Wright & Ferris, 1997). 
Specifically, in the capital market, it is believed that the portfolio owners’ (principals’) 
investment risk can be hedged by investing in diversified firms (Fama, 1980). However, 
when the portfolios reach certain sizes, it becomes challenging for the owners to 
monitor each company in which they have invested. As a result, for the owners to 
manage their companies or portfolios effectively, modern corporate management 
requires a separation between control and ownership (Fama & Jensen, 1983). A direct 
consequence of this separation is that professional managers (agents) control and 
manage the company instead of its owners. This might lead to situations in which 
conflicts of interest arise between managers and owners, namely, where managers tend 
to use their authority to maximize their personal benefits, instead of those of owners. 
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For instance, a CEO (agent) might try to avoid a merger in order to secure his or her 
own position, while the merger is in the shareholder (principal)’s best interest (Beatty 
& Zajac, 1994; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
A traditional agency relationship typically consists of one agent and one principal, 
and conflicts of interest only exist between these two roles (Eisenhardt, 1989). While 
this relationship forms the basis of the principal-agent model, the development and 
growth of modern corporations means that a one-to-one agency relationship no longer 
accurately describes real-world situations. Many more parties are now involved, 
especially when the company is in its initial public phase (Bruton et al., 2010).  
The following subchapter discusses the role of different agents in an initial public 
offering from the perspective of multiple agency theory, in conjunction with their 
influence on specific IPO phenomena such as underpricing.  
1.2 Multiple agency theory 
Board of directors are recruited by the owners to monitor top managers and to 
protect owners’ interests. In other words, the basic function of the board is to ensure 
that all significant decisions made by top management are intended to maximize the 
owners’ interests, in other words, to manage the company effectively and efficiently 
according to the corporate visions and long-term goals (Fama, 1980). Thus, 
theoretically the board should be structured in various ways when companies are in 
different phases of their lifespans. In the case of initial public offerings, due to its 
complex process and frequent interactions with the outside market, to ensure adequate 
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monitoring throughout the process, it is reasonable to include relevant outsiders in the 
board of directors, in addition to the inside board members. As a result, the relevant 
outsiders who play significant roles in the IPO process and thus might be involved in 
the board according to the existing literature are summed as follow: 1) outside directors, 
who are independent of the competition among firms’ top managers and thus can be 
regarded as professional referees (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983); 2) outside 
stockholders, whose conscientiousness in monitoring the firm is presumably positively 
related to the size of their equity stakes (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988); 3) venture 
capitalists, who offer the capital to support the IPO and whose interests are aligned with 
the firm’s performance in the short term, and thus tend to be vigilant in monitoring 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994); and 4) underwriters, whose interests are also aligned with IPO 
companies’ performance in the short term and hence the same argument regarding 
vigilance can be extended as well (Arthurs et al., 2008). Additionally, separating the 
roles of CEO and chairman of the board is considered as the most important method to 
enhance the board’s power with respect to the top management team and thereby deliver 
improved firm performance (Lorsch & Young, 1990). When all of the abovementioned 
parties, whose interests occasionally conflict, are represented on the board, more than 
one principal and agent is involved in the initial public offering process, and thus a 
more complex agency relationship arises (Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).  
This type of agency relationship, which differs from traditional agency theory that 
only considers one principal and agent, can be examined using multiple agency theory 
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(Arthurs et al., 2008). Multiple agency theory illustrates that different ownership 
constituents (principals) have different types of interests, which lead to various decision 
orientations among the different parties on the board (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002). Specifically, in the case of initial public offerings, these diverse 
parties (agencies) can be underwriters, venture capitalists and issuers. In the following 
sections, various interests, decision orientations and the potential interest conflicts of 
these parties will be explained. 
2. Interests of Parties and Their Effects on Short-Term IPO Phenomena 
As stated above, issuers, underwriters and investors are all involved in the IPO 
process, and potential conflicts of interest might occur during different phases in the 
process. For instance, one of the most frequently studied IPO phenomena is 
underpricing, as stated in Chapter 1. Among the three parties, underwriters might 
intentionally set a lower initial price to compensate their preferred institutional 
investors; however, theoretically, such underpricing might be detrimental to the 
interests of issuers because if the shares had been normally priced, they would have 
raised more capital or fewer shares could have been issued (Barry, 1989; DuCharme et 
al., 2001). Another example is flipping activities, which, on the one hand, are beneficial 
to investors who sell shares shortly after the initial date; however, on the other hand, 
excessive flipping activities might cause constant price declines due to an information 
cascade, which is detrimental to issuer’s interests (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Bikhchandani et 
al., 1992).The three parties’ interests have the strongest interactions around the initial 
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date, i.e., in the short term after the IPO. As a result, in this subchapter, underpricing, 
together with its effect, namely, flipping activities, will be explained as the main IPO 
phenomena, from the perspective of the respective interests of issuers, underwriters and 
investors, and the possible agency conflicts among these roles will be analyzed.  
2.1 Issuers’ interests 
As stated in Chapter 1, there are several reasons for issuers to raise public equity. 
In my opinion, issuers with various reasons for going public may also differ in their 
focal interests. For instance, for issuers seeking to readjust the capital structure, their 
focal interest would be selling all the initial shares and raising the total amount of equity 
they need; issuers seeking to merge with and acquire other firms after the IPO would 
avoid having their control being severely diluted by IPO and thus not issue more shares 
than necessary (Chahine, 2008; Smart & Zutter, 2003). As a result, these different 
focuses can lead to different interests on the part of issuers and might lead to different 
reactions to a given phenomenon. In the following, underpricing and flipping will be 
explained based on issuers’ interests according to both the psychological and financial 
disciplines. 
2.1.1 Underpricing from the issuers’ perspective. 
When the underpricing phenomenon is viewed from the issuers’ perspective, it can 
be vividly referred to as a situation in which issuers “leave money on the table” 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2002, p. 413). The amount of underpricing is typically significant 
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and thus should be considered as an indirect cost of the IPO (Ritter, 2014c). For instance, 
companies that went public between 1990 and 1998 underpriced their initial shares by 
$27 billion, which is twice as much as the $13 billion in fees paid to underwriters and 
three times as much as the $8 billion in profit they had generated in the fiscal year 
before the IPO (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). Based on the economic interests of issuers, 
issuers who wish to maintain control of the firm would like to raise as much capital as 
possible, or avoid issuing more shares than necessary, to prevent their ownership from 
being diluted (Alavi et al., 2008; Cheffins, 2008). As underwriters are typically the 
group that suggests initial prices, it appears reasonable that after an IPO with a 
substantial amount of underpricing, issuers will attempt to avoid further cooperation 
with such underwriters that had significantly underestimated the value of their initial 
shares. However, an interesting finding by Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) 
indicated that issuers actually preferred a large amount of underpricing. They studied 
whether issuers switch underwriters when issuing a seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
within 3 years after their IPO to measure whether issuers were satisfied with their 
underwriters after the IPO; they used first-day returns to measure the level of 
underpricing. As previously stated, first-day returns are defined as the percentage 
change from the offering price to the closing price on the initial day (Loughran & 
McDonald, 2013), thus the larger this value is, the greater the extent of underpricing is, 
and the more money is left on the table. Specifically, the results from Krigman et al. 
(2001) showed that issuers who retained underwriters had a 14.2 percent average first-
day return, which was twice that of issuers who changed underwriters, and 15 issuers 
50 
 
with 60 percent first-day returns did not switch underwriters. As a result, contrary to 
what one might assume, the likelihood of retaining an underwriter is positively related 
to the amount of underpricing.  
One possible explanation for this phenomenon offered by Krigman et al. (2001) is 
prospect theory. When making decisions under risk, individuals are more likely to 
exhibit a series of specified behaviors that cannot be explained by the traditional utility 
theory, such as the certainty effect or reference point effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Shefrin & Statman, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
The certainty effect describes the observation that individuals generally 
overweight outcomes that will occur with certainty. This effect was first observed in an 
experiment conducted by Maurice Allais in 1952 and was subsequently known as the 
Allais Paradox (MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979). Applied to the case of underpricing, 
issuers are aware from historical experience of other IPOs that greater underpricing 
generally results in greater demand for new issues, and thus a relatively low offering 
price will likely guarantee that all of a new issue will be sold and all the funding the 
issuer requires will be successfully raised. Specifically, issuers take selling all the 
shares as the certain outcome, and the amount of underpricing as the uncertain outcome 
because the amount of money left on the table will remain unclear until the end of the 
initial day. As a result, in accordance with the certainty effect, issuers are likely to 
pursue the certain outcome at the expense of uncertain outcomes. In other words, issuers 
would like to sell all of the shares regardless of the amount of underpricing. 
The reference point is derived from prospect theory. In short, it is a point above 
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which people become risk adverse and below which people become risk seeking 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). A comprehensive literature review on the reference 
point can be found in Baucells, Weber, and Welfens (2011). In the case of an IPO, 
issuers will announce an initial price range before the shares go public, stating the price 
range at which they want to sell their initial shares (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015c). As a result, it is reasonable to assume that the reference point of 
issuers is a price within the initial price range. As argued by Loughran and Ritter (2002), 
the reference point for issuers is more likely to be the median of the initial price range 
than the historical cost of issuance. When a share is underpriced, it means that the stock 
price after the initial date will be above the reference point; for shares with a negative 
first-day return, it means that the price will drop below the reference point and issuers 
will be strongly loss-averse. Furthermore, they argued, using a different insight from 
prospect theory, that when two related outcomes occur, people tend to treat them as one, 
as Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed in their cumulative prospect theory.  
Cumulative prospect theory not only explains why the same amount of losses and 
gains trigger different levels of emotional response but also might explain a different 
aspect of issuers’ opinions of underpricing. Specifically, in the case of IPO underpricing, 
issuers tend to combine two outcomes: the first outcome is the bad outcome whereby 
control is diluted to a small extent (due to underpricing, more shares are issued than 
necessary); the second outcome is the good outcome whereby the net worth of the 
company increased to a large extent (due to the increased stock price). As a result, after 
combining these two outcomes, issuers perceive underpricing as a good outcome and 
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are pleased by it (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). 
To conclude, underpricing can benefit issuers psychologically, and for those 
issuers who hold a certain amount of initial shares, underpricing can also benefit them 
monetarily. However, what the extent of underpricing should be and how to constrain 
the amount of underpricing within a reasonable range represent core issues that need to 
be addressed. Although, on the one hand complaints about underwriters can be filed 
with the SEC when the initial offering price set by underwriters is too low relative to 
the opening market price, it remains possible that underwriters will exploit their 
superior information and recommend an issuing price that includes an excessive amount 
of underpricing (Baron & Holmström, 1980); on the other hand, it appears that issuers 
are not strongly opposed to substantial underpricing as one would reasonably assume 
(Krigman et al., 2001; Loughran & Ritter, 2002). To ensure that the extent of 
underpricing is moderate, issuers should not only monitor stock market information but 
also separate these two outcomes, namely, perceive good news and bad news separately. 
2.1.2 Flipping activity from the issuers’ perspective. 
Flipping activity, also known as spinning activity, as stated in Chapter 1, describes 
a phenomenon whereby initial investors sell IPO shares shortly after the initial date 
(Bayley, Lee, & Walter, 2006; X. Liu & Ritter, 2010; Maynard, 2001). There are two 
main questions related to flipping activities after the initial date in the IPO context. First, 
are investors more likely to flip favorable shares, i.e., shares with a high first-day return, 
or do they prefer to flip unfavorable shares, i.e., shares with little, zero or negative first-
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day return? Second, do IPO shares benefit from flipping activities? If they do, to what 
extent?  
Regarding the first question, the extent of flipping activities differs between hot 
IPOs and cold IPOs, where hot IPOs have a considerable first-day return, i.e., are 
severely underpriced, and cold IPOs have a low or nearly zero first-day return, i.e., they 
are underpriced to a small extent (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). For instance, R. Aggarwal 
(2003) categorized her IPO sample into very cold, cold, warm and very hot IPOs. For 
very cold IPOs, the average first day return is zero or less; for cold IPOs, the average 
first day return is between zero and 10 percent; warm IPOs’ first day return is between 
10 percent and 60 percent, and the very hot IPOs have an average first day return above 
60 percent. Distinguishing between hot IPOs and cold IPOs helps to differentiate 
favorable IPOs from unfavorable IPOs; doing so is useful because scholars have 
different opinions regarding whether hot or cold IPOs are flipped more frequently. 
Some studies have argued that cold IPOs are flipped faster by institutional investors 
because shortly after the initial date, the stock price remains relatively high for the 
reason that most underwriters will be the market maker when IPOs are cold and 
maintain a high price level by purchasing back the shares and making the market (Ellis, 
Michaely, & O’Hara, 2000; P. H. Schultz & Zaman, 1994). Other studies have argued 
that hot IPOs are flipped more often when the frequency of filliping activity is measured 
as the shares flipped as a percentage of shares offered; the flipping frequency of cold 
IPOs seemed higher when it is measured by shares flipped as a percentage of trading 
volume. The argument of these studies is that the reason for this finding is not simply 
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that cold IPOs are flipped substantially more frequently than hot IPOs; rather, cold IPOs 
have very little trading volume compared with hot IPOs (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Krigman, 
Shaw, & Womack, 1999). For instance, R. Aggarwal (2003) showed that, for very hot 
IPOs, warm IPOs, cold IPOs and very cold IPOs, the average shares flipped as a 
percentage of trading volume is approximately 15 percent, 17 percent, 19 percent and 
21 percent, respectively. However, the average shares flipped as a percentage of the 
shares offered is approximately 10 percent for very cold IPOs and 30 percent for very 
hot IPOs. Her study suggested that the flipping frequency is a relative concept that 
produced various results depending on the factors to which the shares flipped were 
compared.  
A simplified example based on the result of R. Aggarwal (2003) can be made 
concerning the two broad types of IPOs: Firm A issued 100 initial shares, which turned 
out to be a hot issue after the initial date; Firm B also issued 100 initial shares, which 
turned out to be a cold issue after the initial date. Shortly after the initial date, initial 
shareholders of Firm A flipped a total of 30 shares, which were traded 10 times during 
a given period. Over the same period of time, initial shareholders of Firm B flipped a 
total of 15 shares, which were traded 2 times. As a result, for Firm A, the shares flipped 
as a percentage of trading volume is 30/ (30*10) = 30 percent, while the shares flipped 
as a percentage of the shares offered is 30/100 = 30 percent. For firm B, the shares 
flipped as a percentage of trading volume is 15/ (15*2) = 50 percent, while the shares 
flipped a percentage of the shares offered is 15/100 = 15 percent. As a result, in my 
opinion, a direct conclusion concerning whether high flipping frequency is associated 
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with favorable IPOs or whether favorable IPOs are associated with high flipping 
frequency might be misleading. To state the question clearly, in this section, 
shareholders who are allocated IPO shares before the initial date are defined as initial 
market shareholders, and shareholders who purchase the shares after the initial date on 
the secondary stock market are defined as aftermarket shareholders. Based on the 
previously mentioned results, it is the case that, for hot IPO shares, initial market 
shareholders flip a larger number of initial shares.  
Thus, an interesting question can be proposed: do hot IPOs create a high volume 
of flipping activity by initial market shareholders, or does the high amount of flipping 
activities by initial market shareholders create hot IPOs? This question concerns the 
same central issue as the second question proposed at the beginning of this section: how 
much do issuers and IPOs benefit from flipping activity?  
Several studies report that flipping activities by the initial market shareholders 
help to create liquidity in the secondary market and encourage price discovery for IPOs 
(R. Aggarwal, 2003; Fishe, 2002; Krigman et al., 1999). Intuitively, in an extreme 
situation in which no shares will be sold by the initial shareholders immediately after 
the initial date, i.e., when no flipping activities occur, there would be no shares available 
for trading in the secondary market, and thus no underpricing will occur. This would 
lead to a cold IPO. In addition to the disadvantages of cold IPOs stated above, Krigman 
et al. (1999) found that one year after the initial date, cold IPOs continued to be 
perceived as unfavorable by investors, while they continue to regard hot IPOs as 
favorable. The authors also stated that flipping activity was a natural reaction to the 
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underpriced IPOs and that poor IPO performance is not a result of flipping. However, 
other scholars, institutional investors and underwriters have offered numerous critiques 
of flipping activity and flippers for creating the unstable market prices for IPOs (Carter 
& Dark, 1993; Maher, 1990; Stojkovic, 2015). For instance, Stojkovic (2015) argued 
that from 1986 to 2013, the average issuer losses from flipping activities equaled $4.8 
million; Carter and Dark (1993) argued that the price performance of IPOs after the 
initial date is negatively correlated with trading volume, suggesting that flipping 
activities are detrimental to IPO performance in the secondary market.  
In my opinion, as R. Aggarwal (2003) noted, trading volume does not necessarily 
reflect the amount of flipping activity. Trading volume should be positively correlated 
with the popularity of an IPO, rather than how extensively it has been flipped (Kaustia, 
2004; Krigman et al., 1999). From the market perspective, flipping activities increase 
the shares’ liquidity, and high liquidity will in turn increase transaction costs (Amihud 
& Mendelson, 1991). Thus, several studies have noted that frequent traders who execute 
multiple trades per day tend to lose in the stock market in the long run due to factors 
such as the high amount of transaction fees and taxes they have to pay or to cognitive 
biases (over confidence, loss-aversion, etc.) (Barber & Odean, 2000; S. S. Lim, 2006). 
Details on frequent trading behavior from the investor perspective will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. From the issuers’ perspective, summarizing the above, moderate flipping 
activities create liquidity, help to develop the market price, increase the popularity of 
IPOs and provide other investors with the opportunity to purchase initial shares (R. 
Aggarwal, 2003; Krigman et al., 1999). However, when the flipping activity exceeds a 
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certain limit and becomes excessive, in other words, when there are too many flippers 
in the market and the amount of flipped shares exceeds the market’s capacity to absorb 
them, flipping activity will have a detrimental effecting, leading to poor stock price 
performance one year after the initial date, considerable capital loss, and other negative 
effects (Krigman et al., 1999; Stojkovic, 2015). 
As a result, it is possible that flipping activity has a reciprocal causal relationship 
with the popularity of an IPO, and from the perspective of the issuers’ interests, flipping 
activity can be beneficial as long as the volume of flipped shares is moderate.  
2.2 Underwriters’ interests 
As stated in Chapter 1, underwriters are professional organizations that help 
issuers to sell their new shares in the stock market (L. H. Fang, 2005). In this subchapter, 
underpricing as the representative short-term IPO phenomenon will be discussed from 
underwriters’ perspective. Flipping activities will not be listed separately because in the 
secondary market, underwriters’ interests become similar to those of institutional 
investors and thus can be represented by either speculative or non-speculative 
institutional investors, which will be discussed in Subchapter 2.3. 
Generally, one of two types of deals is made in the contract between underwriters 
and issuers: a firm commitment deal or a best effort deal (Baron, 1982). The former 
describes a situation in which underwriters purchase all of the initial shares from the 
issuers irrespective of whether all of the shares can be subsequently sold to the public. 
The latter describes a situation in which underwriters do not purchase all of the initial 
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shares; instead, they make their best effort to sell the shares to the public, and the unsold 
shares are then retained by the issuer (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001a). As the type of 
deals is determined before the initial public offering, it is typically difficult to predict 
whether there will be sufficient public purchasers of the initial shares. The effects of 
these two contract types on the underwriters can be interpreted in two perspectives: on 
the one hand, underwriters that select the firm commitment deal will take more risks 
than those who choose the best effort deal, and on the other hand, the firm commitment 
deal will provide underwriters with higher incentives to devote greater effort to 
advertising and selling the shares than the best effort deal (Logue, 1973). 
In most cases, underwriters with high reputation will choose the firm commitment 
deal over the best effort deal (Arthurs et al., 2008). As a result, these underwriters have 
a strong tendency to intentionally encourage underpricing, which entails selling the new 
offerings at a lower price, primarily for the following three reasons.  
First, the more underpriced a new offering is, the less likely undersubscribing is to 
occur. Undersubscribing describes a situation in which the demand from subscribers, 
namely public investors, falls below the supply of shares (Amihud, Hauser, & Kirsh, 
2003). This situation might convey a signal to the market that the initial shares are of 
low quality and after-market performance might be poor (Agarwal, Liu, & Rhee, 2008). 
The most direct result of an undersubscription is that the initial shares become cold 
issues due to the lack of demand. In contrast to hot issues, cold issues, or cold IPOs as 
stated in Subchapter 2.1.2, are defined as initial shares for which the price has fallen 
below, remained the same, or slightly raised above the offering price in the after-market 
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(R. Aggarwal, 2003; Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). Thus, undersubscription results in high 
risk for underwriters who have the firm commitment deal with the issuers, in which 
case they must retain these unfavorable cold issues or offer those to institutional 
investors, which that usually purchase the majority of initial offerings, and with which 
the underwriters wish to maintain a long-term cooperative relationship. Relationship 
between institutional investors and underwriters will be first introduced in the next 
paragraph, and further details about institutional investors will be explained in Chapter 
4. To conclude, underwriters are unlikely to retain the risk caused by possible 
undersubscription, which might either hurt their own interests, or the interests of their 
long-term strategically allied clients, i.e. the institutional investors. Thus, from the 
aspect of preventing undersubscription, underwriters are likely to set a relatively low 
price for the IPOs, i.e. underwriters tend to encourage underpricing (Ritter & Welch, 
2002; Ruud, 1993). 
Second, more extensive underpricing provides a larger payout to institutional 
investors, which are the long-term strategically allied clients of the underwriters, in 
other words, they are the principal in the agency relationship between underwriters and 
themselves (Ritter, 1987). Specifically, in most circumstances, the institutional 
investors are allocated with the initial shares from the underwriters before the issues 
become publicly available on the initial date. Data from R. Aggarwal (2003) showed 
that, on average, underwriters allocate nearly 82 percent of the shares to institutional 
investors in a sample of 617 IPOs, from May 1997 to June 1998. Because of their 
frequent underwriting business, it is important for underwriters to create their own 
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group of institutional investor clients whom they would like to develop a long-term 
cooperating relationships with (Sherman, 2000). The one-shot collaboration between 
underwriters and issuers is relatively temporary compared with the long-term agency 
relationship between underwriters and institutional investors. Although there is a 
possibility of further equity issuance from the issuers several years after the IPO, 
meaning that underwriters and issuers can cooperate more than once, such collaboration 
is relatively limited compared with the fact that issuers might need to cooperate with 
institutional investors multiple times each year due to the number of equity issuance 
projects in which the issuers are participating (Chemmanur, He, & Hu, 2009; 
Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006). As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that 
underwriters have a stronger incentive to maximize the gains of institutional investors 
than those of their short-term clients, namely, the issuers. For an agent with multiple 
principals, in the event that the interests of these principals conflict, the agent typically 
chooses to protect the principal from which he or she can benefit the most (Jensen & 
Smith, 1985; Spiller, 1990). In the case of an IPO, underwriters will consequently 
choose institutional investors over issuers, and this may in turn undermine the 
underwriter’s objectivity in determining a reasonable offering price and lead to direct 
underpricing (Pollock, 2004). One possible psychological explanation for underwriters 
favoring a given group of clients over another is the norm of self-interest, which 
motivates people to act and speak as though they focus more on their own material 
interest than they actually do (D. T. Miller, 1999).    
Third, by underpricing shares, underwriters can increase their potential future 
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cooperation opportunities with issuers. As previously stated, according to prospect 
theory and reference point theory, issuers are not upset when their shares are 
underpriced; on the contrary, they tend to treat this as good news (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). Krigman et al. 
(2001) found that, in their sample, there are relatively few issuers that switched lead 
underwriters from their IPO issuance to subsequent equity issuances (seasoned public 
offerings), only 30 percent. Among these 30 percent, the IPOs of switchers were 
significantly less underpriced than those of non-switchers. Due to this interesting 
reaction on the part of issuers, underwriters have an incentive to underprice IPOs to 
secure further collaboration with issuers.  
Besides these three drives for underwriters which are likely to encourage 
underpricing, an option which is called overallotment option might buffer the shares’ 
price from too extreme raising or falling after the initial date (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 
2001a). The overallotment option is also referred to as the green shoe option1. In the 
U.S., it allows underwriters to purchase an additional 15 percent, which is the up-limit 
imposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), of the shares sold 
in the IPO at the offering price, within 30 days (R. Aggarwal, 2000; Fishe, 2002). In 
other words, underwriters can distribute up to 115 percent of the planned issuance size 
to the primary investors, of which the portion above 100 are shorts and then purchase 
this number of shares on the public stock market after the initial date and make up for 
the short position they created due to the extra issuance. The purpose of such an option 
                                                             
1 This name originated from the name of the company that first used this option, the “Green Shoe Manufacturing 
Company”. 
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is to protect new issues from unstable stock prices. For instance, if the initial offerings 
are cold issues, meaning that investor demand is below the volume of new offerings, 
underwriters’ purchasing behavior after the initial date will drive up demand in the 
secondary market and prevent the stock price from falling below the initial price. In 
such a situation, underwriters have to purchase the stock at the current market price, 
which is likely below or slightly above the initial price in the case of cold issues, while 
they have already received payment from the primary investors before the initial date, 
and thus their risk of cold issues is buffered by exercising the overallotment option (R. 
Aggarwal, 2000). Because the number of shares distributed to the primary investors is 
decided before the initial date, the overallotment option is likely to be employed before 
underwriters know how the market will react to the IPO. As a result, underwriters that 
have already sold a number of shares in excess of the issuance size will attempt to avoid 
excessive underpricing. For instance, assume that the underwriter has sold 1.15 million 
shares of an IPO at the initial price of $20 per share and an issuance size of 1 million. 
If the first-day closing price after the initial date turned was $30 per share, this IPO 
could be considered a hot issue with a first-day return of ($30-$20)/$20 = 50 percent. 
Thus, underwriters would have to pay an additional $10 per share to make up for the 
short position they created before the initial date. Details on the overallotment option 
will be provided in Chapter 4. 
To conclude, the economic and non-economic incentives for underwriters 
encouraging underpricing seem stronger for preventing it, even though theoretically, 
preventing price volatility in the initial shares is one of the most critical functions 
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underwriters should exercise in their agency relationship with issuers. However, if 
underwriters value their own interests and those of their other principal, institutional 
investors, more than the interests of issuers, they will have the tendency to create 
underpricing and then flip. Fortunately, underwriters with good reputations tend to 
distribute shares to institutional investors that are less likely to engage in flipping 
activities (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998). Thus it is very important to select a prestigious 
underwriter that can perform its duties without bias, even in multiple agency 
relationships. Further details about underwriters’ position in the IPO process will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Investors’ interests 
If defined in a broad sense, there are three types of investors involved in the IPO 
process. According to when they invest in an IPO, the first type of investors are those 
who support startup companies, i.e., the issuers, before the underwriters split the capital 
and distribute it into initial shares, which are sold to the primary investors. The typical 
representative of such investors are venture capitalists, whose main tasks are to invest 
in and fund promising startup companies (Fairchild, 2011; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). The second type of investors are primary investors who are 
allocated initial shares before the initial date. According to the literature, in most 
circumstances underwriters will allocate the initial shares to institutional investors or 
individual investors with large amounts of capital. Thus the second type of investors is 
primarily represented by institutional investors (R. Aggarwal, Prabhala, & Puri, 2002; 
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Jenkinson & Jones, 2009b). The third type of investors begins to invest their capital 
when the IPO shares become publicly tradable, i.e., after the initial date. They can be 
both institutional investors and individual investors (Agarwal et al., 2008; Brau et al., 
2007). The following sections will present the interests of these three types of investors. 
2.3.1 Venture capitalists’ interests. 
Venture capitalists generate profits by offering funding to private companies that 
are going public (Lerner, 1994a). Therefore, venture capitalists can be also considered 
as one party that is involved in a multiple agency relationship: on the one hand, they 
are the principals of the new issuing companies that they invested in; on the other hand, 
they are the agents of the principals that invest in their venture capital funds.  
Venture capitalists’ interests have changed over time. Studies from the 1980s 
reported that venture capitalists functioned not only as the capital provider for but also 
as the monitor of the IPO process and share similar interests with the issuers. For 
instance, samples from 1983 to 1987 showed that IPOs supported by venture capitalists 
were significantly less underpriced than other IPOs and that the cost of going public 
was less in the venture-capital-backed group (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Another 
study using the sample from 1978 to 1987 showed similar results relating to the level 
of underpricing. Studies have also show that venture capitalists tend to maintain a 
certain amount of investment in the IPO firms in which they have invested (Barry, 
Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990). Specifically, using a sample of 433 IPOs 
from 1978 to 1987, Gompers (1996) showed that when comparing younger and older 
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venture capitalists, the former tend to encourage the companies they have invested in 
to go public earlier and with a greater amount of underpricing. Additionally, the 
younger venture capitalists tend to remain on the board of directors for a shorter period 
and hold smaller equity shares. Gompers reported that these results were caused by 
young venture capitalists’ desire to create reputation and ensure that IPOs would be 
successful.  
Indeed, at that time, venture capitalists can generate fast wealth in general. Data 
from P. W. Ross and Isenstein (1988) showed that, on average, every dollar invested 
by venture capitalists earns a net cash return of $1.95, with an average holding period 
of 4.2 years (as cited in Lerner, 1994b). Compared with the 5-year interest rate of U.S 
government bonds in 1990, which is approximately 8.2 percent (U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, 2015), generating a nearly 200 percent return over approximately 4 years’ 
time is one of the fastest way to create wealth. In more recent years, the desire to rapidly 
generate wealth has attracted increasing attention from venture capitalists acting as the 
monitor of the IPO process. P. M. Lee and Wahal (2004) found that, the average first-
day return changed significantly over the period from 1980 to 2000, especially during 
the internet bubble (1999 to 2000). Consequently, in their sample covering 20 years, 
venture-capital-backed IPOs tended to exhibit greater underpricing than IPOs that were 
not backed by venture capital. Their cross-sectional results showed that over the 20-
year period considered, young venture capitalists’ desire to establish their reputation 
also weakened. Higher underpricing in general creates a larger amount of future capital 
flows for venture capitalists, and this phenomenon became significantly stronger after 
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1996. This fast-paced public issuance, again, makes cooperation between issuers and 
venture capitalists transitory. Thus, venture capitalists have an incentive to affiliate with 
underwriters to create underpricing, as well as to flip, as they share a common interest 
(Arthurs et al., 2008). When the connection between underwriters and venture 
capitalists is sufficiently strong, there is potential for greater underpricing. 
A general overview about the venture capitalists’ development and changes of 
interests overtime can be found by the book from Gompers and Lerner (2004). They 
have provided supportive results about venture capitalists’ intention to create rapid 
profit by showing that venture capitalists were likely to affiliate with underwriters in 
some circumstances, and that most venture capitalists were inclined to encourage 
companies to go public as early as possible to earn greater profits in a shorter time span.  
2.3.2 Institutional investors’ interests. 
As previously stated, institutional investors can be representatives of the primary 
investors because underwriters tend to distribute most of the issuance to them (R. 
Aggarwal et al., 2002). The institutions indicated the term institutional investors 
manage large amounts of capital, such as pension funds, insurance companies, mutual 
funds, commercial banks and investment banks (B. S. Black & Coffee, 1994).  
Officially, some underwriters have argued that the reason that they distribute such 
a large number of shares to institutional investors was because they had previously 
cooperated with these institutional investors, and previous experience showed that these 
institutional investors were less likely to flip, which helps to maintain a stable share 
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price in the secondary market (Carter et al., 1998). Indeed, Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky 
(2007) have found that underwriters are more likely to distribute shares to the 
institutional investors with whom they have previously cooperated in other IPO projects. 
However, one might then ask who is responsible for the substantial flipping of shares 
in the market if all the shares have been allocated to investors who do not flip. 
Interestingly, empirical evidence has suggested that institutional investors flip more 
frequently than do individual investors. For instance, R. Aggarwal (2003) found that, 
in her sample of 193 IPOs, over 70 percent of shares were allocated to institutional 
investors, and for the initial IPO prices within the filling range, institutional investors 
flipped approximately 8 percentage points more than did individual investors. However, 
when the initial prices were below or above the filling range, institutional investors 
flipped less, at approximately 3 percentage points and 8 percentage points less than 
individual investors, respectively. Thus, it is partially true that institutional investors 
flip less, especially when share price needs to be stabilized. Another study using an 
Australian sample of 419 IPOs showed that institutional investors were allocated an 
average of 76 percent of IPO shares and that approximately 93 percent of the total gains, 
i.e., the amount of money left on the table, in the first three days after the initial date 
was realized by institutional investors (Bayley et al., 2006). As a result, there is a large 
proportion of institutional investors that intend to flip IPOs and realize the gains shortly 
after the initial date. Such investors can be defined as speculative investors, whose aim 
with an investment is to make a fast profit, and their interests naturally encourage 
underwriters to engage in a larger amount of underpricing. 
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However, from another perspective, there are also non-speculative investors 
among institutional investors. One of the most frequently discussed topics in the fields 
of corporation management and law concerning institutional investors is whether they 
have excessive power on boards of directors (B. S. Black, 1991; Coffee, 1991). Some 
studies refer to the behavior and strong incentive of institutional investors to engage in 
cooperate governance as “activism” (Romano, 2001, p. 174; Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 
p. 554). This provides evidence that many institutional investors are prone to be real 
investors in IPO companies after the initial date, instead of flipping the initial shares 
and making a rapid profit off of them. The interests of non-speculative investors are 
more likely to be in line with those of issuers with respect to their attitude towards 
underpricing. 
2.3.3 Individual investors’ interests. 
Individual investors are regarded as the representatives of secondary market 
investors because most of them cannot participate in the primary allocation and the 
majority of them are trading actively in the secondary market after the initial date 
(Derrien, 2005; Charles Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler, 1991). Additionally, their interests are 
not specifically in line with those of any of the major parties addressed by multiple 
agency theory because they are independent individuals who represent their own 
interests. 
In most contexts, the majority of individual investors are considered 
unsophisticated investors who are more likely to exhibit cognitive biases relative to 
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institutional investors or professional individual investors (Barber & Odean, 2008; 
Dhar & Zhu, 2002; Lakonishok & Maberly, 1990). For instance, consider the weekend 
effect, whereby the average return in the stock market is negative on Mondays and 
positive on the other four days of the week (French, 1980). Lakonishok and Maberly 
(1990) found this effect to be partly correlated with individual investors’ active trading 
behaviors on Mondays in a study focusing on the trading patterns of individual and 
institutional investors. Additionally, in their study, individual investors were found to 
be more likely to execute sell transactions than purchase transactions among the active 
trades taking place on Mondays.  
Interestingly, individual investors exhibit stronger stock purchasing rather than 
selling behavior on other occasions, which is caused by the attention-driven effect. 
Results obtained by comparing the stock purchasing behaviors of institutional and 
individual investors showed that individual investors were more likely to be driven by 
attention-grabbing stocks and become net buyers of them, due to the difficulty of 
searching for the numerous potentially purchasable types of stocks. These “attention-
grabbing stocks” (p. 786) include those that have released positive news, abnormally 
large trading volume, or abnormal high one-day return (Barber & Odean, 2008). Given 
these conditions, IPOs, especially hot IPOs, can be considered a type of attention-
grabbing stocks because their characteristics fit all the three criteria: frequently in the 
news and a large amount of underpricing, which leads to both abnormal trading volume 
and first-day return. Derrien (2005) offered both theoretical and empirical support for 
this. His model first suggested that although IPOs were overpriced compared to their 
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intrinsic value, they were still likely to have high initial return, i.e., a high level of 
underpricing, in markets when the demand from individual investors was amplified by 
information in the secondary market. His empirical data supporting this model showed 
that the aggregate demand of individual investors resulted in high stock prices in the 
secondary market, high underpricing, high first-day return, and poor long-term 
performance. This attention-driven effect is consequently one of the factors that can 
cause underpricing in the secondary IPO market, especially when a large number of 
individual investors are net-buyers after the high first-day return.  
Additionally, cognitive factors tend to influence professional and non-professional 
individual investors to different extents. For instance, the disposition effect, which is a 
typical bias exhibited by investors whereby they tend to sell winning stocks too early 
and hold losing stocks for too long, was found to be significantly less common among 
individuals who hold large amounts of capital and individuals who work as 
professionals (Dhar & Zhu, 2002; Weber & Camerer, 1998). In addition to cognitive 
factors, affective factors and social factors also affect individual investors’ trading 
behaviors, especially non-professionals trading in the secondary market, the details of 
which will be provided in Chapter 5. 
To conclude, multiple agency theory can represent the complex principal-agent 
relationships among the three parties, including their conflicts of interest and different 
preferences concerning two short-term IPO phenomena, underpricing and flipping 
(Figure 4). Furthermore, based on the possible conflicts of interest among the various 
parties throughout the IPO process, it is possible to offer practical suggestions regarding 
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the structure of the board of directors. In my opinion, according to multiple agency 
theory, it is reasonable to have more inside board members than outsiders, or to have 
more parties whose interests are in line with the insiders, which is contrary to traditional 
agency theory. Such a board composition is especially necessary during the initial 
public offering process, when most outside board members (underwriters, most current 
venture capitalists and speculative institutional investors) have an incentive to 
encourage selling the IPO shares at a low price by encouraging underpricing. Inside 
board members, some venture capitalists, and non-speculative institutional investors 
are more committed to the goal of companies’ long-term development, similar to the 
goal of the companies’ shareholders, than the outsiders are. Such different focus of 
interests may result in insiders having greater incentives to protect the interests of the 
shareholders. Additionally, inside board members’ psychological ownership of the 
company also motivates them to devote greater effort, loyalty and commitment to their 
companies (Avey, Avolio, Crossley, & Luthans, 2009; Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, 
Matherne, & Davis, 2005; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001). 
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Figure 4 The interplay of parties involved in the IPO process and their preferences 
concerning underpricing and flipping. On the left-hand side, one arrow represents one 
principal-agent relationship, where the arrow always points to the principal. The 
boldness of the arrow represents the typical duration of time of such a principal-agent 
relationship. For instance, the arrow between issuers and underwriters is the least bold, 
which indicates that the relationship between them lasts for the shortest period of all 
the principal-agent relationships considered here. On the right-hand side, the pluses 
and minuses indicate the parties’ general preferences regarding underpricing and 
flipping activities. For instance, the two minuses in the first row describing issuers show 
that issuers generally do not favor underpricing or flipping activity. 
3. Asymmetric Information Between Parties and Its Effects on IPO Phenomena 
According to the attempts to disentangle the diverse conflicts of interest between 
different principals presented above, it appears that during initial public offerings, 
issuers that represent companies’ true interests are in the weakest bargaining position, 
relative to underwriters, most of the current venture capitalists and speculative 
institutional investors. Theoretically, issuers can also go public without the assistance 
of underwriters (see Chapter 1). In this case, issuers have to set the initial price and 
distribute the new shares on their own, regardless of underwriters’ opinions. Is this 
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approach preferable to hiring an underwriter? To answer this question, it is first 
necessary to clarify the possible asymmetric information between issuers and 
underwriters and that between issuers and investors. 
3.1 Asymmetric information between issuers and underwriters 
The current literature primarily focuses on the situation in which underwriters have 
superior information relative to issuers (Baron & Holmström, 1980; Benveniste & 
Spindt, 1989; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). This situation arises from the following 
three sequential service items that the underwriter provides in an initial public offering 
process: managing (consulting), underwriting, and selling (distributing), which are also 
known as the three functions of underwriters (Baron & Holmström, 1980; Torstila, 
2001). The managing or the consulting function involves advising on general questions 
regarding the IPO process, recruiting other investment banks to join the underwriter 
syndicate, and managing the collaboration among various underwriters in the syndicate 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002; Torstila, 2001). The underwriting function involves assisting 
issuers in determining the important factors of an initial issue, such as the timing, the 
approximate amount and price range of the new shares, filling forms and preparing 
documents for regulators to approve the IPO, sharing some or all of the issuing risk 
with issuers (see best effort contract and firm commitment contract), and developing 
information that might benefit issuers’ corporate governance in the long term (R. 
Aggarwal & Conroy, 2000; Dong, Michel, & Pandes, 2011; Hanley & Hoberg, 2010). 
The selling or distributing function primarily involves a set of activities relating to 
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selling part or all of the new issues, such as releasing affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations and forecasts, conducting road shows, book building, share 
allocation and market making, and all of these activities are performed by underwriters 
to sell shares to certain investors and stabilize the share price in the secondary market 
(Cornelli & Goldreich, 2003; Ellis et al., 2000; Gondat‐Larralde & James, 2008). All 
of the three different functions will be introduced in Chapter 4, where the underwriter 
syndicate is divided into three groups: the management group, underwriting group and 
selling group; thus details on this topic will not be provided here.  
As a result, according to these functions, the asymmetric information between 
issuers and underwriters can take the following forms: 1) for what reasons some 
institutional investors are invited in the roadshow process are unclear to the issuers, or 
2) investors’ demand and willingness to pay for the new issues in the book-building 
process is unclear to the issuers, or 3) the specific investors who will receive the new 
issues from the underwriter in the distribution process and whether they will engage in 
flipping activities in the after-market are unknown to the issuers (Baron & Holmström, 
1980; Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). 
As reviewed in the previous subchapter, the most commonly known contracts 
between underwriters and issuers are the firm commitment contract and best effort 
contract (Dunbar, 1998). Under the former type of contract, underwriters bear all of the 
issuing risk, and under the latter type, issuers and underwriters share the issuing risk. 
This distinction places particular emphasis on the role of risk sharing in the underwriters’ 
process of executing their functions. However, when specifically considering 
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underwriters’ selling or distributing function, there is another way to distinguish such 
contracts between issuers and underwriters: based on whether it is necessary for the 
underwriters to distribute the new shares, these contracts can be categorized into direct 
sale contracts and pure distribution contracts (Baron, 1982). According to Baron (1982), 
in a direct sale contract, issuers alone determine the issuing price, distribute the shares 
without the assistance of underwriters, and underwriters only share the risks when 
selling the shares. In other words, in this type of contract, the underwriter only plays 
part of the selling role, which is the share allocation and market making parts. In a pure 
distribution contract, issuers also set the issuing price, but the underwriters assist them 
with distributing and selling the shares, meaning that the underwriter performs all the 
parts from both the underwriting and distributing functions.  
Based on the degree of asymmetric information, Baron (1982) identifies the 
situations in which different types of contracts usually would be used: 
When underwriters and issuers have identical stock market information, a firm 
commitment contract would be optimal for the issuers, as the issuers can determine the 
stock price as precisely as the underwriters; thus the best option is to transfer the issuing 
risk to underwriters. In this case, issuers only need underwriters for selling and 
arranging the distribution of the shares, i.e. share allocation and market making from 
the selling function. 
When issuers have limited information with which to establish the stock price, 
they should consult the underwriters to determine the optimal price. In such a situation, 
underwriters typically require compensation for providing information. Underwriters 
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typically create such compensation in the form of underpricing, by suggesting a lower 
share price than the real value of the shares. In the model provided by Baron (1982), 
the more precise the issuers wish the information to be, the more compensation they 
should pay, and thus the more underpricing there will be. 
When issuers lack both pricing and distribution information, they should not only 
secure the assistance of underwriters for distributing shares but also consult them about 
the initial price. In other words, an advanced distribution contract that includes 
consulting services should be adopted. In such cases, all three underwriting functions 
will be performed.  
When the information is symmetric, there is no longer a need to hire an underwriter. 
In this respect, theory aligns well with reality; when underwriters or banks go public, 
they usually conduct the entire IPO process by themselves. For instance, Goldman 
Sachs went public in 1999, serving itself as the lead underwriter (R. Aggarwal, 2003).  
These four extreme situations provide support for why underwriters are necessary 
in the initial public offering process from the perspective of asymmetric information. 
Additionally, if one further examines the role of underwriters throughout the initial 
public offering process, the necessity of having an underwriter is also clear from a cost 
saving perspective. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the process of going public is complex and time-consuming. 
For instance, in the U.S., the first step for underwriters is to prepare an extensive amount 
of paperwork to comply with SEC rules in order to get the approval about the IPO 
issuance (Hanley & Hoberg, 2010; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015c). 
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Then, it is typical that underwriters set the initial price one day before the initial date 
and allocate the IPO shares to the primary investors shortly after that (Daily, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2005). During the period between these two occasions, underwriters primarily 
devote their effort to 1) affiliated analysts’ forecasts and recommendations, which are 
allowed to be published after the approval of SEC, 2) market campaign, namely the 
roadshow, which introduces the companies to potential investors, 3) book-building, 
which collects information from the stock market, such as feedback from investors, 
analyzing the indicators of interest, set the price, and so forth (Cornelli & Goldreich, 
2001; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Schulte & Spencer, 2000). Similarly, as stated 
previously, this intricate process requires professional knowledge and experience, and 
thus it would be costly and inefficient if issuers were to directly sell the new shares on 
the market without the assistance of underwriters. 
The share allocation is the final step in the IPO process before the shares enter the 
secondary market, or the aftermarket, where the shares will be publicly tradable. 
Because IPOs are usually considered underpriced, especially in a hot issue market, 
institutional investors and some individual investors who have the opportunity to 
participate in the primary allocation are likely to create an oversubscription of the initial 
shares (Derrien, 2005; Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006). When shares are oversubscribed, 
one of the allocation methods is to distribute the shares according to the amount of 
shares the investors have applied for, meaning that investors can only obtain a part of 
the shares to which they subscribed (Parsons & Raviv, 1985). It has been noted that 
underwriters have their own distribution channel, and most of shares go to institutional 
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investors (R. Aggarwal, 2003). Consequently, who holds the shares to some extent 
determines the flipping activities in the secondary market, which is why this step is 
important to issuers. The literature indicates that underwriters with good reputations 
distribute shares to institutional investors that have a relatively low tendency to flip, 
and most important, they maintain positive cooperation relationship with these 
institutional investors (Carter et al., 1998).  
In my opinion, identifying the non-speculative institutional investors and then 
attempting to access them might be overly time- and energy-consuming for issuers that 
wish to distribute the shares without the aid of underwriters. These challenging tasks 
expose issuers to the potential risk that the flipping activities might be too severe, and 
the loss from this might be more significant than the cost of hiring an underwriter. 
As a result, from an economic perspective, it is always necessary to have an 
underwriter during an initial public offering process. For instance, statistics showed that 
the average number of managing underwriters in an IPO has been constantly raising 
from 1.4 to 6.4 during 1980 to 2014 (Ritter, 2014a). However, questions such as 
whether underwriters are the only actors who benefit from underpricing or what issuers 
will benefit from underpricing have been a topic of discussion in the extant literature. 
Thus, the underpricing phenomenon will be addressed from the issuer’s perspective, 
underwriter’s perspective and investor’s perspective in the following chapters. 
3.2 Asymmetric information between issuers and investors 
Ritter and Welch (2002) suggested that the asymmetric information exists in two 
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forms: the issuer is more informed than the investor or vice versa. 
When issuers possess more information on the qualities of the issuing companies, 
issuers of better-than-average quality are willing to sell the shares at a lower price, as 
this is their way differentiating themselves from the worse-than-average issuers, which 
usually sell shares at the normal price. This is because sound issuers can make up for 
their loss during the IPO from further issuing activities (Welch, 1989). As a result, this 
lower-than-average pricing strategy signals to the investors that these issuers are willing 
to leave money on the table because they are confident in the future of their own 
companies, which is one of the explanations for underpricing from the economic 
perspective.  
When investors hold more information, they are more informed about the current 
market demand for new offerings than underwriters are. These informed investors need 
not constitute the majority of all investors but could be a small group of investors who 
have access to superior information than their peers (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). Based 
on their superior information, these investors can clearly determine whether new issues 
are over- or underpriced. This case, on the one hand, causes issuers to face an allocation 
problem, as they are uncertain of the real demand in the market; on the other hand, this 
leads to a winner’s curse or an informational cascade (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
Specifically, if the shares are overpriced, only uninformed investors will purchase them. 
This triggers the winner’s curse, stating that due to the oversubscription of hot IPOs, 
full allocation only exists in cold IPOs, whereby those investors who receive a full 
allocation are the uninformed investors (Keloharju, 1993; Rock, 1986). Whereas the 
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information cascade model describes the situation in which investors make decisions 
sequentially, and those who decide later follow the decisions made by earlier actors 
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). This model builds on the following 
assumptions: 1) investors make decisions in a sequential order, 2) each investor knows 
the decisions made by investors ahead of him but not the information that the former 
decisions are based on, and 3) later investors trust the information of previous investors 
more than their own. This leads to actors replicating the behavior of other actors on the 
stock market, and this phenomenon is called herd behavior. Herd behavior in 
investment decision making, as stated by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), describes 
a type of behavior whereby an investor would have made a certain investment decision 
if she did not know the decisions of other investors, but she changes her decision when 
she discovers that others did not make the same decision as she would have on her own. 
Similarly, she will also make an investment decision when she knows that others have 
made that same decision. As a result, if the new issues are overpriced, there is a high 
risk that the first movers in the stock market will not purchase the shares, and such 
behaviors are amplified by the information cascade, which makes issues unfavorable. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) found that herd behavior can polarize investors’ subscriptions. 
Similarly, evidence from Amihud et al. (2003) indicates that the new issues are either 
highly oversubscribed or undersubscribed, with very few cases of moderate 
subscriptions.  
To eliminate both forms of asymmetric information, it is necessary for issuers to 
determine the issuing price based on the results of book-building, which is part of the 
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service offered by underwriters. A typical book-building process consists of two steps: 
1) some investors will be invited to evaluate the issues, and 2) these investors provide 
underwriters with the preliminary demand for the shares (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989).  
It has been argued that information compensation is one of the theoretical 
explanations for the underpricing generally observed for new issues (Sherman, 2000; 
Sherman & Titman, 2002). Based on Sherman and Titman (2002), after the book-
building process, the sellers (both issuers and underwriters) tend to compensate these 
investors with underpriced new issues for offering them evaluating information, as it 
can be more costly when sellers acquire market information from other channels. Due 
to the complex book-building process, the more accurate investors reveal their 
information, the more likely their own interests will be harmed, the mechanism of 
which will be explained in Chapter 4. Therefore, the more accurate sellers wish the 
price information to be, the more they need to pay to acquire it, the more money they 
need to leave on the table for investors, and thus the greater the underpricing will be.  
Based on the above analysis, in my opinion, due to imperfections in the stock 
market, such as asymmetric information, information cascade, etc., two conclusions can 
be drawn: 1) underpricing might be unavoidable for new issues, and 2) to minimize the 
cost of such imperfections, it is necessary for issuers to hire underwriters during the 
initial public offering process. 
As stated above, there might be no way to completely eliminate underpricing. In 
addition to the unavoidable underpricing due to market imperfections, proper 
underpricing can occasionally be important for the issuers from other perspectives; for 
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instance, issuers’ aim in going public is not only a matter of raising the largest amount 
of money but also includes achieving other goals, such as having an IPO with a high 
opening price helps to create a steady and reliable image for the company, shareholders 
who benefit from the proper amount of underpricing will be pleased with the company 
and tend to invest more in the future, and so forth (F. Allen & Faulhaber, 1989).  
In my opinion, a certain degree of underpricing will decrease the risks of 
unfavorable subscription and distinguish high-quality companies from ordinary ones, 
and thus this type of underpricing should be termed unavoidable underpricing or 
necessary underpricing. Such underpricing is, to some extent, beneficial for the issuers; 
however, it is difficult to define the threshold and amount involved. Fortunately, the 
scope of such underpricing can be clearly defined because it is primarily generated 
between investors and issuers, and its main function is to compensate for the 
imperfections in the stock market. In contrast to unavoidable underpricing, intentional 
underpricing or unnecessary underpricing arises between issuers and underwriters in 
the presence of asymmetric information; for instance, underwriters might intentionally 
underprice the initial shares to benefit their clients, i.e., institutional investors (Figure 
5). Intentional underpricing will be further explained in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
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Figure 5 Asymmetric information among the three parties and the types of underpricing 
generated thereby.  
To conclude, this chapter explained the interplay among the three parties and their 
possible conflicts of interest, especially their different preferences regarding two short-
term IPO phenomena: underpricing and flipping activities. The terms unavoidable 
underpricing (necessary underpricing) and intentional underpricing (unnecessary 
underpricing) were created based on their essential characteristics and the approach by 
which they are generated. In the following chapters, IPOs and IPO phenomena will be 
further discussed from the perspectives of issuers, underwriters and investors. 
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Chapter 3 Issuers in IPOs  
In most of the IPO literature, issuers are considered at the firm level, where the 
entire company is considered a complete and inseparable entity (Beatty & Welch, 1996; 
Edelen & Kadlec, 2005; X. Li & Masulis, 2003). This is in accordance with the one 
primary perspective on firm behavior, where a corporation is perceived as a flow of 
information or decisions (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976), a black box 
seeking to achieve certain operating goals, regardless of the individuals involved 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1979).  
The other primary perspective is, on the contrary, that the dominant group within 
the firm is decisive with respect to firm behavior and the outcomes of a corporation can 
be regarded as a reflection of values and ideas of its chief executives (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). In other words, the focus of the latter perspective is the individuals who 
play significant roles within the firms. These individuals can be either chief executive 
officers (CEOs) or founders of the issuing firms, both of whom are likely to have strong 
impacts on IPOs. Specifically, the status whether a CEO is also the founder of the firm 
is called CEO founder status, which has significant influence on IPO and firm 
performance. For instance, empirical studies have reported that more than half of CEOs 
at the time of an IPO were founder CEOs, and CEOs with career backgrounds in product 
research and development fields were more likely to retain their positions during an 
IPO than CEOs with other types of career backgrounds (Jain & Tabak, 2008). Newly 
issued companies with founder CEOs were more likely to have greater underpricing 
than those led by non-founders (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Studies 
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conducted by Jensen and Meckling (1979) demonstrated that when firms were 
classified with respect to their socioeconomic backgrounds into categories such as 
entrepreneur-run, family-run, and professionally managed, firms’ levels of diversity 
and acquisitions were different. Specifically, entrepreneurial firms were most likely to 
engage in aggressive acquisitions, and professionally managed firms were most likely 
to be involved in international activities. 
Besides the CEO founder status, empirical studies also report prominent 
differences in corporate performance when CEOs exhibit various characteristics. For 
instance, regarding age, firms with younger CEOs were found to be more likely to 
conduct acquisitions, the likelihood of which decreases by 30 percent with a 20-year 
increase in CEO age (Yim, 2013); firms led by younger managers were likely to have 
greater sales and earnings volatility than those directed by older managers (Child, 1974); 
and younger CEOs’ compensation was found to be more related to sales growth than 
that of older CEOs, which might have effects on firm performance (Coughlan & 
Schmidt, 1985). From the educational perspective, it has been found that administrators 
with higher education were more receptive to innovation (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981).  
This chapter will discuss two central IPO phenomena, underpricing and 
underperformance, from the perspectives of CEO founder status and CEO 
characteristics. Among the various characteristics that CEOs might have an impact, 
overconfidence will be the representative characteristic in the discussion, not only 
because it is one of the most frequently studied CEO characteristics in the literature, 
but also because its direct influence on the two IPO phenomena have yet to be discussed 
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(Goel & Thakor, 2008; J. M. Lee, Hwang, & Chen, 2015). Hence, CEO founder status, 
CEO overconfidence and their influence on underpricing and underperformance will 
be discussed in the following two subchapters.  
1. CEO Founder Status 
CEOs can be classified into two types based on founder status: 1) founder CEOs, 
who are the creators of the companies and have led them since their founding, and 2) 
non-founder CEOs, who become CEOs either through internal promotions or external 
recruiting (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009; Jain & Tabak, 2008).  
It is important to discuss the role of founders, as not only is every firm established 
by one or a group of founders, but this role might also have a lifetime influence on the 
firm (Nelson, 2003), such as Bill Gates at Microsoft, Steve Jobs at Apple, Gabrielle 
Bonheur Chanel at Chanel, etc. Founders or founding teams are generally considered 
to be those who shape firms’ behaviors (Beckman, 2006), represent an important source 
of human capital for firms’ long-term development (Colombo & Grilli, 2005), and 
create the organizational culture (Bass & Avolio, 1993). As a result, it is necessary to 
distinguish between founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs before proceeding to further 
analysis.  
Founder and non-founder CEOs typically differ in several aspects: 1) the amount 
of shares controlled, also mentioned as the wealth effect in some studies (Harford & Li, 
2007; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), as founder CEOs generally hold a larger stake of 
company shares than non-founders and thus control more wealth; 2) the length of time 
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in the CEO’s position, which is usually longer for founder CEOs, as founders begin to 
invest their time and effort on the day when their companies are founded (Allgood & 
Farrell, 2000); 3) the personal characteristics of these two types of CEOs, which are 
usually considered as different: for instance, risk-taking has been cited as one of the 
entrepreneurial characteristics that differentiates founders from non-founders (Begley, 
1995); 4) the psychological commitment to their companies, which is often stronger for 
founder CEOs than for non-founders because founder CEOs are more clear about the 
company’s long-term horizon and are thus more internalized in and identified with their 
companies (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986); 5) other differences, such as that founder 
CEOs are typically younger, with less working experience and receive lower 
compensation than non-founder or professional CEOs (Wasserman, 2003).   
The literature has also shown that founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs behave 
differently in various aspects of management (Jain & Tabak, 2008). With respect to 
decision making, founder CEOs have greater influencing power in cooperation 
management (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). With respect to investment, firms 
with founder CEOs generally make larger investments in research and design (R&D), 
spend more on capital expenditures, and launch more focused mergers and acquisitions 
than firms with non-founder CEOs, as founders are more innovative and prefer to adopt 
more aggressive strategies than non-founder CEOs (Fahlenbrach, 2009). With respect 
to motivation, founder CEOs are more psychologically attached to their firms and thus 
more intrinsically motivated than non-founders (Wasserman, 2006). Interestingly, 
regarding influencing power, founder CEOs exhibit a significantly lower turnover rate 
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when accounting irregularities occur than non-founder CEOs because in such situations, 
CFOs are willing to exit and take the blame for founder CEOs, which leads to a high 
turnover rate in CFOs when firms with founder CEOs are sanctioned for accounting 
irregularities (Leone & Liu, 2010).  
In the following two subchapters, differences in the IPO phenomena (underpricing 
and underperformance) of founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs will be discussed. In 
the last subchapter, the psychological explanation for effects of founder status will be 
analyzed to explain why founder and non-founder CEOs perform differently.  
1.1 CEO founder status and IPO underpricing 
Empirical studies have found that among firms undergoing an IPO, those with 
founder CEOs can be distinguished from those with non-founder CEOs with respect to 
ownership structures of IPO shares (Nelson, 2003). For instance, in an IPO company, 
the higher the percentage of equity held by the CEO, the more likely it is that the CEO 
is a founder; during the initial public offering stage, founder CEOs are less likely to sell 
a large percentage of shares to public investors than are non-founder CEOs, i.e., founder 
CEOs are less likely to conduct flipping activities. In my opinion, these two outcomes 
result from the fact that founder CEOs have greater psychological attachment to their 
firms, and thus they have greater motivation to retain a controlling stake, especially 
after the firms go public. Theoretically, psychological attachment and willingness to 
control should mean that founder CEOs are less likely to encourage underpricing than 
are non-founder CEOs. 
89 
 
However, an empirical study showed the opposite results where issuing firms with 
founder CEOs were more likely to exhibit underpricing. Study by Certo et al. (2001) 
revealed that founder CEOs are less likely to negotiate over an IPO’s first day offering 
price than non-founder CEOs. They contend that this phenomenon is caused by founder 
CEOs’ lack of experience in issuing new shares, which results in managerial uncertainty 
when bargaining with underwriters. As noted in Chapter 2, underwriters generally tend 
to underprice new shares to pursue their own interests or due to their relationships with 
other clients (e.g., institutional investors). Thus, underwriters might exploit founders’ 
lack of experience and weak bargaining position and leave more money on the table 
than necessary, meaning that IPOs involving founder CEOs would tend to have more 
significant underpricing than IPOs involving non-founder CEOs. Consequently, from 
the perspective of underpricing, founder CEOs might be detrimental to owners’ 
interests by underestimating the value of their firm. However, this also entails a larger 
price leap in the new shares. As previously stated, one of the main differences between 
founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs is that the former tend to hold a relatively large 
number of shares (Harford & Li, 2007; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Thus, such a price 
leap would also generate a substantial increase in a founder CEOs’ personal wealth. 
According to prospect theory, as stated in Chapter 2, the pleasure from experiencing a 
rapid increase in personal wealth will be stronger than the pain brought by the dilution 
of control, and it is possible that founder CEOs who hold the major proportion of shares 
will ultimately be pleased by underpricing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). In other words, a substantial increase in the share price would please 
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shareholders, who will overlook the fact that their companies should have been valued 
more highly and the IPO should have raised more capital; alternatively, holding the 
amount of capital raised constant, fewer shares should have been sold and firm control 
should have been less diluted. 
1.2 CEO founder status and IPO underperformance 
Because underperformance is a long-term IPO phenomenon, in my opinion, CEO 
founder status and its impact can be observed along two dimensions. One dimension is 
the longitudinal dimension, where CEO founder status in the sample firms changes over 
time and firm performance is compared ex ante and ex post. The other dimension is the 
cross-sectional dimension, where firms’ performance across different CEO founder 
statuses is compared at a specific point in time.  
1.2.1 CEO founder status and IPO underperformance on the longitudinal 
dimension 
Numerous studies have focused on the likelihood that founder CEOs will retain 
their CEO titles after achieving unusual success during their employment (Elsaid & 
Ursel, 2012; Jain & Tabak, 2008; Parrino, 1997; Wasserman, 2003). For instance, an 
empirical study found that founders were highly likely to leave their positions after they 
reach certain milestones in developing their companies (Wasserman, 2003). 
Specifically, these milestones refer to “the completion of product development” and 
“the raising of each round of financing from outside investors” (Wasserman, 2003, p. 
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149). Going public, obviously, belongs to the latter category.  
Despite the influence of individual characteristics (such as working experience and 
length of tenure), the primary reason that founder CEOs are replaced is that founders’ 
skills and abilities are no longer sufficient to complete the new tasks that emerge after 
the milestones are reached (Wasserman, 2003). For instance, when companies have 
successfully developed new products, skills such as organizing, marketing and selling 
skills become more important than innovating, designing and developing. Founder 
CEOs who do not acquire such abilities are likely to leave their positions. In the case 
of successful financing, founders are more likely to be asked to leave office by investors 
who doubt the founders’ ability to effectively maintain the firm’s long-term 
performance or simply the skills to manage the company (Wasserman, 2003). The 
greater the funding that the company requires from investors, the more likely it is that 
the crucial decisions regarding a change in CEO will be influenced by investors. In such 
a scenario, it can be assumed that a change in CEO founder status might prevent IPO 
companies from experiencing future underperformance. In other words, it can be 
assumed that in the secondary market, founder CEOs are more likely to lead to 
underperformance than are non-founder CEOs, especially when investors have asked 
the founders to leave office.  
In contrast to being fired or forced to leave, founder CEOs also might leave their 
company voluntarily after an IPO. Here the term leave voluntarily is defined in Parrino 
(1997) as follows: “the incumbent takes a comparable position elsewhere or departs 
from previously undisclosed personal or business reasons that are unrelated to the 
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firm’s activities” (p. 172). Begley (1995), by examining the relationship between 
founder status and firm age, showed that founder CEOs in young firms have a stronger 
intention to pass on their firms or their shares as personal property to their heirs. 
Especially in the event that a substantial success, such as reaching the milestone of 
issuing a successful IPO, is achieved, founder CEOs are more likely to leave office 
voluntarily because this situation means that they are in a better bargaining position to 
convince the board and thus are more likely to pass on the CEO position to their heirs, 
for instance, their children. In the context of founders voluntarily leaving and passing 
on the firm to their heirs, long-term performance will be discussed in detail in 
Subchapter 1.3.1 of this chapter.  
1.2.2 CEO founder status and IPO underperformance on the cross-sectional 
dimension 
Studies also found significant correlations between CEO founder status and their 
IPOs’ long-term performance from the cross-sectional dimension. For instance, Nelson 
(2003) found that, after an IPO, the stock market reaction was generally stronger for 
firms led by founder CEOs than those led by non-founders. This can be possibly 
explained by the fact that investors value firms led by founders higher than firms led 
by non-founder CEOs. In other words, IPO firms with founder CEOs are less likely to 
exhibit underperformance than those with non-founder CEOs, from the cross-sectional 
perspective. 
Regarding post-IPOs’ financial performance and the surviving time, firms with 
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founder CEOs are more likely to have better financial performance and are more likely 
to survive for longer compared to those with non-founder CEOs. This result is 
particularly pronounced when the founder is both the CEO and the chairman of the 
board (He, 2008). One of the reasons for a better financial performance and a longer 
surviving time is the founder CEOs require less compensation compared to non-founder 
CEOs. Based on He (2008), the reduced demand for compensation is primarily due to 
founders’ intrinsic motivation. The corporate governance structure, especially 
regarding whether ownership and control are separated, moderates the relationship 
between founder CEO status and company performance. When ownership and control 
are combined, namely when the founder CEO is also the owner of the company, CEOs 
tend to exhibit pro-organizational and collectivistic behavior (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; 
Y. Ling, Zhao, & Baron, 2007). Thus, the previously mentioned finding that investors 
are more likely to ask founders to leave office during an IPO could be a costly and 
ineffective strategy. When founder CEOs lead their companies to improved financial 
performance for less compensation and due to their greater intrinsic motivation, it is 
only reasonable to ask them to leave when the cost of their lack of skills exceeds the 
additional compensation required to hire a new CEO, who is hopefully capable of 
delivering the same level of financial performance, which can be challenging to 
measure in practice. As a result, in my opinion, the decision to fire founders should be 
made with great caution and rigid measurements. 
As stated above, going public is an important milestone during corporate 
development, which is, both theoretically and practically, prone to cause founder CEOs 
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to leave their position. By performing a more detailed analysis of the factors that might 
influence the likelihood of founders remaining as CEOs during the initial public 
offering phase, Jain and Tabak (2008) determined that elements such as the support of 
insiders and the founding team, the outsider control, and personal characteristics of the 
CEO (e.g., age, background) are all correlated with the likelihood of founder CEOs 
remaining in office. Specifically, the factors influencing the likelihood of founder CEOs 
remaining in office can be summarized as follows.  
First, the size of the founding team and the proportion of insiders on the board are 
positively related to the likelihood that founder CEOs will remain in their positions 
during an IPO. These two factors can provide founders with greater bargaining power 
to retain the CEO position. Jain and Tabak (2008) also noted that Wasserman (2003) 
supported their hypothesis, who reported that founders remain CEO for relatively 
longer periods when their co-founders remain with the firm.  
Second, the proportion of outside block holders, the influence of venture capital, 
and the top management team (TMT) independence are negatively related to the 
likelihood of founder CEOs remaining in office during an IPO. Both outside block 
holders and venture capitals are likely to have a negative influence on the independence 
of TMT. The less independent the top management team is, the more likely it is that the 
decisions made by the board will favor outsiders’ interests; for instance, outsiders might 
replace the founder CEO when they believe that he or she is no longer suitable as the 
chief executive. One notorious example is that Steve Jobs was voted out of the CEO’s 
position by the board of directors in the spring of 1985, four years after Apple’s IPO 
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and nine years after he founded the company. 
Third, founder CEOs who have a background in departments concerned with 
output functions, such as product research and development (product R&D), marketing, 
and sales, tend to be more likely to remain in office during an IPO than CEOs whose 
background is in throughput functions departments, such as financing, accounting, 
production and process engineering. The concepts of output function and throughput 
function were developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). They found that CEOs with 
output functional backgrounds concentrate more on the company’s innovation and 
growth, while CEOs with throughput functional backgrounds focus more on the 
company’s internal and external stability.   
Fourth, CEO age is negatively related to the likelihood of founder CEOs remaining 
in office during an IPO. Numerous recent studies have demonstrated that CEO age is 
important with respect to risk-taking (Elsaid & Ursel, 2012), acquisition activities (Yim, 
2013), learning abilities (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006), and even financial 
reporting qualities (Huang, Rose-Green, & Lee, 2012). Older CEOs tend to be more 
risk averse, be less involved in acquisition activities, and have relatively worse 
performance in dynamic industries that require fast learning and adaption but provide 
better quality financial reports. These findings emphasize that CEO age plays an 
important role in corporate governance, and CEOs in distinct phases of their tenures 
have different focuses. In my opinion, the characteristics of younger CEOs are more 
appropriate for the IPO stage, which requires the founders to be more innovative, more 
dynamic, more risk-taking and to have stronger ability of adapting. 
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1.3 Psychological explanations for the effects of CEO founder status 
There are several ways to disentangle the reasons that CEO founder status 
influences firm performance in general. As previously stated, the main differences 
between founder and non-founder CEOs are: 1) the number of shares controlled, 2) 
tenure in the CEO position, 3) personal characteristics, and 4) psychological 
commitment. Thus the first part of this subchapter attempts to disentangle the various 
effects of founder status by comparing family companies, heir-controlled companies 
and founder CEO companies, which differ mainly in the latter two respects. The second 
part will explore the basic personal characteristics of founder and non-founder CEOs 
with respect to risk preference, locus of control and Type A behavior. The third part 
will introduce the psychological commitment of founder and non-founder CEOs. 
1.3.1 Comparisons among family companies, heir-controlled companies and 
founder CEO companies 
In my opinion, it is necessary to compare family firms, heir-controlled firms and 
the founder CEO firms in the following discussion because they share similar 
characteristics with respect to the wealth effect and tenure, but differ in the dimension 
of executives’ personal characteristics and psychological commitment. As a result, by 
comparing the performance of companies with founder CEOs, family firms and heir-
controlled companies, it is possible to distinguish the effects of personal characteristics 
and psychosocial commitment from those of other factors. 
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There are numerous studies on the relationship between CEO status and company 
performance in general. Here CEO status specifically refers to whether the CEO is the 
founder or a family member of the founder (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; D. Miller & 
Breton‐Miller, 2006; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012). A wide range of 
company performance indicators is considered, including market value, stock prices, 
operating performance and accounting performance. In essence, these studies examine 
two questions: 1) what are the effects of a company being operated by the person who 
creates it, and 2) what are the effects of a company being operated by a family member 
or an heir of the founder. The results indicated that in the former situation, founder 
CEOs typically have a positive influence on performance, while in the latter situation, 
company performance can be either better or worse relative to non-family or non-heir-
controlled firms (Adams et al., 2009).  
In the literature comparing family firm performance with non-family firm 
performance, some studies demonstrated that firms controlled by family members 
outperformed those with non-family managers, and this finding was primarily 
explained through stewardship theory and because they entail lower agency costs than 
non-family managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; D. Miller & Breton‐Miller, 2006). 
Stewardship theory describes situations in which managers are motivated by goals that 
are aligned with those of their principals, namely pro-organizational and collective 
behaviors, instead of individualistic goals such as wealth and reputation (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Furthermore, when family firms are divided into two groups whereby one group 
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of firms has founder CEOs and the other group includes firms with non-founder but 
still family CEOs, the former generally exhibit better performance. For instance, one 
empirical study found that family succession predicted a 4 percent decline in operating 
profitability and such underperformance is particularly significant in rapidly 
developing industries, industries that require skills, and large companies (Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007). One possible explanation of this 
phenomenon is offered by Brandstätter (1997), namely, that in terms of personality 
characteristics, founders are typically more emotionally stable and independent than 
owners who inherit control of the company from parents, relatives, or spouses. 
Additionally, the founders were found to be more willingly to expand their firms, more 
likely to attribute successful outcomes to their own effort, and more satisfied with their 
roles as CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 
2009). As a result, certain types of personality characteristics such as self-attribution, 
independence and emotional stability are innate in founder CEOs, instead of gained 
over time (Brandstätter, 1997).  
Interestingly, when comparing the performance of family, heir-controlled 
companies with that of CEOs who are not related to the founders in every way, it seems 
after these firms going public, the investors find the former firms less convincing than 
the latter. For instance, an empirical study reported the result that CEOs who obtained 
their positions by being related to the founder through blood or marriage 
underperformed relative to unrelated CEOs with respect to financial profitability and 
book-to-market ratio (Pérez-González, 2006). As stated in Chapter 1, the book-to-
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market ratio is widely employed in finance to measure investor confidence in a firm. 
Thus, the above finding indicates that investors do not have strong confidence in these 
firms, and thus these firms attract relatively limited interest from investors. Results 
from Pérez-González (2006) also indicated dramatic underperformance by family 
CEOs who did not attend a selective college was found. This result suggested that the 
reason for the underperformance associated with inherited control was the limited set 
of candidates from which to choose a successor CEO.  
However, there has been a dispute regarding whether family firms in general 
outperform non-family firms. Recent studies have attempted to resolve this argument 
by differentiating firms with respect to parameters such as firm size and ownership 
concentration. For instance, D. Miller, Minichilli, and Corbetta (2013) argued that 
family firms will outperform when these firms have both a small scale and a compact 
ownership concentration and underperform when they have both a large scale and 
dispersed ownership concentration. Under a moderate degree of family control, no 
direct impact on company performance can be found. From the perspective of the 
number of international companies and the level of family ownership, the amount of 
international entrepreneurship peaks when family ownership is moderate, and declines 
when the family ownership is either high or low. This result was presented in an 
empirical study of 1,035 American family firms conducted by Sciascia et al. (2012). 
The number of international firms represents a proxy for firm performance and the 
quality of cooperate governance.  
In my opinion, another possible reason that it is difficult to generalize family firms’ 
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performance is that the founder’s status is unclear. Studies on the relationship between 
firm performance and founder status, as the only independent variable, should be 
performed. In such a study, three groups of firms should be analyzed: 1) firms with a 
founder CEO, 2) firms with a non-founder but family CEO, and 3) firms with non-
family CEOs. Other factors which might have an influence on firms’ performance 
should be used as controlled variables, such as firm size, the concentration of CEO 
control, CEO age, CEO educational background, CEO previous experience, etc. It has 
been found by previous studies that these factors affect firms’ performance with 
different outcomes and to different extent. For instance, the reason why firm size should 
be considered is that there are certain sized firms which are within the founder’s 
capacity to control. Besides these factors, I think in the next part, it is necessary to 
examine psychological differences between founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs, 
which might have substantial potential to explain why founder CEOs have better 
performance in certain cases. 
1.3.2 Personal characteristics and founder CEOs 
Psychologically, there are several characteristics that can distinguish founders 
from non-founders. One of the studies which made a good summary is from Begley 
(1995), who stated that founders establishing a new firm are more likely to exhibit risk-
taking, external locus of control, and Type A behavior. 
Risk taking propensity. The relationship between risk taking propensity and 
entrepreneurship has been quite controversial. For instance, Brockhaus (1980) found 
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that risk-taking propensity is not a distinguishing character of entrepreneurs; however, 
a significant risk-taking propensity was observed among entrepreneurs in a study using 
a sample of 71 entrepreneurs and 62 non-entrepreneurs (Ahmed, 1985). In my opinion, 
one of the essential reasons for these divergent conclusions is that scholars employ 
different definitions of an entrepreneur. Returning to Brockhaus (1980) as an example, 
there, an entrepreneur was defined as “a major owner and manager of a business venture 
who is not employed elsewhere” (p. 510). Thus, this definition combines both 
entrepreneurs who founded a company and those who take over an existing company. 
However, according to Ahmed (1985), “entrepreneurship is defined for the purpose of 
this study as a person who starts a business of his own” (p. 781), meaning that in 
Ahmed’s sample, entrepreneurs include only founders. Thus, obviously, the various 
definitions of entrepreneurship explain differences in these studies’ results.  
There are some scholars who regard entrepreneur and founder as different 
concepts. For instance, Nelson (2003) specifically noted that “an entrepreneur is not 
necessarily a founder” (p. 708), which makes it important to distinguish between 
founders and non-founders when considering risk-taking attitudes. There are also 
studies that regard entrepreneurs as founders, while others employ the contrasting 
concept of the entrepreneur as a manager, analogous to studies that regard non-founders 
as entrepreneurs. For instance, one study reported that risk taking was significantly 
correlated with entrepreneurial traits but not with managerial traits (Pines, Dvir, & 
Sadeh, 2012). Entrepreneurial traits in this context refer to a “love of challenge, 
initiative, optimism, creativity, rebelliousness, energy, commitment, being a dreamer, 
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confidence and independence” (p. 106), and managerial traits include “love to manage, 
need control, persistence, involvement and realism” (p. 106). The distinctive traits of 
entrepreneurs and managers, in my opinion, are aligned with the representative 
characteristics of founder CEOs, who obtain entrepreneurial traits, and non-founder 
CEOs (or professional CEOs), who exhibit managerial traits. Thus, risk-taking can be 
regarded as a distinguishing characteristic between founder CEOs and non-founder 
CEOs. 
Locus of control. An internal locus of control, in contrast to an external locus of 
control, is defined by Rotter (1966) as “if the person perceives that the event is 
contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively permanent characteristics” (p. 
1). Thus, individuals possessing an internal locus of control believe in themselves more 
than those with an external locus, who believe that the success of an event depends on 
external factors such as luck, fate, unpredictable events, etc. Studies performed by 
Bonnett and Furnham (1991) among teenagers aged between 16 to 19 revealed that 
teenagers who were interested in becoming an entrepreneur believed in hard work and 
had an internal locus of control. This result indicates that an internal locus of control 
existed long before an individual becomes an entrepreneur. Thus it is a cause of being 
an entrepreneur, rather than a result.  
Type A behavior. Type A behavior, also known as Framingham Type A behavior 
(Haynes, Levine, Scotch, Feinleib, & Kannel, 1978), was observed by Friedman and 
Rosenman (1974) when observing their cardiac patients. Though the original terms 
used to describe Type A behaviors were not clearly defined, the literature in clinical 
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psychology has reported several characters that are significantly related to Type A 
behavior, such as self-confidence, change, autonomy, tension, anger symptoms, etc. 
(Chesney, Black, Chadwick, & Rosenman, 1981; Haynes et al., 1978). This is 
interesting because the disadvantages of Type A behavior symptoms accord with the 
results from Kets de Vries (1985); in interviewing and surveying 38 entrepreneurs, they 
generally observed that these entrepreneurs behave akin to psychologically defensive 
persons: for instance, they have a “strong distrust for the world around them”, and “they 
live in fear of being victimized” (Kets de Vries, 1985, p. 160). 
1.3.3 Psychological commitment and founder CEOs 
As previously stated, another noteworthy finding concerning founder CEOs in 
young firms is that these CEOs are more likely to expect their children to become their 
successors in the business (Begley, 1995). In my opinion, this can be explained by the 
founders’ strong psychological commitment to the firm, meaning that they wish to pass 
it on as their own property to individuals who they trust. This can also be an explanation 
for the high founder CEO turnover rate after a successful IPO, as this provides founders 
with greater leverage to convince and influence the board to pass the firm on to their 
heirs.  
The fact that founder CEOs exhibit stronger psychosocial commitment to their 
companies can be supported from another perspective. Studies have reported that in 
IPO companies, founder CEOs required less of both incentive-based and total 
compensation relative to non-founder CEOs (He, 2008). In my opinion, this 
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phenomenon compatible with the observation that founder CEOs have stronger intrinsic 
motivation, meaning that they require fewer extrinsic incentives to reach a given effort 
level than non-founder CEOs. This strong intrinsic motivation is likely caused by the 
strong psychological commitment to their firms and the abovementioned stewardship 
effect. 
2. CEO Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is defined as individuals having excessive confidence in their 
personal judgment and decisions (Gervais & Odean, 2001). Svenson (1981) 
demonstrated that over 70 percent of drivers believe that they are better than average; 
Weinstein (1980), in a study of 1,258 college students, demonstrated that participants 
rated the possibilities of experiencing positive events above the average and that of the 
negative events below the average.  
There are several possible explanations for overconfidence. Attribution theory 
suggests that humans tend to attribute good results to their own ability and bad results 
to unfortunate external circumstances (L. Ross, 1977); asymmetric information theory 
illustrates that individuals are better informed of their own abilities in certain tasks than 
others, and thus their expectations of others’ performance are less extreme than those 
of their own (Moore & Cain, 2007); egocentrism theory suggests that individuals tend 
to focus on their own performance but overlook that of others (Kruger, 1999). 
In reality, in certain circumstances individuals believe that they will accomplish 
certain tasks, but there are also situations in which they doubt their performance and 
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exhibit underconfidence. Does overconfidence only occur among certain types of 
persons under certain circumstances? If so, which types of persons and circumstances 
are involved? Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999) found that under- 
and overconfidence varied systematically with the domain of questions asked, how the 
questions were presented, and the confidence level of the subjects. Specifically, the 
findings indicated that 1) the level of overconfidence was significantly correlated with 
the domain to which the task belongs (West & Stanovich, 1997); 2) the overconfidence 
was more modest when the question was presented as a two-choice question than as a 
confidence range (Tversky & Koehler, 1994); and 3) individuals who were generally 
confident tended to easily become overconfident (Soll, 1996).  
Of the studies cited above, which primarily concern how individuals perceive their 
abilities, some of them are not specified for capturing real-world decision making, 
especially when personal interests are affected. In other words, will individuals 
continue to conform to their self-perceptions when making choices or decisions? What 
if the choices are relate to monetary issues, such as the amount of a salary or bonus? 
An experiment conducted by Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) demonstrated that individual 
choice behaviors exhibited overconfidence when the tasks were easy and familiar, and 
exhibited underconfidence when the tasks were unfamiliar. These effects are more 
significant when monetary incentives were involved than when they were not.  
When there are many overconfident individuals, questions arise concerning 
whether they are more successful or whether it is beneficial to be overconfident. On the 
one hand, models were presented indicating that overconfident managers were more 
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likely to be promoted to CEO by the boards of value-maximizing companies than less 
confident managers, even if the former occasionally might have made value-destroying 
investments (Goel & Thakor, 2008); on the other hand, studies indicated that 
overconfidence was one of the primary reasons for the failure of new companies 
(Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Thus, to determine the role that overconfidence plays in 
CEOs’ decisions concerning initial public offerings, the discussion should begin with 
overconfidence and CEOs in general. 
The stereotypical image that is brought to mind by the term CEO is someone who 
is ambitious, goal-oriented, energetic, inspiring, and above all, confident (Guthey & 
Jackson, 2005). An empirical study by Klaczynski and Fauth (1996) suggested that 
regarding career events, individuals who were more intelligent were often more 
overconfident. Thus, intuitively, a more intelligent manager is usually more competent 
and thus more likely to be promoted. This also accords with the abovementioned model 
of Goel and Thakor (2008), suggesting that it was highly likely for an overconfident 
manager to become a CEO. One potential implication of the model is that CEOs in 
general are overconfident. 
Several motivations for the argument that managers are generally more 
overconfident than others were provided by Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2003), which 
can also be applied to the case of CEOs. First, the complexity of CEOs’ work makes 
CEOs highly prone to overconfidence because individuals become more overconfident 
when their tasks are more difficult. Second, CEOs’ working tasks are unlikely to benefit 
from the accumulation of experience over time, since the environment based on which 
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CEOs make their decisions is highly uncertain, thus the preconditions for learning from 
experience are absent. Those conditions include the frequent occurrence of similar 
problems, rapid outcomes of decisions and clear feedback (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
However, the typically working tasks of CEOs are replete with change, long-term based, 
and lack clear feedback. Third, in most cases, CEOs obtain their positions through a 
series of promotions, and managers with successful performance are those who are 
promoted. Based on attribution theory (L. Ross, 1977), CEOs have likely accumulated 
many more false attributions than other managers who have not been promoted to CEO, 
as the former believe that they are the reasons for their success. Gervais and Odean 
(2001) demonstrated that this sort of attribution error was one of the factors leading to 
overconfidence. Fourth, selection bias could also play a role in CEOs’ overconfidence: 
on the one hand, managers who are overconfident and optimistic about their future 
might be more likely to apply for the CEO position than those who are not; on the other 
hand, board tends to select managers with a confident and optimistic appearance, as not 
only is this regarded as a sign of greater ability, but also managers who are moderately 
overconfident require less compensation to be motivated and thus are less expensive 
for the board (Gervais, Heaton, & Odean, 2011).   
From the perspective of conducting mergers and acquisitions, by analyzing data 
from the period 1980 to 2002, Billett and Qian (2008) found that positive previous 
merger and acquisition experience led to a high likelihood of subsequent acquisitions, 
and future deals that tend to be driven by overconfidence generally created negative 
wealth effects. These results on the one hand support attribution theory (L. Ross, 1977), 
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and on the other hand demonstrate that CEOs are not only promoted because of their 
overconfidence but also become increasingly overconfident as their successful 
experience accumulates, even though which might lead to unpleasant result. For 
instance, according to the model developed by Goel and Thakor (2008), once CEOs’ 
overconfidence became excessive, they tended to be dismissed by the board.  
In my opinion, it appears that careers of CEOs exhibit various levels of 
overconfidence: being promoted due to moderate overconfidence, becoming 
increasingly overconfident over time, and being fired once they become excessively 
overconfident. If this is the case, CEOs of IPO companies can be considered to be at 
their optimal level of overconfidence: it drives them not to act too abruptly while 
remaining sufficiently ambitious. Unfortunately, the current literature rarely focuses on 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and IPOs and instead on that between 
acquisitions and general performance, which makes it potentially promising for future 
research. Thus, the following sections will begin with these two factors and then attempt 
to shed light on CEO overconfidence and IPOs. 
2.1 CEO overconfidence and IPO underpricing 
Beyond studies focusing directly on CEO overconfidence and IPO underpricing, 
there are numerous other studies on CEO overconfidence and acquisitions. These 
studies, in my opinion, can be used as reference for two primary reasons. First, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the reasons that a company chooses to go public is to 
become a shell company, that is, a target company that other firms can use to go public 
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by simply acquiring it instead of going through the routine IPO process (Aydogdu et 
al., 2007). Therefore, acquisitions can be regarded as one channel for going public, 
which can be considered parallel to the most common issuing process. Second, despite 
the differences between acquisition and IPO, both activities send a similar signal to 
shareholders that the company is experiencing rapid development. According to the 
agency relationship, such favorable news might trigger similar psychological 
mechanisms in CEOs who engage in acquisitions and those who launch IPOs, which 
could be caused by compensation incentives, the tournament effect with other agents, 
or other factors that will benefit the CEO due to his well-regarded performance (Certo, 
Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). As a result, existing work 
on CEOs’ overconfidence and their acquisition behavior can be used as a reference 
when researching the correlations between CEO overconfidence and IPO underpricing.  
Based on the extant literature, one hypothetical outcome of CEOs’ overconfidence 
is that it increases the likelihood of pursuing an IPO. This can be supported by the 
observation that CEOs exhibiting overconfidence tend to behave in a risk-loving way, 
especially when they are motivated by compensation or options they will receive after 
successfully conducting mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate, 2005b).  
Besides the increased likelihood of conducting an IPO, several publications 
showed that overconfidence during acquisition could be value-destroying because 
overconfident CEOs were more likely to overpay for the target company (R. Brown & 
Sarma, 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2005b, 2008). Hence, one might assume that 
overconfident CEOs could be more likely to underprice their IPO shares due to the 
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abovementioned similarities between acquisitions and IPOs. R. Brown and Sarma 
(2007) suggested that both CEO overconfidence and CEO dominance were key factors 
which influence a company’s acquiring decisions, and CEO dominance was no less 
important than overconfidence in making acquisition decisions. Hence, it was further 
suggested that a higher proportion of independent directors should be present on the 
board to constrain CEO dominance and CEO overconfidence in decisions to undertake 
acquisitions (R. Brown & Sarma, 2007). If CEOs’ rash decisions regarding acquisitions 
were the shareholders’ primary concern in their agency relationship, having an 
autonomous board of directors should be a feasible solution. Similarly, it can be 
assumed that it is necessary to control overconfident CEOs’ IPO related decisions, in 
other words, to restrict CEOs’ dominant power in decisions such as setting the initial 
prices, before it harms shareholders’ interests.  
However, if considered from another perspective, CEO overconfidence might 
have the opposite influence on underpricing. Based on proposition in the literature that 
the better-than-average effect of overconfident CEOs makes them believe that their 
companies can generate higher profits and are better than their peer companies 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005b), hence, CEOs’ overconfidence might influence the price 
setting of the initial shares, which to some extent mitigates the underpricing 
phenomenon.  
Consequently, for future studies, there are three main issues regarding the 
relationship between IPOs and CEOs’ overconfidence that remain unclear: 1) whether 
CEOs’ overconfidence affects the likelihood of pursuing an IPO, 2) what are the 
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outcomes of such influences on underpricing, whether they increase or decrease the 
amount of underpricing, and 3) if increase, how to keep them from harming the 
shareholders’ interests. 
2.2 CEO overconfidence and IPO underperformance 
In general, how does overconfidence affect a CEO’s performance and further on 
affect the firm performance, which can be used for studying the underperformance of 
IPO in future research? A review of this subject will help to provide a macroscopic 
perspective on how psychological mechanisms interact with CEO performance and will 
hopefully offer additional insights into the relationship between CEO overconfidence, 
IPO decision making and IPO long-term performance.  
Just as every coin has two sides, there have been in essence two opposing 
arguments regarding how overconfident CEOs influence firm performance: on the one 
hand, some results showed that CEO overconfidence could lead to unfavorable 
consequences, such as negative wealth effects on shareholders (Billett & Qian, 2008); 
on the other hand, a study found that overconfident CEOs could have positive influence 
on firm performance, such as prompting innovation in firms (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). 
As there are increasing numbers of (over)confident managers being promoted to CEO, 
it appears that the latter argument is more consistent with the reality: having 
overconfident CEOs must provide the shareholders or the board with more particular 
advantages than those CEOs who are not overconfidence. An interesting finding in this 
regard was that executives who were born in earlier years appear to be, on average, 
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more conservative than younger managers; additionally, managers with an MBA 
background were more likely to undertake relatively aggressive and bold strategies. For 
instance, with a sample from 1969 to 1999, every ten-year decrease in age was found 
to result in an average 1.7-percentage-point decline in capital expenditures, and older 
CEOs tend to accept lower managerial risks and engage in less diversification (Bertrand 
& Schoar, 2003). If combined with the results from several studies (see Aktas, De Bodt, 
& Roll, 2005; Billett & Qian, 2008), which have reported that CEOs tended to gain 
experience and became overconfident over time, these studies suggest that young CEOs 
and managers from a more recent generation were generally more aggressive and 
confident than young CEOs and managers from the previous generation. This 
phenomenon, if considered from an evolutionary perspective, indicates that the 
corporate governance environment in the 1990s required more aggressive and confident 
CEOs and managers than the 1960s environment. Hence, if less confident CEOs were 
gradually eliminated through board decisions or competition among peers at the 
managerial level, this could be compatible with the assumption that overconfident 
CEOs provide more advantages than disadvantages. The advantages of overconfident 
CEOs, as stated previously, primarily including producing additional innovation in 
firms, requiring less compensation, devoting more effort to work, reducing the cost of 
agent conflicts, and reducing the financial risks, provide further evidence of this 
(Gervais et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). However, overconfident CEOs are also 
more likely to engage in acquisition activities, which might lead to long-term 
underperformance (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Thus in the following subchapters, 
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explanations will be provided from these perspectives. 
2.2.1 CEO overconfidence and innovation 
Using options exercise behavior and press coverage to measure CEOs’ level of 
overconfidence and the number of patents and total citation count by other new patents 
as measures of innovative output, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) studied CEOs and cooperate 
innovations from 1993 to 2003 and found that overconfident CEOs were better 
innovators than less confident CEOs. Overconfident CEOs were more likely to invest 
in risky projects, and they generated more innovations measured by patents and total 
patent citations. On the one hand, investing in risky projects results in higher volatility 
in stock returns, but on the other hand, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) also found that 
overconfident CEOs were better at seizing external growth opportunities and translating 
them into firm value, especially in industries in which innovation is important.  
The going public phase is usually in which a company develops at its greatest rate, 
with numerous outside opportunities and innovative ideas. As a result, hiring a CEO 
who can exploit external opportunities and is sufficiently bold to invest in innovative 
projects might be important for companies who are planning to go public. As there is 
no empirical literature on the relationship between overconfident CEOs and the value 
of IPO companies, it can be only assumed that IPO companies with overconfident 
CEOs have higher firm values than IPO companies with CEOs who are less confident, 
for the reason that former tend to be more innovative than the latter. Additionally, 
several studies have found that innovative firms tended to control larger market shares 
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and have higher competence (Blundell, Griffith, & Van Reenen, 1999; Danneels, 2002). 
As a result, it is reasonable to propose a hypothesis that firms with overconfident CEOs 
have greater value than do those with less confident CEOs. Specifically, the level of 
CEO overconfidence can be measured by two parameters, as in Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), using portrayals of CEOs in the press to measure outsiders’ perceptions of CEO 
overconfidence and using CEOs’ personal investment in their companies to measure 
their own level of confidence in the company; the value of the firm can be measured by 
both the initial price and the price of the shares after the initial date.  
Consequently, from the perspective of innovation, overconfident CEOs tend to be 
involved with more innovative firms, which might increase firm value and, theoretically, 
decrease the likelihood of long-term underperformance.  
2.2.2 CEO overconfidence, compensation and effort 
In addition to CEO overconfidence and its possible effect of increasing firm value, 
studies have found that overconfidence might also help to reduce the cost of the firm, 
from the perspective of CEO compensation. The argument that overconfident CEOs 
require less compensation than less confident CEOs might appear to be paradoxical 
because, intuitively, overconfident CEOs should believe that they are better than 
average and thus will demand more compensation than less confident CEOs. However, 
a model presented by Gervais et al. (2011) did not support this intuition. In a basic 
principal-agent model, the principal is usually assumed to be risk neutral and an agent 
to be risk averse, as the principal can create a portfolio that allows him or her to balance 
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individual risks while agent’s payoff is closely linked to a single project for which he 
must bear the individual risk (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Such risk aversion decreases 
the utility of the agent’s well-being, consequently, the more risk averse an agent is, the 
higher compensation he or she requires to compensate for the disutility caused by the 
risk premium. As mentioned above, overconfident CEOs are usually more aggressive 
in making decisions, and they are also less risk averse than less confident CEOs (Ben-
David, Graham, & Harvey, 2007). Therefore, overconfident CEOs have lower risk 
premiums and require less compensation for a given level of motivation than less 
confident CEOs. In the extreme case, when CEOs are particularly overconfident, it is 
possible that the principal will exploit the agent’s bias and offer a highly convex 
contract. In such a contract, agents can only obtain higher compensation by working 
extremely hard. When agents are particularly overconfident, they believe that they will 
always be compensated to a greater extent than they can actually achieve, and thus they 
are always willing to accept highly convex contracts. In this situation, principals will 
obtain future benefits because such behavior represents a form of arbitrage regarding 
the CEO’s excessively optimistic belief in the outcomes of his decision (Gervais et al., 
2011; Goel & Thakor, 2008). 
From another perspective, the model developed by Gervais et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that overconfident CEOs exerted more effort than less confident CEOs 
for a given level of compensation. This is likely one of the most prominent reasons that 
overconfident agents are promoted to CEO. 
Compensating overconfident CEOs as if they were less confident entails two 
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primary disadvantages: 1) the shareholders’ payoff is decreased because they are 
overpaying their CEOs, and 2) overconfident CEOs are more sensitive to compensation 
than less confident CEOs, and thus excessive payment is more likely to encourage 
overconfident CEOs to make risky decisions which might turn out to harm the 
shareholders’ best interests (Gervais et al., 2003). Due to the findings that overconfident 
CEOs are generally more likely to make risky decisions than less confident CEOs, when 
compared to overconfident CEOs, less confident CEOs need to be provided with 
stronger incentives, namely increased compensation. Similarly, when overconfident 
CEOs receive the same level of compensation as less confident CEOs, they are more 
likely to engage in risky behavior that might harm the principals’ interests. As a result, 
in practice, it is important to identify the extent of CEOs’ confidence and compensate 
them accordingly.  
 Consequently, from the perspective of compensation and effort, overconfident 
CEOs tend to require less compensation and devote more efforts, both of which 
decreases the cost of firms and theoretically decrease the likelihood of long-term 
underperformance. 
2.2.3 CEO overconfidence and agent conflict 
A CEO with a moderate level of overconfidence was found to cause less agent 
conflict than a less confident CEO, and interestingly, this moderate level of 
overconfidence was found to encourage the CEO to make decisions that would be 
aligned with shareholders’ interests (Gervais et al., 2003). In their model, Gervais et al. 
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(2003) argued that, when making decisions, less confident CEOs tended to postpone 
decisions longer than necessary due to their high level of risk aversion. Such 
postponement behavior was found to be, in most scenarios, contrary the best interests 
of shareholders. For CEOs with a moderate level of overconfidence, as they perceived 
the risk of the potential project to be lower than it actually would be, they tended to 
make the decision faster than rational CEOs, which would be aligned with the best 
interests of shareholders.  
In my opinion, the impact of overconfidence can also be interpreted from another 
perspective: overconfidence helps to reduce conflict between principals and agents and 
makes a principal-agent contract more effective. As the aim of introducing 
compensation or performance pay in a principal-agent contract is to decrease principal-
agent conflict and align the two parties’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989), when 
overconfidence serves a similar function to compensation, theoretically it should be 
true that less compensation is necessary in a contract involving overconfident agents 
than in a contract involving less confident agents.  
Consequently, from the perspective of agent conflict, overconfident CEOs tend to 
decrease agency cost, and hence decrease the likelihood of long-term underperformance. 
2.2.4 CEO overconfidence and companies’ financial risks 
Apple Computers has had a reputation for operating without debt for nearly 20 
years, until 29 April 2013 when it began to sell its first bond offer (Cornell & Shapiro, 
1987). It appears that the company’s financial policy has changed since the exit of its 
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former CEO, Steve Jobs, in October 2011. Steve Jobs was well known not only for his 
achievements with Apple Computers but also for his self-confident character. There is 
an interesting description from his autobiography by Isaacson (2011) concerning how 
he became employed at Atari, “I (Alcorn, the boss of Atari) was told, ‘We’ve got a 
hippie kid in the lobby. He says he’s not going to leave until we hire him. Should we 
call the cops or let him in?” (p. 43). This shows that he was not only persistent but also 
overconfident enough to wear sandals in the lobby of a company where he wished to 
work. Jobs also ranked as one of the greatest innovators in the last 75 years by Business 
Week in 2004. This combination of overconfidence, zero-debt financial policy, and 
innovative behavior, as explained in section 2.4.1, might be no coincidence, which was 
supported by the results from Malmendier and Tate (2005a). With the panel data from 
Forbes 500 CEOs, their results showed that overconfident CEOs tended to regard 
external funds as an unduly cost and these CEOs are more interested in accumulating 
cash flows. As a result, companies with overconfident CEOs are more apt to retain a 
large cash pool and low external debt.  
According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), financial leverage, which is 
calculated as debt divided by equity, is a proper measure of a company’s financial risk. 
The greater the leverage is, the greater the likelihood that the company will be 
vulnerable to financial risk or bankruptcy. A large cash pool can prevent the company 
from closing down if the cash flow ceases. As a result, overconfident CEOs can, to 
some extent, reduce financial risks, from the perspectives of lower financial leverage 
and operating with sufficient cash flows, which decreases the likelihood of long-term 
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underperformance. 
2.2.5 CEO overconfidence and companies’ financial risks 
Overconfident CEOs are more apt to undertake acquisitions. By analyzing CEOs’ 
personal investment in their companies and outsiders’ perceptions of their degree of 
overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate (2008) found that CEOs who were considered 
overconfident were 65 percent more likely to launch an acquisition. In their study, they 
used portrayals of CEOs in the press to measure outsiders’ perceptions of CEO 
overconfidence, and used CEOs’ personal investment portfolios to reveal CEOs’ beliefs 
concerning their firms’ prosperity. The press portrayal data in their sample were 
collected from articles mentioning CEOs in the following leading business publications: 
The New York Times, BusinessWeek, Financial Times, Economist, and Wall Street 
Journal. The number of articles containing words such as confident or confidence and 
optimistic or optimism was used as the CEO overconfidence variable, and the number 
of articles containing the words reliable, cautious, conservative, practical, frugal, or 
steady was used as the variable representing rational CEOs. 
On the one hand, as there are few studies on the direct relationship between 
overconfidence and IPOs, in my opinion, these two proxy methods for measuring 
overconfidence, portrayals of CEOs, and their personal investment can both be used to 
examine the relationship between CEO overconfidence and the likelihood of 
conducting IPO. On the other hand, as stated in Chapter 1, acquisitions could lead to 
IPO long-term underperformance (Brau et al., 2012). Consequently, from the 
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perspective of acquisition, overconfident CEOs might increase the likelihood of long-
term underperformance.  
2.3 Psychological explanations for CEO overconfidence 
Evidence of CEO overconfidence can be traced back to 1988, when Cooper et al. 
(1988) conducted a study using a sample of 2,994 entrepreneurs. They found that 81 
percent of the entrepreneurs regarded the odds of your business succeeding as 7 out of 
10 or even more and 33 percent perceived the success of their business as 10 out of 10. 
Interestingly, when the participants were asked about the odds of any business like you 
succeeding, 39 percent of entrepreneurs perceived the odds as 7 out of 10 or better and 
11 percent perceived the odds as 10 out of 10. The responses to these two questions are 
overly optimistic given the success rate of new entrepreneurs. In my opinion, the gaps 
between these two proportions are impressive (48 percent and 22 percent, respectively), 
which can be interpreted as indicating that 48 percent and 22 percent of these 
entrepreneurs believed that their firms would be successful simply because they were 
the leaders. Additionally, the perceived odds also appear to be overly optimistic 
compared to the average survival rate of new entrepreneurs after 6 years during the 
period from 1986 to 1988, which was 39.8 percent (Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989).  
As stated above, there are two possible reasons that CEOs are overconfident: first, 
CEOs could be “born” that way, meaning that they already possessed this characteristic 
before becoming CEOs, or in other words, overconfidence is one of the reasons that a 
person becomes a CEO; second, CEOs could become overconfident over time, meaning 
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that they “gain” this characteristic through the process of operating their firms, or in 
other words, overconfidence is a result of being a CEO (Billett & Qian, 2008). 
2.3.1 Overconfidence as the reason for becoming a CEO 
It is, again, therefore necessary to analyze this question by dividing CEOs into 
founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs. In this subchapter, the term professional CEO 
will be used to replace the term non-founder CEO, as there are few extant studies of 
overconfidence among inherited CEOs who obtain their positions through blood or 
marriage. As a result, this subchapter will primarily discuss whether founders and 
professionals were already overconfident before becoming CEOs. 
One paradoxical result that might support the assumption that founder CEOs were 
born to be overconfident is the high failure rate of new startup firms. Hayward, 
Shepherd, and Griffin (2006) presented their model and demonstrated that the more 
overconfident CEOs are, the more likely they were to deprive their startups of resources, 
and thus the more likely their startups were to fail. In their study, depriving a firm of 
resources referred to situations such as overconfident founders being more willing to 
start their firms with smaller endowments or being more likely to reduce the liquidity 
of their firms. In these two cases, firm resources were either insufficient from the 
beginning of the startup or made insufficient during the managerial process. In my 
opinion, that result shows that overconfident people tend to start their own firms and 
become CEOs, regardless of the success rate. In other words, overconfidence is the 
reason for becoming a CEO. 
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In contrast to founder CEOs, professional CEOs appear to exhibit less 
overconfidence. An empirical study by Busenitz and Barney (1997) showed that, when 
comparing the founders of start-up companies with an average time of 1.7 years since 
the founding day and managers from middle- to upper-managerial levels in large 
organizations, the former group was significantly more overconfident than the latter, 
operationalized by respondents overestimating the likelihood of being correct. 
Furthermore, if founders’ overconfidence can lead to a startup’s complete failure, 
and the overconfident founder CEOs can be found only in the firms which are relatively 
young? Are all of the overconfident CEOs eliminated and only those with a moderate 
level of confidence remain? An up-to-date empirical study of CEOs from large S&P 
1,500 companies indicated that, among firms considered large and successful, founder 
CEOs exhibited more overconfidence than professional CEOs. Additionally, founders 
were found to have more optimistic forecasts regarding their firms and were more likely 
to regard their firms as undervalued (J. M. Lee et al., 2015). 
In my opinion, based on previous studies, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
founder CEOs are born to be overconfident; they can either lead their firms into 
dangerous situations, in many cases even failure, or they can lead the firms to survive 
and thrive, during which time their overconfident characteristic remains, or might even 
increase (this will be discussed in the following subchapter). Regarding professional 
CEOs, there is no general conclusion, and it is quite likely that they are not excessively 
overconfident before they become CEOs, and they are not as overconfident as the 
founder CEOs. It can be the case especially in the case of middle- to upper-level 
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managers in large firms, and they remain less overconfident once they become CEOs 
compared to the founders. 
2.3.2 Overconfidence as the result of being a CEO 
From an evolutionary perspective, if overconfidence is considered as sort of 
irrationality, it should have been eliminated through the long progress of human 
evolution. However, if overconfidence is a bias that generally exists, especially among 
CEOs, overconfident individuals should be beneficial to their companies if they are to 
“survive” during their careers as managers.  
From a purely economic perspective, overconfident entrepreneurs are argued to 
have the tendency to make decisions based on their own information instead of 
following herd behavior, which causes valuable information that is privately owned by 
less confident entrepreneurs to spread throughout the group. As a result, overconfident 
CEOs tend to lead their firms in a more rational way than less confident CEOs and 
avoid having their decisions influenced by herd behavior (Bernardo & Welch, 2001). 
From the behavioral perspective, it has been observed that entrepreneurs (both 
founder CEOs and professional CEOs) become more overconfident when the 
environment becomes more complex (Forbes, 2005). Thus, it can be assumed that the 
larger a firm becomes, the more overconfident the CEO is likely to be. Comparable 
results have been reported in the case of bank CEOs: the longer they served in their 
positions, the more hubris they exhibited and the more likely they were to attribute good 
news to themselves and bad news to the external environment (N. M. Brennan & 
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Conroy, 2013). 
Regarding the rate at which overconfidence increases during CEOs’ tenure, 
founder CEOs appear to gain overconfidence more rapidly than professional CEOs. 
This can be supported by empirical evidence indicating that the difference in 
overconfidence between senior founders and professional CEOs is larger than that 
between junior founders who just graduated from university and professional CEOs (J. 
M. Lee et al., 2015).  
Based on the above mentioned literature, founder CEOs exhibit a greater level of 
overconfidence than professional CEOs, both before they became CEOs and while they 
served as CEOs. For founders, overconfidence can be interpreted as one of the reasons 
that they became CEOs and as a consequence of working as CEOs. Professional CEOs 
are more likely to be “humble” before they become CEOs, and their overconfidence 
also increases during their time in office, but to a relatively lesser extent when compared 
to founder CEOs.   
This chapter reviewed IPOs from the CEO’s perspective and with respect to CEO 
founder status and CEO overconfidence. In addition to these topics, it explained IPO 
two main phenomena: underpricing and underperformance (Figure 6). Based on the 
extant literature, some aspects of the relationship between CEO and IPOs remain 
unexplained, such as CEO overconfidence and IPO underpricing, which offers a 
potential focus for future research. 
The next chapter will review IPOs from the perspective of underwriters. 
Specifically, IPO phenomena, underpricing and underperformance, will be discussed 
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on the basis of both economic and psychological studies. 
Figure 6 The influence of CEO founder status and CEO overconfidence on short-term 
IPO underpricing and long-term IPO underperformance. The pluses and minuses 
reflect how two factors are correlated. For instance, CEO overconfidence increases 
the likelihood of company innovation, and hence a plus sign is placed in front of 
“innovation”. “Hypothetical” means that there are no direct empirical studies on 
these aspects, and hence the positive or negative correlations can be only assumed 
based on extant studies. 
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Chapter 4 Underwriters in IPOs 
Underwriters, which can be investment banks or commercial banks, help issuers 
to sell their debt or equity issues to the public, and their function is similar to that of 
wholesalers in commodity selling (Evan & Levin, 1966). Although U.S. commercial 
banks were prevented from engaging in underwriting activities by the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act, due to their frequent lending relationships with issuers, commercial banks 
have gradually become active in underwriting since 1989 (Drucker & Puri, 2005; 
Yasuda, 2005). Investment banks, by contrast, have always been active in the 
underwriting business, and they are occasionally directly referred as underwriters by 
default (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Dunbar, 2000). For instance, in 2014, the top 
three underwriters as measured by the amount of proceeds raised in the IPO market 
were: Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, and Citicorp (Renaissance Capital, 2015c).  
As stated in the previous chapters, although hiring underwriters for an IPO is 
considered costly, when comparing the overall advantages and disadvantages, 
prominent scholars assume that issuing new shares with the help of underwriters is 
preferable because doing so saves time and energy. When the opportunity cost is 
considered, i.e., the gains issuers would have made from devoting their time and energy 
to operating the business instead of conducting an IPO on their own, hiring underwriters 
can represent a savings for issuers (Kanatas & Qi, 1998; Posnett & Jan, 1996). 
Additionally, anecdotal statistics reveal that, in the 1970s, over 90 percent of IPO 
companies went public with the participation of underwriters (Smith Jr, 1977). 
Furthermore, of the 32 companies that issued initial public offerings from November 
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2014 to December 2014, all hired underwriters (Renaissance Capital, 2015b). Statistics 
also indicate that underwriters have increasingly participated in the IPO process: the 
average annual number of managing underwriters (the main members in an underwriter 
syndicate) increased steadily, from 1.4 in 1975 to 6.4 in 2014 (Ritter, 2014a). Thus, 
underwriters have consistently played a significant role in the IPO process in recent 
decades, which makes it crucial to discuss the tasks that underwriters perform in an IPO.  
For years, more than one underwriter has consistently been involved in a given 
IPO (Ritter, 2014a). Theoretically, a single underwriter is also capable of executing an 
IPO. For instance, Rajan and Servaes (1997) included IPOs with one underwriter in 
their sample covering the period from 1985 to 1987. However, in practice, the complete 
underwriting service is conducted by a group of underwriters, which is referred to as an 
underwriter syndicate in most circumstances (Oesch, Schuette, & Walter, 2015; 
Pollock, Porac, & Wade, 2004).  
Empirical studies have found several advantages of forming an underwriter 
syndicate, such as risk sharing, fair information practices, and increased monitoring of 
issuing companies (Corwin & Schultz, 2005; R. S. Hansen & Torregrosa, 1992; Yasuda, 
2005). First, risk sharing is one of the primary reasons that a management group forms 
a syndicate. Using a sample of 1,535 bond issues, Yasuda (2005) found that the main 
function of lower-tier underwriters in a syndicate was risk sharing, which was also the 
main reason that they were initially invited to participate in the syndicate. Second, 
according to Yasuda (2005), the efficiency and comprehensiveness of information 
production was one primary reasons that top-tiers underwriters were invited to 
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participate in a syndicate. Additionally, a study using a sample of 1,638 underwriter 
syndicates found that the likelihood of revising initial-price-related information was 
positively correlated with the number of underwriters in the syndicate, i.e., fair 
information practices are more likely during initial price setting when a syndicate, 
rather than a single underwriter, is involved (Corwin & Schultz, 2005). Third, a 
syndicate can effectively increase monitoring of issuers, which is also considered a 
legitimate function of an underwriter syndicate (R. S. Hansen & Torregrosa, 1992). One 
direct result of increased issuer monitoring is that it enhances the intrinsic value of the 
issuing company, i.e., a well-monitored company is valued more highly than a 
relatively less monitored company (R. S. Hansen & Torregrosa, 1992; Jensen, 2001). 
Among these reasons for forming a syndicate, the first reason (risk-sharing) directly 
benefits underwriters, and hence they are willing to collaborate with one another, 
despite the possibility that their individual compensation could be reduced. The last two 
reasons benefit issuers: information processing reduces the level of underpricing in the 
short term, and increased monitoring increases companies’ intrinsic value and 
decreases the likelihood of underperformance in the long term. Both reasons make 
issuers willing to hire an underwriter syndicate instead of a single underwriter. 
An important consideration in most collective relationships, including syndicates, 
is the homogeneity within the syndicate, where homophily principle can be applied. 
“Similarity breeds connection” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001, p. 415), and 
homophily principle states that once categorizes one’s personal environment with 
respect to similarity in features such as race, ethical behaviors, age, and religion. One 
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example demonstrating that the homophily principle can be applied at an 
interorganizational level was provided by Shi and Tang (in press). Their empirical study 
showed that, in the U.S., numerous joint venture activities were significantly associated 
with both religious and ethnic similarity, which supports the hypothesis that firms with 
similar cultures tend to establish strategic alliances (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai (2004) also conducted a study at the interorganizational 
level. They categorized the extant literature based on the features of firms that had been 
studied, such as homogenous motives, trust, learning, and equity. The similarity of such 
features was found to foster the creation of strong ties among firms. 
However, no extant study (either empirical or theoretical) has focused directly on 
the possible similarities among members of underwriter syndicates, which, in my 
opinion, might have profound implications for the study of underpricing. Using the 
abovementioned studies as a reference, it can be assumed that members of an 
underwriter syndicate that share more similarities tend to have closer ties with one 
another. Furthermore, closer ties might lead to less diversified opinions regarding the 
initial price, which increases the likelihood of underpricing (Corwin & Schultz, 2005). 
Hence, I propose a hypothesis for future study: the greater the similarities that are 
shared among the members of an underwriter syndicate, the more likely it is that IPO 
shares will be underpriced. Note that there are several factors that might influence the 
likelihood of forming a syndicate in addition to homogeneity. For instance, the 
popularity of the issuing firm’s industry, the issuing firm’s home region, the maturity 
of the issuing firm, the group size of the underwriter syndicate, and the syndicate’s 
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density, i.e., the extant relationship ties among the potential syndicate members. These 
factors are derived from an empirical study of U.S. venture capital syndicates from 
1985 to 2007, which showed that even with distant geographical and industrial ties, 
certain features increased the likelihood that venture capitalists would form a syndicate. 
These features include: 1) the current investment popularity of the target company’s 
industry, 2) target company’s home region, 3) how mature the target company is, 4) the 
size of the syndicate and 5) the density of the relationships among members (Sorenson 
& Stuart, 2008).  
In addition to homogeneity within an underwriter syndicate, heterogeneity is also 
required because different members are supposed to perform different functions during 
an IPO process. An underwriter syndicate can be divided into three groups with respect 
to function: the management group, the underwriting group, and the selling group 
(Torstila, 2001). Note that categorization of these groups is not only based on the 
various functions of each group but also according to the sequence of when each group 
is active during the IPO process. However, the classification is not based on the role of 
a single underwriter. In other words, possible overlaps exist across these three groups, 
and one syndicate member can serve in more than one of the three groups. Various 
factors, such as the number of new issues, the scale of the issuing companies, and the 
relationship between underwriter and issuer, might cause such overlap (Corwin & 
Schultz, 2005; Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001).  
This chapter will describe each group in sequential order according to their tasks 
during the IPO process. The functions of each group and their influence on IPO 
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underpricing and underperformance will be the main focus. 
1. The Management Group 
According to Torstila (2001), the management group includes one lead 
underwriter and several co-managers. The obligation of the management group is to 
structure the syndicate and to invite audit companies, legal firms, and investment banks 
to join the other two groups. In other words, the function of the management group, 
specifically the lead underwriter, is to serve as the recruiter and organizer of the 
members of the syndicate (Torstila, 2001). 
1.1 Lead underwriter 
A lead underwriter, as the name implies, is the leader of the underwriter syndicate 
and the head of the management group. It functions as a combination of the three groups: 
in addition to recruiting, it administrates the road show, as the underwriting group does 
(Krigman et al., 2001); it helps to distribute IPO shares, as the selling group does, for 
instance, for IPOs on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange between 1997 to 2002, the clients 
of lead underwriters purchased 8.79 percent of the total issue amount (Griffin, Harris, 
& Topaloglu, 2007). Note that the recruiting and organizing function, which selects the 
underwriters that will be invited to participate in the syndicate, is an unique function 
that the members of other groups are unable to exercise (Cheolwoo Lee, Jeon, & Kim, 
2011). To my understanding, this is also the reason that the lead underwriter is placed 
in the management group. 
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Theoretically, lead underwriters are important because they determine the 
members of the syndicate; empirically, lead underwriters influence issuers in various 
ways. For instance, results indicate that more prestigious lead underwriters were 
involved in IPOs with lower returns because such underwriters tend to choose issuers 
with lower issuing risk (Carter & Manaster, 1990); another study showed that the 
activities of lead underwriters before IPO issuance were closely related to the rate of 
return on the initial day, and the activities of lead underwriters after IPO issuance can 
have a long-term effect on issuers’ underperformance (Logue, Rogalski, Seward, & 
Foster-Johnson, 2002). Furthermore, by focusing on the influence of Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy after the financial crisis in 2008, Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012) 
found that among all Lehman’s clients that received underwriting, advisory, analyst, 
and market-making services, only the underwriting clients suffered a substantial, on 
average 5 percent within 7 days, the aggregate risk-adjusted amount of which is $23 
billion. 
Hence, the selection of lead underwriters is of significant importance. There are 
two models describing lead underwriter selection in the extant literature: the mutual 
selection model and unidirectional selection model. The mutual selection model 
emphasizes the opinions of both sides, i.e., how underwriters and issuers choose one 
another (Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 2005). The theoretical support for this model is 
that both issuers and underwriters may have a substantial impact on one another in 
terms of further public offerings, long-term performance, reputation, and so forth. In 
this model, the final deal is based on a two-sided mechanism. Specifically, underwriters 
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consider the quality of the issuers, such as the amount of issues, the likelihood that the 
IPO will be approved by the SEC, the long-term performance of the issuing firms, and 
the likelihood of future cooperation, i.e., whether issuers will issue secondary equity 
offerings (SEO). Issuers consider the capabilities of underwriters, especially the 
services they can offer, including their certification, promotion, allocation and further 
support for the IPO shares (Fernando et al., 2005).  
In addition to the mutual selection model, most studies have focused on the 
unidirectional selection model. This model emphasizes factors influencing issuers’ 
choice of lead underwriters, where issuers select underwriters to cooperate with and 
underwriters’ opinions are not considered. For instance, IPOs supported by venture 
capitalists were found to be more likely to hire underwriters with all-star analysts (X. 
Liu & Ritter, 2011). Empirical study from Japan showed that issuers were more likely 
to choose underwriters where their board members had previously worked (Takahashi, 
2014).  
In practice, for instance in the U.S., issuers are the final decision makers 
concerning whether they will collaborate with lead underwriters. Such decisions are 
usually made through a bake-off stage, which is also referred to as a beauty contest or 
beauty pageant (Fernando et al., 2005; Jenkinson & Jones, 2009a; Lowry & Schwert, 
2004). The bake-off is usually held a minimum of six months before the IPO. In the 
bake-off, investment banks compete via written proposals and oral presentations 
(Jenkinson & Jones, 2009a). This may be the main reason that most studies focus on 
the unidirectional selection model, i.e., only consider the issuers’ perspective. In 
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addition to the capabilities and services underwriters offer (Fernando et al., 2005), two 
other factors were found to influence issuers’ choice of lead underwriters. 
The first is the previous lending relationship. By analyzing 16,625 US debt and 
equity offerings (including IPOs), the main factor influencing lead underwriter choice 
was found to be the previous lending and underwriting relationships with banks 
(Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006). For IPOs, the dominant factor is the lending 
relationship because there cannot be any previous underwriting relationship. In other 
words, issuers prefer to choose their previous lenders as their lead underwriters. Similar 
results can be found in empirical studies by Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 
(2007) and Drucker and Puri (2005).  
The second factor is the underwriter’s reputation. Prestigious underwriters were 
found to be associated with low-return IPOs, i.e., IPOs with a lower amount of 
underpricing in the short term (Carter & Manaster, 1990). In the long term, specifically 
a three-year holding period, more prestigious underwriters were found to be associated 
with less severe IPO underperformance (Carter et al., 1998). The argument that the 
underwriters with better reputation are usually correlated with better after-market 
performance by issuing firms was also supported by evidence from other countries, 
such as Chinese non-state-owned IPO firms that collaborated with more prestigious 
underwriters exhibited significantly better performance (C. Chen, Shi, & Xu, 2013).  
However, the correlations between underwriters’ reputation and the amount of 
underpricing vary across samples from different countries. For instance, an empirical 
study from Australia showed that issuers that cooperated with more prestigious 
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underwriters tended to exhibit greater underpricing (Dimovski, Philavanh, & Brooks, 
2011), analysis from China showed that there was no significant relationship between 
underwriters’ reputation and underpricing (Su & Bangassa, 2011), and results from the 
U.S showed that more prestigious underwriters were correlated with lower returns, i.e., 
lower underpricing (Carter & Manaster, 1990).  
There are several potential explanations for such results: different stock market 
regulations, different demands for IPO shares, and the different periods considered by 
the studies. An empirical study from Japan showed that levels of underpricing depended 
on the demand for the issues. For hot IPOs, the level of underpricing was positively 
related to underwriters’ reputation; for cold IPOs, the level of underpricing was 
negatively related to underwriters’ reputation (Kirkulak & Davis, 2005). The period of 
the study is also important because the focus of IPOs has changed over time. Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) divided the years between 1980 and 2003 into four periods: 1980s, 
1990-1998, 1999-2000, and 2001-2003, when the average first-day return on IPOs was 
7, 15, 65 and 12 percent, respectively. They argued that in the last period, namely after 
the internet bubble (1999 to 2000), the focus of IPOs shifted from maximizing issuers’ 
proceeds to increasing individual wealth. In other words, before the internet bubble 
period (1999 to 2000), issuers sought underwriters that minimized underpricing such 
that new issues can be sold at the highest price; after the bubble period, issuers began 
to cooperate with underwriters, which created greater underpricing, and hence pre-IPO 
shareholders could increase their personal wealth. Specifically, X. Liu and Ritter (2010) 
found that for hot IPOs, executives of issuing firms who had personal accounts with 
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stock brokers intentionally sought underwriters with a reputation for severe 
underpricing instead of avoiding them. One approach whereby lead underwriters can 
engender substantial underpricing is to have high analyst coverage, in other words, 
having a large number of affiliated analysts (Cliff & Denis, 2004). 
Because this is the first appearance of the term analyst coverage in this dissertation, 
several concepts related to analyst coverage need to be clarified, which is also an 
interesting phenomenon I observed when reviewing the available literature. There is no 
universal definition of the term analyst coverage, but there are four common meanings 
of the term. First, it is used to describe the number of analysts or the size of the analyst 
group tracking and observing a specific stock or firm (see Bhushan, 1989; Cliff & Denis, 
2004). Second, it refers to all of the individual analysts in an analyst group or to an 
analyst group as an entity. Such studies are typically related to all-star analysts who 
are prestigious and are able to cause strong market reaction (Clarke, Khorana, Patel, & 
Rau, 2007). Third, it represents analyst recommendations, such as in the research of 
James and Karceski (2006), where “favorable” (p. 1) was used to describe the coverage, 
and “strength of coverage” (p. 2) was used to describe analyst recommendation, such 
as strong buy, buy, etc., similar to the usage in Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008). 
Fourth, it is used to refer analyst forecasts (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000). An analyst 
forecast represents the analyst’s prediction of a certain firm’s future earnings (as in 
analyst earnings forecast) or a firm’s future development (as in analyst growth forecast). 
Differences between these two types of forecasts can be found in Lin and McNichols 
(1998).  
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Thus in this dissertation, to avoid confusion, I will only use the term analyst 
coverage as in the first sense, which is to describe the number of analysts. In the other 
three cases, I will explicitly use the terms individual analyst or analyst, analyst 
recommendation, and analyst forecast, respectively. In the last case, analyst earnings 
forecast and analyst growth forecast will be specifically noted when necessary. 
To conclude, on the one hand, issuers need to be particularly cautious when 
choosing lead underwriters because issuers might be strongly influenced by negative 
news related to their lead underwriter; on the other hand, issuers tend to primarily 
consider the following three factors during their decision-making process: 1) the 
capabilities and services of underwriters, 2) previous lending relationship, and 3) 
underwriter reputation. However, whereas there is no universal consensus concerning 
whether issuers pursue prestigious underwriters, the two other factors are positively 
correlated with the likelihood that an issuer will cooperate with an underwriter. 
1.2 Co-manager 
The other role in the management group is the co-manager. Currently, there is 
typically more than one co-manager in an underwriting syndicate, all of which are 
chosen by issuers during the bake-off stage in a similar process to that used to select 
the lead underwriter (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000; Ellis et al., 2000). Before the 1980s, 
a single lead underwriter was the only participant and performed the roles of all three 
groups in a single IPO underwriting deal (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000). In other words, 
before the 1980s, there was no co-manager. Thereafter, the average number of co-
138 
 
managers in an underwriter syndicate has consistently, from 0.4 in 1980 to 5.4 in 2014 
(Ritter, 2014a).  
In addition to the abovementioned advantages of using an underwriter syndicate 
over a single underwriter, other reasons responsible for the growing number of co-
managers participating in an IPO can be interpreted from the perspectives of co-
managers and issuers. From the perspective of co-managers, specifically investment 
banks and commercial banks, they are eager to become co-managers even if they fail 
to be chosen as lead underwriters for two main reasons. First, the responsibility of co-
managers is substantially smaller compared with that of lead underwriters; for example, 
the former’s role after an IPO concerning market making is limited (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 
2000; Ellis et al., 2000), while the commissions they receive are relatively larger 
relative to the functions they execute. Examples from H. C. Chen and Ritter (2000) 
showed that, among all the three components of the underwriting commission 
(management fee, underwriting fee, and selling fee), the only part that differentiates the 
commissions of the lead underwriter and co-managers is the selling fee, which is 
proportional to the number of shares they each distribute or sell. Beyond this factor, the 
management fee and underwriting fee received by the lead underwriter and co-
managers are identical2. Second, future collaboration between issuers and co-managers 
is highly likely, meaning that co-managers have an opportunity to be promoted to the 
lead underwriters for issuers’ further equity issuing activities, namely SEOs (Corwin & 
Schultz, 2005; Krigman et al., 2001). Krigman et al. (2001) showed that in a sample of 
                                                             
2  The examples from H. C. Chen and Ritter (2000) only include the case in which there is one co-manager. In the 
case of multiple co-managers, the approach to splitting commissions will be different.  
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572 IPO firms issuing SEOs, approximately one-third of the sample (180 firms) 
switched their lead underwriters. Among these switchers, in 25.6 percent of the cases, 
issuers promoted one of their co-managers from the IPO to be the lead underwriter for 
their SEOs.  
From the issuers’ perspective, there are also two main reasons for hiring co-
managers. First, the fees issuers pay for the entire underwriting syndicate are fixed in 
most cases3, namely, at 7 percent of the total proceeds that the new shares will raise on 
the stock market, calculated as the initial price multiplied by the number of issued 
shares (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000; Fernando, Gatchev, May, & Megginson, 2014). For 
instance, for a firm issuing 2 million IPO shares with an initial price of $20 per share, 
the total commission for the entire underwriter syndicate is 7%*($20*2) million = 2.8 
million, regardless of the number of co-managers in the syndicate. Second, the more 
co-managers there are, the more analysts they will bring, and thus the more analyst 
earnings forecasts will be provided (Cliff & Denis, 2004; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). An 
analysis of a sample of 3,032 IPO firms showed that adding an extra co-manager could 
increase the number of analysts who follow the stock by between 0.36 and 0.55 (H. C. 
Chen & Ritter, 2000). Additionally, the larger the size of the issuing firm and the 
amount of the IPO issuance are, the more analysts the issuer would require (Barth, 
Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001). As a result, for issuers with large firm size and IPO 
issuance, it is necessary to hire more co-managers who will thus bring more analysts. 
                                                             
3 Here, “most cases” means that there 77 percent of the sample of 1,101 IPOs from 1995 to 1998 adopted the 7-
percent payment method, with the trend increasing over time. The 7-percent payment method is especially 
popular among IPOs with proceeds from $20 million to $79.99 million, reaching 91 percent among the sample 
from 1995 to 1998.   
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Hence, for issuers, the total commission they pay for the syndicate is constant, and more 
co-managers are likely to bring more analysts. Consequently, it is reasonable for issuers 
to hire more co-managers, especially for large issuing firms or a large amount of IPO 
issuance.  
In my opinion, based on the statistics from Ritter (2014a), it seems that the number 
of co-managers has yet to reach its upper limit. Among the three parties, issuers, 
underwrites and investors, the only parties that has the motivation to stop the number 
of co-managers from increasing are the members of the underwriting syndicate. When 
the entire syndicate receives a constant commission amount, the more co-managers 
there are, the less commission each syndicate member can obtain, which is especially 
true for the lead underwriter (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000). Thus how many co-managers 
will be engaged in an underwriting activity becomes a bargain between the lead 
underwriter and the issuer. No extant studies have documented any negotiations 
between lead underwriters and issuers on this topic, and there is no practical evidence 
concerning the outcomes of such negotiations. Thus, the outcome depends on who has 
the stronger bargaining position before the underwriter syndicate is formed.  
In my opinion, issuers hold the stronger position for two reasons: first, as stated 
previously, issuers are the final decision makers concerning their collaboration with 
underwriters (Fernando et al., 2005); second, among banks’ business lines, the 
underwriting business is the main source of income for investment banks and 
commercial banks. “Investment bankers readily admit that the IPO business is very 
profitable”(H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000, p. 1105). When competing to be an issuer’s 
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favorite underwriter, bankers are more likely to be in a weaker position when 
bargaining with the issuer. Additionally, Corwin and Schultz (2005) found that having 
more co-managers tended to provide fairer information related to the initial price, and 
thus less underpricing would be created. Therefore, in my opinion, the function of co-
managers can be interpreted as supervisors hired by the issuers rather than as assistants 
to the lead underwriter. No extant studies have explicitly focused on the role of co-
managers from this perspective, and interesting results might be found by studying 
which party has a stronger influence on how co-managers execute their roles in an IPO 
process. Furthermore, a hypothesis that issuers with more co-managers might exhibit 
less underperformance can be proposed for future study, if the results of the study 
proposed above were to show that co-managers function more as supervisors for the 
issuers than as the assistants of lead underwriters. 
2. The Underwriting Group and the Selling Group 
In the previous subchapter, lead underwriters and co-managers were introduced as 
the management group that administrates the underwriting business and recruits other 
members of the syndicate. In addition to these two parties, the literature tends to neglect 
other underwriters in the syndicate because they are the lower-tier underwriters and 
play insignificant roles (Yasuda, 2005). However, in this dissertation, as the three 
groups are differentiated according to functions instead of entities, the other two groups 
that serve underwriting and selling functions are considered equally important. The 
order in which these functions are performed is in accordance with the practical 
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sequence of the IPO process, which demonstrates how an underwriter syndicate 
operates during different phases of underwriting IPO shares. Because the underwriting 
group and selling group share numerous similarities, the similarities will first be 
presented in the following paragraphs, and the differences will be presented in 
Subchapters 2.1 and 2.2.  
The underwriting group and selling group can jointly be termed the non-
management group, the members of which are selected by lead underwriters and issuers. 
The non-management group holds less responsibility in an IPO process compared with 
the management group and receives substantially lower commissions. For instance, the 
number of new shares that will be allocated to the non-management group for further 
distribution is decided 48 hours before the initial date, while for the lead underwriter 
and co-managers, the numbers of shares allocated is decided upfront (Corwin & Schultz, 
2005; Narayanan, Rangan, & Rangan, 2004).  
There are several parties that might be hired as members of a non-management 
group: 1) the previous, current, or potential future lenders of issuers (usually banks) 
(Bharath et al., 2007; Corwin & Schultz, 2005; Yasuda, 2005); 2) close business 
partners of the issuers (Corwin & Schultz, 2005); and 3) parties that have personal ties 
with important individuals of the lead underwriter or the issuers (Corwin & Schultz, 
2005; Takahashi, 2014). Most likely, these members are hired primarily to maintain 
important business relationships for issuers: either to repay or reward the previous 
lenders or to develop existing relationships for the future. Hence, it is highly likely that 
some members engage in flipping activities when issuers intend to reward them. 
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Conversely, members that wish to maintain relationship with issuers are less likely to 
flip to preserve the potential for future cooperation. No extant studies have analyzed 
flipping activities from this perspective. Thus, future studies could use the type of 
relationship between issuers and underwriters as an indicator of flipping activities, 
where the more likely future cooperation is, the less likely underwriters will be to 
engage in flipping activities.  
The underwriting group is responsible for the paperwork that must be submitted 
to the SEC and the documents to be disclosed to the public. The most important 
paperwork and documents include 1) Form S-1 required by the SEC as a registration 
statement, which includes a preliminary prospectus stating the range of the anticipated 
offer price and the amount of the new issues; 2) various pieces of financial information 
on the issuers, such as annually audited financial statements, interim unaudited financial 
statements and other required company financial information; 3) a final prospectus 
clarifying the final offer price shortly before the IPO; and 4) relevant legal documents 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015c).  
Among the abovementioned four parts, the final prospectus (the third part) should 
be considered a common function performed by both the underwriting group and the 
selling group. On the one hand, the main difference between the preliminary prospectus 
and the final prospectus is that the latter includes the final offer price, and the former 
includes only the offer price spread. In other words, the majority of the preliminary 
prospectus remains unchanged in the final version (Daily et al., 2005; Garfinkel, 1993). 
On the other hand, functionally, the preliminary prospectus is prepared to obtain the 
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approval of SEC, whereas the final prospectus is prepared for potential investors. Thus, 
in my opinion, based on the main contributors to and purposes of these two prospectuses, 
the final prospectus should be considered a joint task of the underwriting group and 
selling group.    
The selling group is primarily composed of investment banks. Following SEC 
approval, this group conducts the road show, collects requests from clients, especially 
institutional investors, and distributes the shares to the primary investors (Torstila, 
2001).  
Note, again, that because the syndicate is divided into three groups based on their 
functions instead of based on individual entities, overlaps among these groups exist. In 
other words, one individual identity (one investment bank or commercial bank) can 
work in more than one group. For instance, lead underwriters distribute the largest 
number of shares to primary investors and thus belong to the selling group. Hence, it is 
not the entire underwriting group or selling group that has few responsibilities or plays 
an insignificant role but the individual entities (investment banks or commercial banks) 
that are not part of the management group and are referred to as low-tier underwriters 
(Carter et al., 1998; Yasuda, 2005). 
2.1 The underwriting group, underpricing and underperformance 
As stated above, the main task of the underwriting group is to compile documents 
that need to be submitted to the SEC and the public. This task can also be disentangled 
into a three-stage process: information discovery, integration and disclosure.  
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The three stages take place in a sequential order, which has not been presented or 
analyzed in the extant literature. Hence, in the following part, factors that might 
influence the main IPO phenomena (underpricing and underperformance) will be 
discussed with respect to these three operations, information discovery, information 
integration, and information disclosure. Note that the information discussed here is 
more formal and transparent than the information considered in a later stage of an IPO, 
namely the road show or market making stage, due to SEC regulations (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2015f). Specifically, the approach by which documents 
that present such information is strictly regulated and thus can be measured under 
universal standards. For instance, in the U.S., financial statements are regulated by 
accounting standards issued by American Accounting Association (American 
Accounting Association, 1966), and the SEC regulates how the preliminary prospectus 
must be compiled (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015e). In my opinion, 
such information will directly influence the success of the IPO application, the analyst 
recommendations and forecasts, issuers’ underperformance, and indirectly, the offer 
price and the popularity of the new issues among investors. 
2.1.1 Information discovery  
This stage begins when the underwriting group begins to collaborate with the 
issuers. Underwriters’ main objectives during this stage are: 1) to conduct due diligence 
research and obtain the relevant information through direct communication with issuers, 
2) to cooperate on external audits for IPO and legal experts, and 3) to review the issuers’ 
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financial statements (Michaely & Womack, 1999; Sjostrom Jr, 2005). A large body of 
studies has focused on the asymmetric information between issuers and investors 
(Cohen & Dean, 2005; Hughes, 1986), and most of these studies focused on the case in 
which underwriters have superior information relative to issuers (Baron, 1982; 
Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1989). However, in my opinion, instances of asymmetric 
information in which issuers possess more information than underwriters can have a 
larger impact on underwriters’ outcomes, as, at this stage, underwriters are the most 
important intermediaries from which investors obtain information. Hence, underwriters 
having inferior information directly leads to asymmetric information between issuers 
and investors.  
In my opinion, there are two potential explanations for the lack of research in this 
context. First, it is difficult to measure and compare issuers’ financial status before and 
after underwriters’ participation because all financial information is privately owned 
before an IPO. Furthermore, the prospectus compiled by the underwriters contains not 
only raw information from before underwriters’ participation but also information that 
has been categorized and sorted by the underwriters. Second, in this stage both issuers 
and underwriters are driven by the same goal: to ensure that the SEC approves the IPO 
application. Hence both parties might intend to collude. Further details on such possible 
connivance will be discussed in Subchapter 2.1.2, on the information integration stage. 
As stated above, information disclosed by the underwriting group is the primary 
information revealing issuer characteristics to investors, and hence when both parties 
tend to connive and engage in window-dressing behavior, positive illusions concerning 
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issuing firms are likely to be created. In the short term, such illusions might temporarily 
generate high demand from individual investors for IPO shares, which would lead to 
an instant rise in the stock price in the secondary market and increase the level of 
underpricing. In the long term, the market bubble created by such an illusion will burst 
when the temporary demands from individual investors disappear and, in turn, increase 
the extent of underperformance. Thus, asymmetric information between underwriters 
and issuers at this stage might lead to issuers’ underpricing and underperformance and 
hence should be studied. 
I hereby propose several possible parameters to measure the asymmetric 
information at this stage. 1) The ambiguity of the prospectus. An ambiguously worded 
prospectus might suggest that information is not fully disclosed, and thus the hypothesis 
should be that the extent of the ambiguity in the prospectus is positively correlated with 
issuers’ underperformance. For information on a parameter to measure ambiguity, refer 
to Arnold, Fishe, and North (2010) and Goetzmann, Ravid, Sverdlove, and Pons-Sanz 
(2008), where relative word counts between hard information and soft information were 
used to measure the level of ambiguity. According to Arnold et al. (2010), hard 
information refers to numerical information, whereas soft information refers textual 
information. In other words, the proportion of disclosed textual and descriptive 
information is positively related to the ambiguity of the prospectus. 2) Changes between 
the preliminary prospectus and final prospectus. Significant changes between these two 
versions of the prospectus (expect for the initial price) made for no clear reason can be 
interpreted as issuers having not fully disclosed their information. Hence, once could 
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hypothesize that the amount of changes between two prospectuses is positively 
correlated with issuers’ underperformance. 3) Differences in the opinions issued by the 
third-party audit and that of the underwriting group. While it is rare for their opinions 
to conflict, when significant conflict is detected, the possibility of biased judgments 
must be considered (however, such conflicts can also be results of the audit). Hence, 
once can hypothesize that the extent to which the opinions of auditors and underwriters 
conflict is positively correlated with issuers’ underperformance. Studies related to 
auditing firms, underpricing and underperformance have been conducted and found, 
among other observations, that there is less underpricing for auditing firms with higher 
reputation (Wang & Wilkins, 2007) and that audit quality is positively correlated with 
the survival rate of IPO companies (Jain & Martin Jr, 2005). Such studies reveal the 
importance of auditing firms and demonstrate the importance of noticing differences of 
opinion between auditors and underwriters and the possible correlation of such 
differences with issuers’ underperformance.  
2.1.2 Information integration 
During this stage, underwriting group analyzes the information generated and 
discovered in the previous stage, compiles Form S-1 (one of the required forms in an 
IPO application) and other related documents (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015c). As stated above, because both issuers and underwriters share a 
common motivation during this stage, they are likely to engage in collusive activities 
when disclosing the information.  
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In my opinion, this stage provides limited opportunities for underwriters to collude 
with issuers, except for the information disclosed in the prospectus, as the remaining 
information must be presented under universal standards according to SEC regulations. 
For instance, financial statements requires a format that is beyond the scope of 
underwriters’ influence (American Accounting Association, 1966; U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2015e). It can be assumed that there is greater opportunity for 
collusion when information is less transparent and relatively informal. This assumption 
is based on studies about transparency in general, where market transparency was found 
to reduce collusive price effects (C. Schultz, 2005), transparency was positively 
correlated with personal accountability (Roberts, 2009), and financial standards are 
accompanied by information quality and transparency (Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 
2007). Note that the extent of information transparency differs throughout the 
underwriting process, such as the transparency of information released by sell-side 
analysts while making recommendations in the road show and information revealed 
during market making of the selling stage, both of which will be discussed in 
subsequent subchapters.  
In my opinion, a prospectus is the type of document that contains the most 
ambiguous information of all documents provided by the underwriting group. In a 
prospectus, 10 sections contain information that might substantially influence investors’ 
decision making (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015c). 1) The 
prospectus summary, which includes a general introduction to issuers, such as their 
routine business, corporate strategy, general financial condition, and prospective uses 
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of the raised funds. 2) Risk factors, which could significantly influence business and 
future performance from the perspective of the issuing company’s management. 3) The 
use of proceeds, which specifies the plans for the money raised from issuing new shares. 
4) Dividend policy, which includes the future plans for paying dividends and the 
historical payments to shareholders. 5) Dilution, which exists in most cases and means 
that the book value of a stock is different from the average price paid by all existing 
shareholders. 6) Selected financial data, which include specified financial data from the 
previous five years (in some cases, two years or even none 4 ). 7) Management’s 
discussion and analysis, which discloses issuers’ financial conditions from the 
management’s perspective. 8) Business, which describes issuers’ business in detail, 
such as significant suppliers, consumers, competitors, and subsidiaries. Additionally, 
legal proceedings are conducted at the end of this section, disclosing significant 
litigation in which the issuers are involved. 9) Management, which reports biographic 
information on directors and CEOs. 10) Financial statement and notes, which consists 
of the audited financial statements for the previous three years (in some cases, two 
years5). Additionally, this section begins with an auditor’s opinion from the unbiased 
auditor who has audited the issuer’s financial statements (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015c).  
Of the 10 sections of the prospectus, the 1) prospectus summary, 2) risk factors 
                                                             
4 According to the SEC, only two years of selected financial data are required if the company is an “emerging 
growth company”, which has less than $1 billion in revenue. No selected financial data are required if the 
company is a “smaller reporting company”, meaning that its stock will be valued at less than $75 million in public 
transactions after the IPO. 
5 According to the SEC, only two years of financial statements are required if the company is an “emerging 
growth company” or a “smaller reporting company”. 
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and 7) management’s discussion and analysis contain mostly textual information rather 
than numerical information. As stated above, textual and descriptive information is 
considered soft information that is highly ambiguous (Arnold et al., 2010; Petersen, 
2004), and thus these sections might convey ambiguous information, and investors and 
researchers should devote additional attention to them. 
There are a few extant studies focusing on IPO prospectuses from different 
perspectives. For instance, no significant correlation was found between the 
information offered in the prospectus (such as founder CEO status, board prestige, and 
firm size) and the initial price (Daily et al., 2005), whereas prospectus information (such 
as firm size, prior profitability, and spending on research & development (R&D)) was 
found to be a useful forecast of IPO firms’ survival rate. Specifically, firm size and 
prior profitability are positively correlated with the one-year abnormal return after the 
IPO; spending on R&D is also related to the one-year abnormal return but only to a 
limited extent (Bhabra & Pettway, 2003).  
In my opinion, most extant studies have focused on the numerical information 
contained in the prospectus, such as firm size and age instead of textual information. 
The lack of such studies could be due to the abovementioned reason that the parameters 
to measure the extent of asymmetry are difficult to obtain. One approach in practice to 
decrease information ambiguity is that laws and regulations should encourage privately 
owned companies to reveal their financial information to the public, as is the case in 
Italy (financial information on privately owned Italian companies can be found at 
www.cerved.com). As such changes might be difficult to implement in the short run, it 
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might be more realistic to require companies that plan to issue IPOs to provide financial 
information two or three years ahead of the issuance, instead of revealing such 
information after the underwriters’ investigation. By implementing such regulation, it 
would be possible to reduce the likelihood of issuers exploiting their superior 
information and of collusion between issuers and underwriters. 
2.1.3 Information disclosure 
During this stage, all relevant documents prepared in the previous stages are 
disclosed to the public and submitted to the SEC. Such information is available to all 
public investors through the SEC database (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2015d). These IPOs are called filed IPOs, which are awaiting approval from the SEC 
(Busaba, Benveniste, & Guo, 2001). After this stage is complete, the tasks of 
underwriting group are considered complete, and the selling group becomes active.  
2.2 The selling group, underpricing and underperformance 
The tasks of the selling group include conducting the road show, collecting the 
demands of investors, and allocating the new issues (Torstila, 2001). In my opinion, the 
selling group of an underwriter syndicate functions similarly to the sales department in 
a commodity enterprise, except that the commodity sold by an underwriting syndicate 
is IPO share. In this subchapter, the functions of the selling group will be introduced 
based on the sequence of functions in an underwriting process. Additionally, factors 
influencing IPO phenomena such as underpricing and underperformance will be 
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discussed, and possible avenues for future research based on the extant literature will 
be proposed. 
2.2.1 Release of analyst recommendations and forecasts  
Analyst recommendations, earnings forecasts and growth forecasts are typically 
released by an analyst employed by the lead underwriter (Bradley, Jordan, Ritter, & 
Wolf, 2004; Lin & McNichols, 1998). Because such analyst recommendations and 
forecasts usually help to increase demand for IPO shares, they can thus be perceived as 
preparation for selling shares. An analyst recommendation is released after the quiet 
period, which lasts from the time when issuers file their Form S-1 until the form is 
approved by the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015d). In other 
words, the quiet period begins after the information disclosure stage is completed by 
underwriting group and lasts until the selling group is allowed to release 
recommendations and forecasts. Many extant studies have focused on the quiet period 
and its influence on IPO phenomena. However, because it belongs to neither the tasks 
of the selling group nor the tasks of the underwriting group, it will be discussed 
separately in Subchapter 2.3. 
Analyst recommendation. In the analyst recommendation, analysts state their 
recommendations for investors concerning the IPO, such as buy, strong buy, neutral, 
and hold (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015a). Such recommendations 
are based on analysts’ personal judgment and opinions and thus may contain cognitive 
bias, such as overconfidence (Hong & Kubik, 2003), or be influenced by various 
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conflicts of interest (Michaely & Womack, 1999).  
Analysts vary in the extent to which they are influenced by such biases and 
interests. For general stocks (not necessarily IPO shares), analyst recommendations can 
be categorized according the following perspectives. With respect to whether an 
analyst’s recommendation is his or her first for a particular stock, analyst 
recommendations can be categorized into four types: analyst initiations, upgrades, 
downgrades, and reiterations, the latter three of which are comparable 
recommendations subsequent to the initiations (Bradley et al., 2008). Analyst 
recommendations can also be categorized with respect to the analysts’ employers: sell-
side analyst recommendations, buy-side analyst recommendations, and independent 
analyst recommendations (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015a). 
Specifically, sell-side analysts work for stock selling organizations, such as brokers, 
investment banks, and commercial banks; buy-side analysts work for money 
management agencies, such as mutual funds and investment advisors; and independent 
analysts are not affiliated with either buy-side or sell-side agencies (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2015a). Among the sell-side analysts, those whose employers 
are also the lead underwriter of the issuers are referred to as the affiliated analysts, and 
the remainder as unaffiliated analysts. 
These different types of analysts play a role in various phases of an IPO process 
(Bradley et al., 2008). For instance, an analyst recommendation released immediately 
after the quiet period belongs to the category of sell-side analyst initiation. After the 
IPO shares are issued, more analysts will rate the newly issued shares, which can be 
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buy-side analyst recommendations, independent analyst recommendations, or sell-side 
analyst recommendations (non-initiations) (Bradley, Jordan, & Ritter, 2003).  
One reason for different timing of the release of these recommendations is that, in 
general, affiliated analysts have greater access to issuer information than do 
independent analysts. For instance, a recent study found that sell-side analysts had 
private interactions with issuer management, such as private meetings (Soltes, 2014). 
Another study that surveyed 365 sell-side analysts reported that private 
communications with the management represented more useful input than analysts’ 
own research and other sources of hard information (L. D. Brown, Call, Clement, & 
Sharp, 2015). Another potential reason for differences in timing is that affiliated 
analysts feel an obligation or pressure to offer recommendations because they work for 
the underwriters of the issuers. An empirical study showed that affiliated analysts, i.e., 
sell-side analysts, issue recommendations sooner than unaffiliated analysts. 
Furthermore, affiliated react more slowly to bad news and are slower to downgrade 
recommendations but react significantly faster to good news and issuer faster upgrade 
recommendations (O’Brien, McNichols, & Hsiou-Wei, 2005). O’Brien et al. (2005) 
offered support for the two abovementioned reasons for the differences in the timing of 
recommendations.  
These different types of recommendations also tend to cause different extents of 
market reactions. Using a sample of over 7400 analyst recommendations from 1999 to 
2000 (bubble period), Bradley et al. (2008) showed different market reaction towards 
these types of recommendations. They divided the timing of analyst recommendations 
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into two periods: the first period covered one month after the quiet period, and the 
second period covered the remaining 11 months of the year. The results showed that, 
generally, over 90 percent of initiations that were released were made by affiliated 
analysts in the first period, and a large number of initiations were released by 
unaffiliated analysts in the second period. Moreover, the market showed little reaction 
to the initiations from the affiliated analysts but a larger, positive reaction to the 
initiations in the second period, not only to recommendations from unaffiliated analysts 
but also those from affiliated analysts.  
Interestingly, it seems that the extent of the market reaction is correlated with the 
time period considered rather than the side employing the analysts. Bradley et al. (2008) 
also stated that when controlling for the period of issuance, market reactions to the 
recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts were essentially the same. 
Additionally, stronger market reactions were observed when affiliated analysts issued 
an upgrade or downgrade relative to recommendations made by unaffiliated analysts. 
Bradley et al. (2008) did not offer an explicit explanation for this phenomenon. 
However, in my opinion, this market reaction can be explained by information 
asymmetry and investor expectations for two reasons: 1) investors have little, or no, 
access to information concerning the issuers during the quiet period, while affiliated 
analysts are informed; 2) once the quiet period is finished, two scenarios are likely to 
be triggered.  
First, investors might naturally consider themselves in an inferior position relative 
to underwriters and affiliated analysts, who might also desire to collude with issuers 
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(M. Li, McInish, & Wongchoti, 2005; C. Schultz, 2005). For instance, Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar (2014) showed that pressures related to affiliation and investment 
banking are highly correlated with positive bias in analyst recommendations. 
Second, major investors might be unsure of the ethical standards of underwriters 
and hence might assume that affiliated analysts releasing positive recommendations is 
a common occurrence after the quiet period. For instance, in a sample of 1,611 IPOs 
from 1996 to 2000, Bradley et al. (2003) found that 95 percent of the affiliated analyst 
recommendations were either strong buy or buy in the five-day period after the 
expiration of the quite period. In a sample of 683 IPOs, 87 percent of the affiliated 
analyst recommendations fall into the buy or strong buy categories from 1999 to 2000 
(Bradley et al., 2008). According to the regulations of the CFA Institute, the clause 
“protect the integrity of opinions” states that “members, candidates, and their firms 
should establish policies stating that every research report concerning the securities of 
a corporate client should reflect the unbiased opinion of the analyst” (CFA Institute, 
2014, p. 27). Although it stipulates that analysts should make an unbiased judgment 
regardless of whether their employers are involved in underwriting business for the 
same company, it is highly likely that major investors are unaware of the extent to 
which affiliated analysts act in accordance with such standards.  
Besides the two abovementioned scenarios, M. Baker and Wurgler (2007) found 
that investor sentiment, describing the inaccurate belief about the future performance 
and investment risks in the stock market, had a stronger influence on stocks with lower 
capital and those for companies that are younger, less profitable, more volatile, and 
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growing, all of which are characteristics of IPO companies. Thus investors’ sentiments 
triggered by their inferior position, including both inferior information on issuers and 
on underwriters’ ethics, can be a possible reason for different market reactions. 
Furthermore, the different extents of market reactions observed in Bradley et al. (2008) 
can be explained by the following psychological factors. 
The first is biased self-attribution. Biased self-attribution can influence investors’ 
confidence in different scenarios (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998a). For 
instance, investors are more likely to overreact to their private information signals and 
underreact to public information signals. Due to the high proportion of positive 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations around the quiet period, it is reasonable to assume 
that investors perceive the positive recommendations as a public information signal and 
thus underreact. As a result, the market reaction to recommendations issued shortly 
after the quiet period is weak. Conversely, it is rare for affiliated analysts to downgrade 
their recommendations; for instance, among the 1,760 recommendations given by 
analysts affiliated with a lead underwriter or co-managers in an IPO, 420 
(approximately 24 percent) were downgrade recommendations (Bradley et al., 2008). 
Another relatively general example concerns the case of SEO shares; of a sample of 
7,401 recommendations from all analysts, 883 (approximately 12 percent) were 
downgrade recommendations (Lin & McNichols, 1998). Thus, downgrade 
recommendations are less common than the positive recommendations, which is likely 
to be perceived as private information. Investors overreact to private information, and 
thus the market has strong reactions to downgrade recommendations.  
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The second factor is loss aversion. In essence, loss aversion describes people’s 
stronger sensitivity to losses relative to an equal amount of gains (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & 
Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Regarding the market reaction to 
downgrade recommendations, investors react more strongly to these than to other 
recommendations because downgrades symbolize possible loss in most circumstances 
(except for the downgrade from strong buy to buy). This represents a plausible 
explanation for the scenario in which the market reacts more strongly to a downgrade 
than to a general positive recommendation from affiliated analysts around the quiet 
period but cannot sufficiently explain the scenario in which the market reacts more 
strongly to a downgrade from affiliated analysts relative to a downgrade from 
unaffiliated analysts, according to statistics reported by Bradley et al. (2008).  
The third factor is trust. It might be the case that investors have less trust in 
affiliated analysts than in unaffiliated analysts. However, the stronger market reactions 
to affiliated analysts’ downgrade recommendations relative to those of the unaffiliated 
analysts, as found by Bradley et al. (2008), nearly rules out this explanation because, 
otherwise, investors would react consistently throughout the period, i.e., the market 
reaction would remain weak. The asymmetric reactions to recommendations from the 
same group of analysts indirectly support the other two explanations; in other words, 
investors can exhibit biased self-attribution or loss aversion bias.  
Furthermore, in my opinion, the weak reaction of major investors to analyst 
recommendations around the quiet period might cause underpricing. Shortly after the 
quiet period, analyst recommendations and forecasts are the only source of information 
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about the issuing firms. When major investors underreact and exhibit lower demand for 
IPOs than how they would react in the remaining 11 months of the year to the same 
type of analyst recommendations, underwriters can be misled about the real demand for 
IPOs and set a relatively low initial price. Moreover, according to market efficiency 
theory (Fama, 1998), when investors do not react according to the available information, 
market becomes inefficient. Because many studies have noted that underpricing is a 
result of market inefficiency (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998b; Shayne & 
Soderquist, 1995; Shleifer, 2000), the market’s asymmetric reactions to affiliated 
analyst recommendations can be perceived as an example of the market acting 
inefficiently and as one reason for the necessary underpricing or unavoidable 
underpricing mentioned in Chapter 3.  
Additionally, when considering how investors react to analyst recommendations 
and forecasts in general, the market seems highly inefficient, and investors seem 
particularly irrational when trading in IPOs. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) 
found that institutional investors generally react to an analyst recommendation as if the 
recommendation were downgraded by one level. In other words, they react to strong 
buy recommendations as if they were buy recommendations, to buy recommendations 
as if they were hold recommendations and to sell recommendations as if they were hold 
recommendations. Moreover, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) showed that 
institutional investors reacted more strongly to downgrade recommendations from 
affiliated analysts in the context of IPOs. Interestingly, individual investors were more 
likely to exactly follow analyst recommendations.  
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Analysts’ Behavior. Because most institutional investors are professional investors, 
such as pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2015f), their reactions to analyst downgrade 
recommendations indicate that one should not react literally to recommendations.  
Indeed, many extant studies show that analysts are generally overconfident, 
exhibit forecast bias and are positively biased due to self-selection. They might also be 
influenced by external factors such as reputational concerns, peer pressure or career 
concerns (Hilary & Menzly, 2006; T. Lim, 2001; Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014). 
For instance, T. Lim (2001) explained the generally positive forecasts of analysts from 
two perspectives: 1) from the perspective of external factors, analysts may propose 
overoptimistic recommendations due to pressure from their employers (underwriters) 
to avoid harming their underwriting business relationships with issuers; they may be 
influenced by their reputation, which will be further discussed when introducing the 
all-star analysts; 2) from the perspective of overconfidence, similar to the argument 
offered by Hilary and Menzly (2006), analysts are irrational and cognitively biased. 
Specifically, analysts who had predicted earnings relatively more accurately than the 
median analyst in previous seasons tend to exhibit stronger overconfidence in later 
seasons: their forecasts tended to become less accurate and drift further from the 
consequence forecast after four seasons (Hilary & Menzly, 2006). Hilary and Menzly 
(2006) explained that analysts’ overconfidence was the result of an excessive reliance 
on their private information and discounting of public information. In my opinion, the 
asymmetric reliance on various sources of information can be further explained by self-
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attribution bias and self-serving bias. Self-attribution bias means that people tend to 
overreact to their personal information and underreact to public information, especially 
under ambiguous circumstances (Daniel et al., 1998a; Kelley, 1973); self-serving bias 
means that people tend to attribute their successes to internal factors, such as their skills, 
knowledge or capabilities, but failures to external factors (D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975).  
Furthermore, interesting results were found when simultaneously analyzing 
analysts’ recommendations and forecasts (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014). 
Following T. Lim (2001), Malmendier & Shanthikumar (2014) categorized the reasons 
for positive bias into two types: strategic distortion and nonstrategic distortion. 
Strategic distortion refers to positive recommendations caused by reasons similar to 
those noted regarding the abovementioned external concerns, and nonstrategic 
distortion refers to distortions caused by the cognitive biases of analysts. Their results 
showed that analysts who make positive recommendations due to strategic distortions 
tend to speak in two tongues. Speaking in two tongues refers to the phenomenon 
whereby analysts issue overly optimistic recommendations but also issue less positive 
forecasts. In the case of nonstrategic distorters, both recommendations and forecasts 
exhibit a similar level of optimism.  
In my opinion, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) provide an approach to 
differentiate between the strategic and nonstrategic distortions that cause analysts’ 
overoptimistic recommendations. This approach may help investors in analyzing both 
stocks and IPO shares. Based on major results from the literature, it is possible to offer 
suggestions for analyzing affiliated analysts’ recommendations and forecasts. For 
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investors who are interested in a certain IPO, they should first objectively estimate 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations and forecasts. When both recommendations and 
forecasts show a consistent level of optimism, i.e., positive forecasts and buy or strong 
buy recommendations, the possibility that analysts are influenced by external factors 
(strategic distortion) can be eliminated. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) showed 
that such cases are rare, indicating that this approach can help to exclude the majority 
of IPOs for which affiliated analysts are strategic distorters. Second, based on Hilary 
and Menzly (2006), investors should conduct further research on analysts’ previous 
recommendations and forecasts. The more consecutive accurate predictions among the 
most recent previous predictions, the more likely analysts are to exhibit cognitive biases 
in their current predictions and vice versa. Finally, investors should make their 
decisions as if the recommendations were downgraded by one level, as Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar (2007) note that institutional investors do.  
 All-star analysts. Based on various principles, there are many different rankings 
of sell-side analysts. One of the most frequently used ranking by academic studies is 
the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team ranking, which is created 
annually on the basis of surveys soliciting feedback and votes from buy-side managers, 
such as chef investment officers from institutional investors, portfolio managers, or 
buy-side analysts from money management institutions (Bagnoli, Watts, & Zhang, 
2008; Clarke et al., 2007; Leone & Wu, 2007). The survey includes questions on sell-
side analysts’ 1) skills, such as the quality of written reports, the accuracy of earning 
estimates, and the quality of selecting stocks; 2) knowledge of the industry; and 3) 
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responsiveness to the investors, such as accessibility and timely communication (Clarke 
et al., 2007; Leone & Wu, 2007). Another ranking system that is frequently employed 
is the best on the street analysts from The Wall Street Journal, where analysts are 
ranked by the portfolio returns earned during trades according to the analyst’s 
recommendation in the previous year (Bagnoli et al., 2008; P. Brown, Ferguson, & 
Jackson, 2009; Groysberg, Healy, & Maber, 2011).  
All-star analysts are those who located near the top of such rankings (Bagnoli et 
al., 2008). These analysts have considerable influence in the underwriting industry, and 
their behavior might influence the likelihood of their employers (investment banks) 
winning an underwriting deal (Ljungqvist, Marston, et al., 2006). One anecdotal 
example is that when Merrill Lynch hired an analyst, Phua Young, who was favored by 
Merrill’s client, Tyco, Merrill Lynch immediately won the lead underwriter position in 
issuing Tyco’s $2.1 billion in bonds on Young’s first workday (Clarke et al., 2007).  
Despite such stories in the industry, one might nevertheless wonder whether 
investors can fully rely on the recommendations of these all-star analysts. A study using 
a sample of the performance and ranking of 42,014 analysts over a 10-year period 
showed interesting results. First, all-star analysts’ persistent excellent performance 
suggested that they indeed have superior ability instead of being lucky, and they were 
considered leaders by their peer analysts even before the ranking was published. Second, 
the results suggested that such superior ability is attributed to analysts’ talent rather than 
their experience (Leone & Wu, 2007). Similarly, using the ranking from the Wall Street 
Journal, Desai, Liang, and Singh (2000) found that all-star analysts outperformed in 
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making recommendations of large-capital stocks, which are considered comprehensive 
tasks. Another study found that when all-star analysts changed employers, their 
recommendations and forecasts results continued to exhibit a similar level of optimism, 
indicating that they do not give overly optimistic recommendations due to external 
pressure from employers (Clarke et al., 2007). This might be explained by the finding 
reported by Hong and Kubik (2003) that all-star analysts have favorable career 
outcomes concerning job selection, promotion or moving to a more prestigious 
employer due to their reputation and their relatively accurate previous forecasts.  
All-star analysts’ overoptimism. When all-star analysts do not exhibit strategic 
distortion, do they exhibit nonstrategic distortion or cognitive bias such as being 
overoptimistic? Some studies have shown that analysts can benefit from being 
optimistic. For instance, analysts who are optimistic were found to be rewarded by 
working in more prestigious investment banks (Hong & Kubik, 2003). Ellis, Michaely, 
and O’Hara (2004) found that underwriters with more optimistic analyst 
recommendations tend to attract larger underwriting deals (as cited in Boudry, Kallberg, 
& Liu, 2011). However, overoptimistic analysts were found to be worse off by 
increasing the likelihood of terminating their careers and reducing the likelihood of 
promotion (Leone & Wu, 2007). One anecdotal example supporting this argument is 
that in April 2003, 10 of the largest Wall Street investment banks reached a settlement 
by paying $1.4 billion in compensation and penalties due to issuing overly optimistic 
recommendations and forecasts to attract investment banking clients (Agrawal & Chen, 
2008). 
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In my opinion, it seems that studies conducted before 2004 tended to show that 
overoptimism was a preferable trait for analysts. For instance, the sample used by Hong 
and Kubik (2003) was from 1983 to 2000, including the internet bubble period (1999 
to 2000). Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that analysts were incentivized to issue 
overly optimistic recommendations before the bubble burst; these incentives might be 
opportunities to work in a more prestigious investment bank or the likelihood of 
attracting more underwriting business for their current employer. A study specifically 
focusing on the period from 1996 to 2000 showed that, beginning in 1998, analysts 
made more optimistic recommendations, especially for internet stocks; positive 
correlations were found between the level of optimism in the recommendations and the 
subsequent return on the related stocks (O’Brien & Tian, 2006). Thus, from another 
perspective, the internet bubble can be partly attributed to analysts’ overoptimistic 
recommendations. Additionally, many studies showed that analysts exhibit strong herd 
behavior when making forecasts and recommendations. Specifically, analysts tend to 
release both forecasts and recommendations that are similar to those previously released 
by other analysts (Clement & Tse, 2005; Trueman, 1994; Welch, 2000). As a result, it 
can be assumed that before the internet bubble, overoptimistic analysts were likely to 
be rewarded with more opportunities and that this optimism was amplified by herd 
behavior among the analysts, which ultimately led to the internet bubble. U.S. federal 
securities regulators sought to put an end to such behavior by charging the largest 10 
Wall Street investment banks in 2003 (Agrawal & Chen, 2008), which, in my opinion, 
directly influenced analysts’ overoptimistic behaviors. As a result, subsequent all-star 
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analysts were found to be less overoptimistic than the average analyst (Leone & Wu, 
2007).    
Other characteristics of all-star analysts. Despite the disagreements concerning 
all-star analysts’ overoptimism, scholars agree that all-star analysts are more willing to 
take risks and are bolder than other analysts. One study showed that bold forecasts were 
more accurate than herding forecasts, as bolder analysts tended to incorporate their 
private information more completely, and thus, their forecasts tended to be more 
coherent (Clement & Tse, 2005). Bolder analysts tend to be perceived as leaders by 
their peer analysts and hence more likely to be rated as all-star analysts (Leone & Wu, 
2007).  
To conclude, in the first stage of underwriters’ selling activity, analysts exert a 
major influence on investors’ decisions concerning whether to purchase an IPO and, in 
some instances, even on issuers’ decisions concerning whether to cooperate with an 
investment bank for their IPO issuance before beginning selling. Furthermore, 
investment banks ultimately consist of individuals, including analysts. Individuals’ 
characteristics and cognitive biases always influence their intellectual output, here, 
analyst forecasts and recommendations. In the following subchapter, the road show 
conducted by selling group will be discussed. 
2.2.2 Road show 
A road show is presented by issuers and underwriters to large and important 
168 
 
investors such as institutional investors, money managers and portfolio managers 6 
(Doring, 2013; Schulte & Spencer, 2000). Road shows usually take place before setting 
the initial price and are generally held in regional, national or international large cities, 
depending on the number of new issues and locations of important investors (Schulte 
& Spencer, 2000). The process usually includes 1) the lead underwriter explaining the 
amount of the issuance, the initial price range and future usage of capital raised by the 
IPO; 2) the issuing firms’ CEO presenting basic information on the firm, such as current 
profitability, expected future development, main competitors and market shares; and 3) 
the CEO and lead underwriter participating in one-on-one meetings with important 
potential investors, in an effort to obtain information on investors’ expected purchasing 
volumes and the price they are willing to pay (Schulte & Spencer, 2000). For instance, 
Goldman Sachs’ road show for its own IPO in 1999 included 63 one-on-one meetings 
and 27 group meetings, invited a total of approximately 1,100 institutional investors 
and covered 38 cities (R. Aggarwal, 2003). In addition to collecting information relating 
to investors’ demand for IPO shares, which helps underwriters to set the initial price in 
the next stage, a road show is also intended to promote new issues. One study showed 
that investors’ demand usually increased after the road show (D. Zhang, 2004). 
Specifically, by using 30-second content-filtered video clips of road show presentations 
from the CEOs of issuing companies, that study showed that the first impression made 
by a CEO, including trustworthiness, competence, and even attractiveness, is positively 
correlated with the market value in the secondary market (Blankespoor, Miller, & 
                                                             
6 According to Schulte & Spencer (2000), generally, individual investors are not included in the road show. 
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Hendricks, 2015). In other words, CEOs making positive impressions during the road 
show tends to decrease the likelihood of underperformance. Additionally, as the one-
on-one meetings with large investors have become popular in road shows, studies have 
found other advantages of such meetings. For instance, Sherman (2000) and Schulte 
and Spencer (2000) found that one-on-one meetings help to create long-term 
relationships between institutional investors and underwriters. 
2.2.3 Book building 
After the road show, underwriters usually obtain information about the 
preliminary demand for IPO shares. The method used by underwriters to assess demand 
is call book building on Wall Street (R. Aggarwal, 2003). Part of the road show’s 
function can be considered the initiation of the book building process because it 
provides information on, for example, potential investor demand, the expected price 
per share, and the length and number of shares that the secondary market is willing to 
bear. (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Certo, 2003). Generally, if demand is high, underwriters will 
set a relatively high initial price. Hence, when investors offer completely accurate 
information concerning their demand, the initial price will consequently be driven 
higher. Thus when investors need to pay more in the future for being open and honest 
about their purchasing intentions, it is likely that they will acquire something in return 
for their information. It is reasonable to expect that the more accurate their information 
is, the more they should be compensated by the issuers and the underwriters (Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). Thus, scholars have noted that underpricing is one approach to 
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compensate investors for their information (Derrien & Womack, 2003; Sherman & 
Titman, 2002).  
Empirical studies have also focused on the relationship between initial price 
adjustments and investors’ demand. An initial price adjustment means that the final 
initial price exceeds the initial price range disclosed during the road show. For instance, 
for shares involved in an initial price adjustment, investors demand had increased and 
underpricing became more significant after the adjustment (Hanley, 1993). Hanley 
(1993) argued that the reason for this phenomenon was that underwriters partially adjust 
the initial price and intentionally set the final price lower than it should be based on the 
demand information collected during the road show.  
However, in my opinion, stronger underpricing might result from the 
consequences of the initial price adjustment because institutional investors’ demand is 
dynamic: it is highly likely that investors will purchase more after the initial price 
adjustment. In addition to the abovementioned reason for institutional investors’ 
reluctance to fully reveal their demand during the road show, they might also be 
uncertain of the quality of the new issues and the future performance of IPO shares 
because during the road show stage, issuers should have superior information about 
their own firm relative to the information held by outside investors. Hence, investors 
are in inferior position and may be conservative in purchasing the new issues. 
According to Burt (1982), people are more likely to seek others’ opinions as a reference 
in ambiguous circumstances (as cited in Rook, 2006). Consequently, it can be assumed 
that institutional investors tend to herd while purchasing IPOs. Several studies have 
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focused on institutional investors and herd behaviors. For instance, using data from the 
Korean stock market, Woochan Kim and Wei (2002) found that although individual 
investors exhibited stronger herd behavior than institutional investors, foreign 
institutional investors were more likely to herd than were domestic investors due to a 
lack of information. Mutual funds also exhibited behavior when there were consensus 
changes in analysts’ recommendations in the stock market, and this herd behavior was 
especially significant when these recommendations were downgrades, due to fund 
managers’ career concerns (N. C. Brown, Wei, & Wermers, 2013). These two studies 
show that although institutional investors are more professional, they nevertheless 
exhibit herd behavior, especially when they are exposed to ambiguous situations or are 
driven by incentives such as career concerns. Thus, in my opinion, it is reasonable to 
assume two sequential scenarios. First, institutional investors are generally 
conservative when purchasing a large number of IPO shares due to their inferior 
information and are unwilling to give away accurate demand information, both of which 
lead the expected demand estimated during the road show to be lower than the actual 
demand. This can explain the existence of underpricing without an initial price 
adjustment. Second, institutional investors exhibit herd behavior when they assume that 
their peers have strong demand for the IPO shares, and their herd behavior might be 
more pronounced when they have career concerns, such as being unwilling to 
underperform their peers. Thus the demand for shares will be driven up and so will the 
stock price. Combining these reasons provides a partial explanation of the stronger 
underpricing observed after an initial price adjustment.  
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In my opinion, based on these assumptions, two hypotheses can be proposed: 1) 
when IPOs have a final initial price that exceeds the initial price range, IPOs that are 
allocated to larger or more prestigious institutional investors exhibit a greater extent of 
underpricing; 2) when IPOs have a final initial price that exceeds the initial price range, 
less informed institutional investors are likely to increase their demand for the IPO 
shares. Specifically, the first hypothesis is based on the results of two studies. First, 
institutional investors exhibit stronger herd behavior when career concerns are stronger 
(N. C. Brown et al., 2013); second, more prestigious investment banks and analysts 
have stronger reputational concerns (Ljungqvist, Marston, et al., 2006). Hence, larger 
and more prestigious institutional investors should also have stronger reputational and 
career concerns, which might lead to stronger herd behavior. Thus, when such investors 
perceive that their peers have purchased a large quantity of a certain IPO, they might in 
turn increase their own purchase. Herd behavior makes the actual demand in the 
secondary market exceed the expected demand, which generates a greater level of 
underpricing. If the first hypothesis were accepted, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: for an IPO with an initial price that exceeds the price range, part of the 
underpricing is caused by herd behavior by institutional investors due to their career 
and reputational concerns.  
The second hypothesis is based on the argument from Burt (1982) and Rook (2006) 
that people tend to engage in herd behavior when they are less informed. A dummy 
parameter describing whether an institutional investor had a one-on-one meeting with 
the issuer during the road show can be used differentiate informed institutional 
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investors from uninformed investors. A similar parameter was used by D. H. Solomon 
and Soltes (in press), who found that investors that met privately with senior 
management traded more informatively during the period surrounding the meetings. 
Hence, institutional investors who are invited to participate one-on-one meetings can 
be considered informed investors and thus will exhibit less herd behavior. Less herd 
behavior means that such investors are less likely to change their demand for the IPO 
shares, which can be measured by the number of shares purchased by institutional 
investors after the initial date. If the second hypothesis were accepted, it would indicate 
that for an IPO with an initial price that exceeds the price range, part of the strong 
underpricing is caused by herd behavior by institutional investors due to their lack of 
information. 
To conclude, underwriters begin their book building process during the road show, 
and the process continues until underwriters manage to set the final initial price 
(Sherman & Titman, 2002). Although there have been consistent doubts concerning 
proficiency of the book building process, such as scholars arguing that it decreases the 
total proceeds from an IPO issuance compared with an allocation of shares at a fixed 
price (Benveniste & Busaba, 1997; Busaba & Chang, 2010) or that it creates greater 
underpricing compared with an allocation of shares through an auction (Derrien & 
Womack, 2003; Kaneko & Pettway, 2003), it is nevertheless the most frequently used 
and preferred method in the stock market at present. The two alternatives approaches 
for setting the initial price are the fixed price and Dutch auction methods, which have 
been adopted in a few countries, but were gradually driven out of the market by the 
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book building method, for instance in Japan and most European countries (Kutsuna & 
Smith, 2004; Sherman, 2005). Hence, they will not be the focus of this discussion. The 
next subchapter will directly focus on the results of book building, which are initial 
price determination and share allocation. Due to the significance of these outcomes, 
they are presented in a separate subchapter.  
2.2.4 Determination of the initial price and share allocation 
Because underwriters and issuers determine the initial price and share allocation 
according to the results of the book building process, one direct method to study how 
such decisions are made is to examine the books. For instance, by examining such 
books from 39 international equity issuances, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) found that 
institutional investors that provided more information during the road show received 
more shares as a reward for helping underwriters to set the initial price, similar to 
findings by Ritter and Welch (2002) and other scholars (see Chemmanur, 1993; Corwin 
& Schultz, 2005; Sherman, 2000). Additionally, in their study, three types of investors 
were found to be favored by underwriters and to receive more shares: 1) investors that 
previously in a relatively large number of IPO issuances, 2) investors that provided 
revised bids while the book was still open, and 3) domestic investors.  
Similarly, by studying the books from 63 international equity issues, Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2003) found that underwriters relied substantially on information provided 
by investors when setting the initial price. Specifically, the loyalty of institutional 
investors, the number of subscriptions, and public information were all found to affect 
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the initial price. Bids offered by loyal institutional investors (measured by the frequency 
of past IPO participation) tend to have a considerable influence on the initial price, and 
bids requiring a larger number of shares also strongly affect the initial price. Public 
information indirectly affects the initial price by influencing the bids offered by 
institutional investors. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) also described the process 
whereby underwriters determine the initial price according to the books they had built, 
which, interestingly, does not strictly follow a certain rule or specific formula. Once the 
book is closed, underwriters develop a demand curve according to the bids (expected 
demand) from investors, and the price is determined by the information reflected in this 
curve. Both underwriters and issuers are involved in this process, and thus both parties 
have decision-making power. 
One might argue that the samples used in these two studies are relatively small. 
However, due to the limited access to underwriters’ books, very few studies can be 
conducted by directly examining the books. This is also one reason that the mechanisms 
of share allocation and initial price determination remain unclear and can be only 
measured by textual information instead of numerical information (Bertoni & Giudici, 
2014).  
As a result, most studies focusing on share allocation can only be conducted 
indirectly by examining the results of share allocations, instead of analyzing the process 
(Nimalendran, Ritter, & Zhang, 2004). For instance, R. Aggarwal (2003) stated that 
most IPO shares are allocated to loyal institutional investors or large individual 
investors, as they are considered to be less likely to flip the shares. The proportion of 
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IPO shares distributed to these investors can vary from 60 percent to 90 percent of the 
total issuance amount (R. Aggarwal, 2003). Similarly, other examples focusing on 
underwriters indicate that institutional investors are favored over individual investors 
during the allocation of IPO shares, as reported by Pulliam and Smith (2000), Pulliam, 
Smith, and Gasparino (2000) and R. Smith and Pulliam (2000) (as cited R. Aggarwal 
et al., 2002). The phenomenon of share allocation revealed by most studies whereby 
underwriters favor one group of investors over another violates certain rules of the SEC 
and Charted Financial Analyst Institute (CFAI). For instance, the Standards of 
Professional Conduct for CFA chart holders, who are the main participants in most 
underwriting transactions of prestigious investment banks, requires that clients be 
treated fairly. Especially in IPO allocation, distributing hot issues only to favorite 
clients will likely lead to a CFA chart holder facing investigation by the CFA 
Disciplinary Review Committee (CFA Institute, 2014). Moreover, the SEC and the U.S. 
Attorney’s office specifically investigate whether underwriters intentionally allocate 
hot IPO issues to their favored clients (R. Aggarwal et al., 2002). 
In my opinion, the confidentiality of the books allows underwriters to allocate 
shares and determine the price following their preferred approach. Underwriters might 
argue that institutional investors and large individual investors are less likely to flip the 
shares, and hence distributing shares to them can help to protect the fragile price of IPO 
shares. However, there is a thin line between loyal clients and favored clients. On the 
one hand, the loyal clients and favored clients might have a reciprocal causation effect, 
whereby loyal clients are indeed underwrites’ favored clients due to their past positive 
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collaboration experience, and favored clients can become loyal over time because they 
develop positive relationships with underwriters. On the other hand, underwriters tend 
to intentionally build long-term relationships with institutional investors due to their 
business concerns, a finding that has also been supported by many empirical studies 
(Gondat‐Larralde & James, 2008; Griffin et al., 2007; Sherman, 2000; Stoughton & 
Zechner, 1998). 
As a result, I believe that it is always difficult to disentangle the factors driving 
underpricing whenever the process for setting the initial price and allocating shares is 
neither transparent nor strictly regulated, i.e., the book building process. It is even 
possible that institutional investors that are invited to participate in one-on-one 
meetings have been already pre-selected according to underwriters’ preferences. 
Paradoxically, over time, such a pre-selected-participants method (book building) has 
driven the other two methods (the fixed-price and Dutch auction methods) out of the 
market, despite that the other two methods both have relatively clear rules on share 
allocation and initial price determination. In short, these two methods provide all 
investors with a relative open and fair platform for shares distribution, but they have 
nevertheless been driven from the market (Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002; Wilhelm, 
2005). In my opinion, this is indirect evidence of market inefficiency because a less fair 
method has become widespread over time.  
Another relevant question is the following: what would happen if the shares were 
fairly distributed to every investor who applied to participate in the IPO? Will the fairest 
method also be the best one? My answer would be yes only if all of the investors who 
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receive IPO shares are non-speculators; in other words, investors will not immediately 
flip IPO shares after the initial date.  
The advantages and disadvantages of flipping activities have been described from 
various perspectives. For instance moderate flipping activity can increase liquidity in 
the secondary market and facilitate stock price discovery; excessive flipping activities 
are likely to have detrimental effects on new issues. However, R. Aggarwal et al. (2002) 
showed that individual investors flip to a greater extent when the initial price exceeds 
the initial price range; in other words, individual investors decrease the likelihood of 
price stabilization. For instance, for cold IPOs, when investors immediately flip the IPO 
shares after the initial day, the supply of the shares will surge, and the direct result is 
that the price of IPO shares will decline. Such phenomena can be magnified by herd 
behavior by investors when the available information is limited, i.e., in IPO trading 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Shiller, 1995). A high volume of flipping activities can 
substantially damage the initial price even for stocks that might have promising future 
performance (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Amihud et al., 2003; Krigman et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, flipping activity was found to be positively correlated with the amount of 
underpricing, i.e., hot IPOs are more likely to be flipped. Consequently, to some extent, 
the root of flipping activities lies in the amount of underpricing (R. Aggarwal, 2003; 
Bayley et al., 2006).  
As stated in Chapter 2, underpricing can be categorized into two types. The first 
is unavoidable underpricing: for example, when underpricing functions as a signal to 
differentiate high-quality IPO companies from low-quality ones due to information 
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asymmetry (Welch, 1989); when underwriters set a lower price to attract speculative 
investors thereby allowing flipping and the creation of high liquidity for the IPO shares 
after the initial date (Boehmer & Fishe, 2000); or due to the attention-driven effect of 
the individual investors in the aftermarket who are net buyers of IPOs (Barber & Odean, 
2008). The second is intentional underpricing: this is created by underwriters for the 
purpose of compensating their favored institutional investors (R. Aggarwal et al., 2002), 
compensating institutional investors for providing accurate information about the 
market demand during the book building process (Sherman & Titman, 2002), or 
forming long-term relationships with certain intuitional investors due to business 
concerns (Sherman, 2000). Thus, even when the second aspect of underpricing is 
eliminated, the share of underpricing generated by market inefficiency will remain. As 
a result, as long as the market is inefficient, underpricing will always exist due to 
unavoidable underpricing, which might have the tendency to lead to excessive flipping 
activities by speculative investors if control is not exercised over the allocation of shares 
to primary investors. Flipping activities are one reason that underwriters cannot 
distribute shares equally to every investor if they wish to protect IPOs from herd 
behavior by investors, which is another phenomenon of market inefficiency. To 
conclude, market inefficiency leads to unavoidable underpricing, and then flipping 
activities occur, and finally, underwriters have to exclude some investors, which is why 
the book building method is the only method that has persisted over the decades 
(Kutsuna & Smith, 2004; Sherman, 2005).  
Because, in practice, it is difficult to differentiate the first type of underpricing 
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from the second type, one bold approach to eliminating the second type of underpricing 
(intentional underpricing) might be to allocate the shares fairly to all investors. 
However, as stated above, such a fair allocation is likely to create considerable flipping 
activities due to the increased number of speculators. As a result, the first type of 
underpricing will remain as long as the market is inefficient, and the elimination of the 
second type of underpricing is likely to cause stronger flipping activities. In short, I 
believe that underpricing will always exist as long as the market is inefficient in the 
form of asymmetric information, low liquidity and irrational investors.  
2.2.5 Market making 
The broad concept of market making begins when issuers decide to launch IPOs. 
The main focus at this stage is to attract underwriters and institutional investors to 
participate in the initial stages of IPO issuance, as previously stated, the bake-off stage 
and the road show stage (Bahadir, DeKinder, & Kohli, 2015). However, the market 
making that will be explained in this section will focus on one function of the selling 
group in underwriter syndicate. It includes attracting investors to purchase IPO shares 
after the initial date, maintaining the liquidity of the transfers, and preventing strong 
price fluctuations of the IPO shares (Ellis et al., 2000; Ellul & Pagano, 2006; Ritter & 
Welch, 2002).  
Specifically, after analyzing purchasing activities three months after the initial 
date using a sample of 559 IPOs, Ellis et al. (2000) found that lead underwriters were 
the main market makers during these three months, and while co-managers also 
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participate in market making, their effect is rather subtle. Those authors also identified 
the functions of lead underwriters as follows: 1) lead underwriters were found to 
function as active market makers by handling an average of 60 percent of the total 
amount of shares in the first days after the initial date and 50 percent in the first three 
months; 2) lead underwriters were found to function as purchasers to stabilize the share 
price after the initial date. For instance, they purchased on average 4 percent of the total 
number of shares and 22 percent of the total number of shares when the first-day trading 
price fell below the initial price. In other words, if the IPO is a cold issue, its lead 
underwriter has to function as an institutional investor that simulates demand and 
attempts to prevent the stock price from declining below the initial price. As a result, 
lead underwriters have to bear the risk of holding an excessive number of shares of cold 
IPOs in their inventory. This might appear to resemble the firm commitment deal 
explained in Chapter 2, which requires underwriters to purchase all IPO shares 
regardless of whether they are able to be sold in the primary market (Dunbar, 1998). 
However, it is different. Because a firm commitment deal requires underwriters to pay 
the issuers out of the total proceeds (the number of shares issued multiplied by the final 
initial price) before the initial date (Ritter, 1987). Hence, lead underwriters’ purchasing 
behavior after the initial date is not included. Based on the existing literature, in my 
opinion, there are several incentives for underwriters to purchase IPO shares after the 
initial date. 
Compensation Concerns. Underwriters receive three main types of compensation. The 
first is the direct compensation paid by issuers, which is usually 7 percent of the total 
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proceeds from an IPO issuance. This compensation will be paid to the entire syndicate 
when the IPO is complete (H. C. Chen & Ritter, 2000). Using a sample of 4,780 IPOs, 
Torstila (2001) showed that the 7-percent proceeds received by the entire syndicate was 
approximately divided into shares of 20, 60, and 20 percent, to the management group, 
selling group, and underwriting group, respectively; the concession to the selling group 
represents a larger proportion if the IPO is a hot issue with a large first-day rate of return. 
This distribution method is broadly used by most underwriter syndicates; thus some 
studies call this the 20/20/60 split (Cheolwoo Lee, 2012). Hence, the selling group 
receives the largest proportion of compensation in underwriting syndicate. In my 
opinion, this aspect of compensation does not necessarily drive underwriters to 
purchase shares after the initial date because it is paid ex ante. However, this aspect of 
compensation does encourage underwriters to sell as many shares as possible, even to 
themselves when necessary. Thus some underwriters might already hold a large block 
of shares before the initial date, and those underwriters that have firm commitment 
deals with issuers are even more likely to do so. Second, underpricing, as stated 
previously, can be interpreted as a hidden means of compensating underwriters because 
in most circumstances, underwriters purchase some or all of the IPO shares at the initial 
price before the initial date (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Dunbar, 1998). This aspect of 
compensation might incentivize underwriters to create a large amount of underpricing, 
which can be realized in two ways: setting a lower initial price or driving the share price 
higher after the initial date. In addition to the arguments of Ellis et al. (2000), 
underwriters’ purchasing behavior has been studied by other scholars. For instance, a 
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study conducted in a single investment bank found that the lead underwriter purchased 
approximately 15 percent of all shares with the aim of supporting the initial price in the 
first two days after the purchase, and the subsequent repurchasing activities were 
primarily intended to create profitability and maintain the liquidity of shares in the 
market (Boehmer & Fishe, 2004). R. Aggarwal (2000) found that underwriters used 
more than the purchasing method to stimulate the stock price after the initial date; other 
methods, such as penalizing clients who flip the shares and selectively using the 
overallotment option, are also used to stabilize the stock price. One way to penalize 
investors that are flipping shares is for underwriters to deprive them of their concession 
while the shares are sold, according to R. Aggarwal (2000). Another approach is to ban 
investors that flip from future IPO allocations (Stojkovic, 2015). Third, overallotment, 
which allows underwriters to sell more shares (up to 15 percent more) than the offer 
size indicates, can also profit underwriters. Because overallotment is an option that 
underwriters can choose whether to exercise, as stated in Chapter 2, it is also known as 
the green shoe option (Hogan, 2000; Hogan, Olson, & Kish, 2001). Intuitively, 
overallotment helps underwriters to decrease the risk of holding excessive shares of 
unfavorable IPOs. For instance, if the market price declines below the initial price, 
underwriters can repurchase the shares from the market and sell to the extra 15 percent 
of investors at the initial price. Exercising the overallotment option, on the one hand, 
can help the underwriter to compensate for the loss due to price decreases if an IPO is 
a cold issue. On the other hand, it stimulates the demand for IPOs after the initial date. 
R. Aggarwal (2000), using a sample of 114 IPOs, showed that over 50 percent of 
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underwriters exercised the overallotment option, with an average overselling amount 
of 11 percent of the issuance size. These shot positions (the overselling amount) were 
made up within approximately 17 days of the initial date, with a total number of 22 
transactions. Interestingly, her data showed that not all IPOs that were over allocated 
were cold issues because, on average, approximately 4 percent of the losses were 
experienced due to stock prices that were higher than the initial price. Other studies 
have also found that the overallotment option benefits both underwriters and issuers 
(see Chowdhry & Nanda, 1996; D. Zhang, 2004). As a result, the overallotment option 
can either increase or decrease underwriter compensation. Although the overallotment 
option is not necessarily compensation for underwriters, it was designed to protect 
underwriters from suffering losses from issuing cold IPOs. Moreover, it could be the 
main reason that underwriters exhibit strong purchasing activity after the initial date (R. 
Aggarwal, 2000). 
Reputational Concern. To date, few studies have directly focused on the relationship 
between underwriter reputation and purchasing behavior after the initial date. One of 
the most relevant of this limited number of studies found that underwriter reputation is 
moderately correlated with price stabilization activities and operationalized whether the 
overallotment option was exercised to measure price stabilization activities (Logue et 
al., 2002). Interestingly, that study found that price stabilization activities were 
positively correlated with the long-term return of IPOs, and the overallotment option 
was found to have a significant effect on the 36-month rate of return. In my opinion, 
the relationship between underwriter reputation and underwriter purchasing activities 
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after the initial date is an interesting topic because of its practical consequences. For 
instance, if the lead underwriter’s reputation is positively correlated with purchasing 
activities after the initial date, for IPOs made through prestigious investment banks, 
there will be considerable demand in the short run after the initial date because, most 
likely, the prestigious lead underwriter will purchase a large number of IPO shares and 
stimulate market demand. As a result, in such a case, investors should avoid purchasing 
shares shortly after the initial date for IPOs that use prestigious underwriters.  
2.3 Collaboration among the groups in the IPO process 
No recent study clearly states how each group works and collaborates in different 
phases throughout the initial public offering process. One of the possible reasons for 
this lack is that, regarding underwriters, most contributions have tended to study the 
syndicate as a whole, with the leading underwriter serving as the representative of the 
three groups. Another possible reason is that it only becomes practical to divide the 
syndicate into groups when analyzing how the syndicate divides the compensation. In 
my opinion, however, this gap might offer the possibility examine the underwriter 
syndicate in greater depth by determining the group with the most important influence 
on underpricing and which group might have the strongest effect on issuers’ long-term 
performance.  
Based on the definition of different syndicate groups proposed by Torstila (2001), 
together with the detailed description of initial public offering procedures from various 
studies, I would like to present how these groups cooperate from the perspective of the 
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underwriting syndicate in seven phases. Because most of the phases were addressed in 
the previous subchapters when introducing the functions of the different groups, in this 
subchapter, these functions will simply be mentioned to maintain a consistent analytical 
structure, which also helps to form a complete picture of the different phases according 
to the timeline.   
First phase: the bake-off stage. This stage typically occurs six months before the 
IPO. In this stage, the lead underwriter and co-managers from the management group 
are selected by issuers and begin to choose other members of the syndicate. The main 
task in this stage for potential lead underwriters is to persuade issuers to cooperate with 
them by providing personalized service, recommending strategies and competing with 
other underwriters to win the competition (Krigman et al., 2001). In my opinion, during 
this stage, there is no conflict of interest between issuers and underwriters, and as 
Krigman et al. (2001) stated, it is highly likely that there is substantial handholding 
between issuers and underwriters. Conflicts of interest only exist among underwriter 
candidates due to the highly competitive contest for the lead underwriter position 
(Jenkinson & Jones, 2009a). Interestingly, once issuers have chosen a certain 
investment bank as the lead underwriter and the group of banks that will be included in 
the syndicate, the competition will cease, and the bargaining power of underwriters will 
be weakened. According to Jenkinson and Jones (2009a), a European IPO employed an 
innovative method to prevent the issuer from losing its strong bargain position. In this 
IPO, the roles of the underwriter syndicate were separated into different entities, instead 
of the traditional approach whereby the lead underwriter plays a central role in all three 
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groups. According to this method, one advisory bank was hired to offer advice 
concerning the size of the issue, the price range of the shares and allocation of the shares, 
and it also advised issuers regarding which banks should be invited to participate in 
book building and share allocation. In the next stage, different banks (not necessarily 
the advisory bank) are hired to allocate the shares shorty before the initial date. This 
method maintains the completion among the banks because future uncertainty 
incentivizes the advisory bank to engage in due diligence and suggest a relatively fair 
price for the IPO shares. The approach of Jenkinson and Jones (2009a) offers the 
possibility to derive an understanding of the roles in an underwriting syndicate that 
differs from the traditional method, in which the three different groups are separated 
according to the perspectives of both function and entity. However, in practice, this 
method has not been widely used, and there is little data available to empirically test 
whether such an approach can help to reduce the extent of underpricing. In my opinion, 
this method should be considered an alternative to the traditional method in the bake-
off stage when issuers wish to decrease the level of underpricing.    
Second phase: preparation stage. As stated previously, the underwriting group is 
primarily responsible for this stage, including preparing the registration statement, 
which is transformed into the primarily prospectus, and providing other documents for 
the SEC and the public (Ellis et al., 2000). In terms of timing, this phase begins with 
the underwriting syndicate preparing to file applications for the IPO and concludes 
when the documents are submitted to the SEC, i.e., the filing of IPO. Because this phase 
was discussed in depth in Subchapter 2.1, it is unnecessary to discuss it further here. 
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Third phase: quiet period. The quiet period begins with the filing of IPO and lasts 
for 25 (before 9 July, 2002) or 40 calendar days (after 9 July, 2002) (Highfield, Lach, 
& White, 2008). During this phase, the SEC prohibits issuers and underwriters from 
“publishing opinions concerning valuation and from making forward-looking 
statements regarding earning, revenues, and similar items” (Bradley et al., 2003, p. 1). 
However, the SEC has modified these restrictions by liberalizing information; for 
example, “all reporting issuers are, at any time, permitted to continue to publish 
regularly released factual business information and forward-looking information” (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005, p. 51) beginning on 1 December, 2005. 
Scholars from different disciplines have argued that the creation of the quiet period rule 
and empirical cases have challenged whether the reform has been practically applied 
by underwriters and issuers. For instance, Heyman (2013), considering a legal 
perspective, proposed that the quiet period rule is unlikely to succeed a challenge on 
the basis of the free commercial speech doctrine provided by the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. One of the well-known practical cases calling into question the 
fairness of the quiet period rule to small investors is that, during Facebook’s IPO, 
Morgan Stanley (the lead underwriter of Facebook IPO) decreased its revenue estimates 
and outlook for Facebook without informing retail investors. This was likely one of the 
reasons for the poor performance of Facebook’s IPO during its first couple of months, 
where the initial price was $38 per share on 18 May, 2012 and its closing price had 
declined to approximately $20 per share by 20 August, 2012 (Nasdaq, 2015). When 
Facebook and Morgan Stanley were sued by some of the small investors, they argued 
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that the quiet period rule had prevented them from disclosing such a detailed forecast 
(Cedergren, 2015).  
The SEC has made two major changes to the quiet period rule. The first change 
was on 9 July, 2002, when NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711 extended the quiet 
period from 25 calendar days to 40 calendar days (Lach, Highfield, & Treanor, 2012). 
The second change was on 1 December, 2005, when the SEC relaxed its restriction on 
the types of information that had been previously prohibited (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2015d).  
In my opinion, from a psychological perspective, the quiet period itself can result 
in high demand from investors because tensions are accumulated during this stage. The 
psychological support for this phenomenon is known as psychological reactance, 
which was proposed by Brehm (1966), stating that when a person’s freedom is 
suppressed or decreased, he or she will become “motivationally aroused” (p. 378). In 
case of the quiet period, when investors have no access to relevant information, they 
are deprived of their freedom to be informed, and the longer the quiet period is, the 
greater the extent to which their freedom will be decreased. As a result, the longer the 
quiet period is, the higher the demand from investors might be, especially among small 
investors because they might regard themselves as inferiors in the initial market whose 
freedom to purchase IPO shares had already been eliminated by the underwriters. Thus, 
the quiet period rule can actually be one of the factors responsible for underpricing. 
Both practical and empirical evidence has shown that the value of new shares increases 
after, or even shortly before, the expiration of the quiet period (Bradley et al., 2003; 
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Bradley et al., 2004). A sample of 1,161 IPO companies from 1996 to 2000 was 
examined with the finding that the average first-day return was 37.4 percent (Bradley 
et al., 2003). Such a high first-day return was due to the particularities of the internet 
bubble period (from 1999 to 2000), when the average first-day return soared to 89 
percent (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003). To eliminated the unusual return caused by the 
market, Bradley et al. (2004) conducted an extended study with 94 observations from 
January 2001 to mid-July 2002 and found a 13.9 percent first-day return. Note that the 
quiet period in these two studies lasted for 25 calendar days. After the quiet period was 
extended to 40 days, Highfield et al. (2008) conducted a follow-up study using a sample 
of 267 IPO companies from 2002 to 2005; however, they focused on how analyst 
predictions were influenced by the extension of the quite period. There are many factors 
that might have important effects on IPO underpricing, and while studies have focused 
on the amount of underpricing before and after the quiet period was extended, it is 
nevertheless difficult to disentangle the effects of these factors. Thus it would be ideal 
to perform a simulation study in the lab in which only the length of quiet period is 
manipulated. The expected results would be that the group exposed to a longer quiet 
period is likely to have a higher demand for IPO shares. If these results were obtained, 
then the SEC should reconsider the wisdom of having a quiet period.  
Again, in my opinion, the second change to the quiet period was rather formalistic 
because the new rules did not clearly distinguish between the types of information that 
could be disclosed and those that could not. Wording such as “regularly released factual 
business information and forward-looking information (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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Commission, 2015d, p. 51)” is ambiguous and creates asymmetric information between 
issuers and investors. From my perspective, underwriters might intentionally exploit 
such information asymmetry and thus could harm retailer investors’ interests, as in the 
example of Facebook and Morgan Stanley. In instances where laws, rules and 
regulations are not applicable, moral standards become the primary factor protecting 
vulnerable investors in the stock market.  
Fourth phase: release of analyst recommendations and forecasts. After the quiet 
period expires, analysts are allowed to release recommendations and forecasts 
concerning issuing companies’ future development and potential earning abilities (Lin 
& McNichols, 1998). In my opinion, beginning with this phase, the remaining tasks 
performed by the underwriting syndicate should be regarded as the functions of the 
selling group, as that group focuses on selling IPOs. The details of this phase were 
provided in Subchapter 2.2.1.  
Fifth phase: road show and book building. Because in the book building method 
(which is the most common), the road show and book building processes usually occur 
within a relatively brief period (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001), I combine them into one 
phase. For details on this phase, see Subchapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
Sixth phase: initial price determination and share allocation. Similarly, the 
determination of the initial price and share allocation are closely related, both in terms 
of timing and on a material basis, because according to the book building method, 
underwriters will develop a demand curve according to the book and decide both the 
initial price and the share allocation (Hanley, 1993). Details on the share allocation and 
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initial price determination can be found in Subchapter 2.2.4. One additional factor that 
influences the initial price, which is also beyond the control of both issuers and 
underwriters, are the market conditions during the issuance period. One of the indirect 
indicators affecting the initial price level is the number of IPO companies during a 
certain period. Data provided by Ritter (2014a) offer empirical support for this, stating 
that during the year 2008, when the financial crisis began, there was a 90 percent 
average decrease in the number of IPO companies compared to other years. 
Additionally, during years characterized by hot issue markets, many more companies 
went public compared to normal years. For instance, during the internet bubble (1999 
to 2000), 858 companies went public, which is more than 50 percent of the number of 
companies that went public from 2001 to 2014 (Ritter, 2014a). The influence of the 
market on the initial price is beyond the control of underwriters and issuers, but it is 
closely related to the third party involved in the IPO process: investors. Questions such 
as how can investors’ emotions, biases and trading behaviors influence the market to 
such a great extent will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Seventh phase: market making. As stated in Subchapter 2.2.5, market making 
takes place after the initial date and primarily concerns lead underwriters’ purchasing 
activities. The effect of such purchasing activities has been explained from both the 
issuer and underwriter’s perspectives and will be explained from the investors’ 
perspective in Chapter 5.  
Generally, this chapter describes the IPO process from the perspective of 
underwriters, which form the three groups of an underwriter syndicate: the 
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management group, underwriting group and selling group. The functions of the three 
groups are introduced in sequential order, where underpricing and underperformance 
are further explained (Figure 7). In the next chapter, IPOs will be discussed from the 
perspective of the third main party in the IPO process: investors. 
Figure 7 IPO from the underwriter’s perspective. The boxes of formed by dotted lines 
represent the main process of interaction between 1) the issuer and the underwriting 
group and 2) the investors and the selling group. The column in the middle represents 
parameters that influence underpricing and underperformance. Positive signs in the 
column with underpricing and underperformance mean an increasing the level of 
underpricing/underperformance, and negative signs mean the opposite. (H) represents 
“hypothetical”, and relevant hypotheses can be made for future research. “AR” and 
“AF” denote an analyst report and an analyst forecast, respectively; “IP” represents 
initial price; and “Info” represents information.  
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Chapter 5 Investors in IPOs 
Based on the timing of their participation in the IPO process, investors can be 
categorized into three groups: venture capitalists, institutional investors and individual 
investors. As stated in Chapter 2, venture capitalists typically fund startups before the 
latter’s IPO (Megginson & Weiss, 1991); institutional investors are the primary 
investors and receive allocations of initial shares before the initial date in the primary 
market (R. Aggarwal, 2003); and the majority of individual investors participate in the 
IPO process when the initial shares begin to be publicly tradable in the secondary 
market (Derrien, 2005; Mauer & Senbet, 1992).  
Additionally, there are other ways of dividing investors. To do so, a set of concepts 
relating to investors needs to be introduced: institutional investors versus individual 
investors; large investors versus small investors; and sophisticated investors versus 
unsophisticated investors. 
Institutional investors are considered more sophisticated information processors. 
For instance, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007) showed that institutional investors 
differed from individual investors in the following respects: first, institutional investors 
react according to the information provided in the analysts’ recommendations or 
forecasts, whereas individual investors tended to react regardless of how informative 
the recommendation and forecast are; second, the authors found that institutional 
investors were net sellers when the recommendations were sell or strong sell, but 
individual investors were net buyers regardless of whether the recommendation was 
buy or sell. Similar results were found by Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh (2008) 
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by analyzing individual investors’ trading behavior after a stock’s earning 
announcement. Individual investors were found to be net buyers of stocks with either 
extreme positive returns or extreme negative returns. Both studies showed that 
individual investors are less sophisticated in terms of information processing. In the 
literature, they are referred to as unsophisticated investors or naïve investors, while 
institutional investors or large investors are referred to as sophisticated investors (Cohn, 
Lewellen, Lease, & Schlarbaum, 1975; De Bondt, 1998; Elton, Gruber, & Busse, 2004). 
As stated in Chapter 4, individual investors have a stronger tendency to engage in 
herding behavior than do institutional investors, and hence the likelihood that individual 
investors will engage in dangerous market-destructive trading behaviors is higher than 
that of institutional investors. Additionally, IPO share performance at this stage can be 
easily destroyed by a large amount of irrational trading, and thus it is unsurprising that 
underwriters are more willing to distribute IPOs to institutional investors than to 
individual investors.  
Another reason that institutional investors are preferable candidates for receiving 
IPO shares is that they are less likely to engage in flipping or spinning activities after 
IPOs begin to be traded. According to the CFA Institute, underwriters are likely to ban 
clients that had previously engaged in flipping activities from future IPO allocation lists 
(CFA Institute, 2014). Additionally, in practice, another way of preventing flipping 
activities beyond excluding the flippers before the allocation is to impose penalty bids. 
The penalty bid is used to restrict the underwriting syndicate’s members from 
distributing shares to flippers. Specifically, if the clients of a syndicate member engage 
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in flipping activities, the lead underwriters will deprive the syndicate member of that 
member’s commission according to the number of shares flipped (R. Aggarwal, 2003).  
Several studies have focused on ways of allocating the initial shares between 
institutional investors and individual investors. Both practical evidence and empirical 
studies in the U.S. have shown that large quantity of IPO shares are allocated to 
institutional investors and that individual investors are only able to receive a small 
proportion of IPO shares. For instance, R. Aggarwal et al. (2002) found that, in their 
sample of 174 IPOs, more than 70 percent of the initial shares were allocated to 
institutional investors. However, in other countries, studies have shown that there are 
cases in which underwriters are willing to allocate a relatively larger number of shares 
to small investors. For instance, in the Hong Kong stock market, when there is no 
trusting relationship between underwriters and large investors, or when underwriters 
cannot effectively control the occurrence of the large investors’ flipping activities, 
underwriters are more willing to distribute the new shares, especially those of more-
underpriced IPOs, to small investors who have been loyal to them (Cheng, Chan, & 
Mak, 2005). As mentioned by Cheng et al. (2005), this result might also be related to 
the protective regulations concerning small investors that are imposed in Hong Kong 
stock market. 
Another set of contrasting concepts that should be explained is the primary market 
and the secondary market. As stated in Chapter 1, these two markets are distinguished 
by the initial date of trading. In the primary market, the initial shares are sold at the 
initial price before the initial date (Spindt & Stolz, 1992). The primary market is also 
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referred to as the initial market or the original market (R. Aggarwal, 2003; R. Aggarwal 
et al., 2002). In the secondary market, namely, after the initial date, the IPO shares 
become publicly tradable, and the share price depends on the supply and demand in the 
secondary market (Agarwal et al., 2008; Busaba & Chang, 2010). The aftermarket is 
also referred to as the secondary market (Mauer & Senbet, 1992).  
As a result, in this chapter, for investors that invested in companies after the 
decision to go public had been made, both institutional and individual investors, will be 
discussed. Venture capitalists will be discussed as representatives of early-stage 
investors that invested in companies before the decision to go public had been made, 
i.e., that provide funds to support startups prior to the issuance of shares. Hence, this 
chapter will discuss three types of investors: venture capitalists, institutional investors 
and individual investors. The role of venture capital, venture capitalists or venture 
capital organizations, is to “raise money from individuals and intuitions for investment 
in early-stage business that offer high potential but high risk” (Sahlman, 1990, p. 473). 
Hence, venture capitalists should be categorized as organizational investors, similar to 
institutional investors. Consequently, this chapter will be divided into two subchapters: 
the first subchapter will introduce organizational investors, including venture capitalists 
and institutional investors, and the second subchapter will explain individual investors 
and their specific trading behaviors, especially the interpretation of trading behaviors 
from a psychological perspective.  
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1. Organizational Investors 
1.1 Venture capitalists 
In the U.S., venture capitalists are the main source of capital for firms before they 
conduct an IPO, and hence the venture capital market is regarded as being closely 
connected to the stock market. From another perspective, issuing an IPO is considered 
one of the common methods for venture capitalists to cash out their investments (B. S. 
Black & Gilson, 1998). Furthermore, a successful exit via issuing an IPO or making an 
acquisition is considered “a common measure for the success of a private venture-
backed firm” (Lindsey, 2008, p. 1157). Note that the term venture-backed firm the 
companies that are funded by venture capitalists, in short, they can also be referred to 
as VC-backed companies (Ivanov & Xie, 2010; Ritter, 2014b).  
A successful IPO is not only considered a factor capable of identifying a successful 
venture capitalist but also as a factor for measuring an outperforming VC-backed 
company. For instance, a study found that, on the one hand, issuing an IPO as a means 
of exit has been popular among VC-backed companies, especially during the internet 
bubble phase, and on the other hand, the success of an IPO is considered one way to 
measure whether a VC-backed company outperforms a non-VC-backed company (Puri 
& Zarutskie, 2012).  
As a result, the success of issuing an IPO is important from the perspectives of 
both venture capitalists and VC-backed companies. Therefore, it important to discuss 
details such as the function of venture capitalists, the long-term performance of VC-
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backed companies, and venture capitalists’ career concerns.  
1.1.1 Venture capitalist and VC-backed IPOs 
Several studies have found that venture capitalists have helped to increase IPO 
companies’ value by executing different functions. These functions include providing 
certification and monitoring, and acting as a nexus for companies to form alliances 
(Barry et al., 1990; Lindsey, 2008; Megginson & Weiss, 1991).  
Certificate function. Venture capitalists provide certification for IPO companies 
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991). The certification hypothesis was first advanced by Booth 
and Smith (1986), who proposed the relationship between capital raising and 
underwriting, whereby reputable capital ought to support high-quality products. 
Similarly, the certificate function served by reputable venture capitalists should also 
signal that the IPO companies they have invested in are of better quality relative to their 
peers (P. M. Lee & Wahal, 2004; Megginson & Weiss, 1991). This is supported by a 
study suggesting that venture capitalists’ reputation was closely related to IPOs’ long-
term performance after the initial date (Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, & Singh, 2011). 
Specifically, this study found that the reputation of the venture capitalists had a 
significant, positive correlation with IPOs’ long-term performance. Additionally, 
Krishnan et al. (2011) found that venture capitalists with better reputations tended to be 
more active in participating in the governance of the companies they had invested in, 
even after the initial date. This positive participation in firm governance could thus have 
a positive effect on these IPO companies’ long-term performance.  
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Monitoring function. Venture capitalists also function as monitors of IPO 
companies. For instance, using a sample of VC-backed companies over a 10-year 
period, a study found that one of the incentives for venture capitalists to invest in IPO 
companies was to be in a position to exercise a monitoring function (Barry et al., 1990). 
Specifically, several traits of such venture capitalists were found to support their 
monitoring roles, such as holding concentrated equity control, maintaining their 
investment after the companies went public, and servings as members of the board of 
directors. Consequently, one of the outcomes of these venture capitalists’ monitoring 
function was limited underpricing, according to Barry et al. (1990). Another study that 
supported the notion that venture capitalists serve a monitoring function was conducted 
by Lerner (1995). By examining the strength of venture capitalists’ monitoring and the 
change in CEOs, Lerner (1995) found that the number of venture capitalists on the 
board increase in the event of a change in CEO. Specifically, he found that there were 
5 times the number of venture capitalists added to the board of directors compared to 
the case when there was no change in CEO (Lerner, 1995). This result showed that 
venture capitalists strengthened their role as monitors when needed, which illustrated 
the importance of their monitoring function. 
Nexus function. According to Lindsey (2008), companies that are funded by the 
same venture capitalists are more likely to form strategic alliances. Venture capitalists 
provided advantages such as information utilization and resource sharing to facilitate 
the formation of such alliances. The nexus function is possible because while investing 
in different companies, venture capitalists obtain detailed information, such as the firms’ 
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strategies. This access to important information provides venture capitalists with the 
ability to create profitable alliances among the companies in which they have invested. 
Most of these alliances were found to be research and development (R&D) alliances, 
marketing alliances or alliances between companies from the same industry (Lindsey, 
2008). Additionally, Lindsey (2008) found that alliances between companies supported 
by the same venture capitalist were more likely to conduct an IPO. 
These three functions were found to have a significant and positive influence on 
the value of VC-backed IPO companies. Thus, the following lists significant 
differences between VC-backed IPO firms and non-VC-backed IPO firms from various 
perspectives (Brav & Gompers, 1997; Jain & Kini, 1995; Puri & Zarutskie, 2012).  
From the perspective of performance before the initial date, VC-backed IPO 
companies underperformed non-VC-backed IPO companies in terms of operating 
performance (Jain & Kini, 1995). Jain and Kini (1995) measured operating performance 
using parameters including operating return on assets and operating cash flow over 
assets. Operating return on assets is an accounting parameter that is used to measure 
operating profitability per unit of an asset. Operating cash flow over assets is also an 
accounting parameter that measures the liquidity of cooperate profits per unit of an asset. 
VC-backed companies were found to have significant lower values for both parameters, 
meaning that they have lower profitability and asset liquidity than non-VC-backed 
companies. Jain and Kini (1995) interpreted this phenomenon from two perspectives. 
First, it is possible that VC-backed companies were prevented from engaging in 
window-dressing behaviors owing to monitor by venture capitalists. Window dressing 
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is the manipulation of accounting numbers around the fiscal reporting date to create a 
false impression improved performance through financial statements, such as delaying 
expenses or realizing revenues in advance (L. Allen & Saunders, 1992; Beaver, 1968). 
Jain and Kini (1995) argued that the reason that VC-backed companies underperformed 
non-VC backed companies before the initial date might be because that the latter engage 
in window dressing behaviors to attract a larger amount of investment during the IPO. 
Second, it might be the case that VC-backed companies engaged in an IPO at the earlier 
stage of their development than non-VC-backed companies. This interpretation was 
supported by data indicating that VC-backed companies had larger expenditures and 
smaller profit margins than non-VC-backed companies. Such characteristics (high 
expenditures and low profit margins) exhibit the characteristics of an early-stage 
developing company according to the life cycle theory of the firm (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Mueller, 1972).  
From the perspective of initial shares on the initial date, VC-backed IPO shares 
have a higher initial price and a larger issuing size compared with non-VC-backed IPO 
shares, even when the sales and total assets of the two samples of IPO companies were 
similar (Jain & Kini, 1995; Megginson & Weiss, 1991). 
From the perspective of performance after the initial date, VC-backed IPO 
companies outperformed non-VC-backed IPO companies in terms of operating 
performance. Specifically, VC-backed IPO companies had significantly larger 
operating return on assets and operating cash flow over assets than comparable non-
VC-backed IPO companies (Jain & Kini, 1995).  
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From the perspective of stock market performance, a similar result supporting the 
notion that VC-backed IPO companies outperformed non-VC-backed IPO firms was 
found by Brav and Gompers (1997). In their study, the five-year equal weighted returns 
on IPO was used as a parameter to measure stock market performance. The returns of 
934 VC-backed IPO companies and 3,407 non-VC-backed companies were compared, 
where the five-year average return was approximately 45 percent for VC-backed IPO 
stocks and approximately 23 percent for non-VC-backed IPO stocks. This study can 
also be interpreted from the perspective of long-term IPO underperformance, as various 
scholars have held that IPOs generally underperform in the long term (Espenlaub, 
Gregory, & Tonks, 2000; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991). However, by 
separating IPO companies with respect to whether they were backed by venture 
capitalists, Brav and Gompers (1997) observed no long-term underperformance in VC-
backed IPO companies. In their study, underperformance was only observed among the 
smallest non-VC-backed IPO companies in their sample. After expanding the sample, 
underperformance was also found in non-IPO companies of a similar size and book-to-
market ratio as the long-term underperforming companies in their original sample, i.e., 
non-VC-backed small companies. Consequently, Brav and Gompers (1997) explicitly 
noted that long-term underperformance should not be an IPO effect.  
As a result, it seems that when analyzed from most perspectives, VC-backed IPOs 
outperform non-VC-backed IPOs, except for before the initial date. All of the studies 
mentioned above used samples from the U.S. However, interestingly, a study using a 
sample from Europe provided different results. According to Rindermann (2003), there 
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were no significant differences in performance between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-
backed IPOs in Europe. In his study, the performance measure included both operating 
performance and stock market performance, and the sample was collected from the 
stock markets in France, Germany and the U.K. Rindermann (2003) argued that this 
result should be interpreted as venture capitalists being heterogeneous and still 
experiencing a process of integration. This study, in my opinion, indirectly supports the 
hypothesis that VC-backed-IPO companies outperform, and thus have greater value, 
than non-VC-backed IPO companies.  
As stated above, though venture capitalists were found to add value to IPO 
companies, there has been considerable discussion of whether VC-backed companies 
in general outperform non-VC-backed companies. Recent studies noted that VC-
backed companies only outperform with respect to scale and firm growth and not with 
respect to profitability. From the perspective success rates, a recent study analyzing a 
dataset covering 25 years found that VC-backed companies generally had higher 
success rates than non-VC-backed companies (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). Additionally, 
both successful and failed VC-backed companies outperformed non-VC-backed 
companies with respect to scale and not with respect to profitability. A similar result 
was obtained in a meta-analysis conducted by Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and Müller 
(2013). Using a combination of 76 empirical samples including 36,567 companies, they 
found that venture capitalists had a performance effect, but this effect only appeared in 
firm growth and not in profitability. Additionally, the performance effect was only 
found to be stronger for firms at the middle phase of their development but was weaker 
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for firms that were very young or very mature.   
1.1.2 Venture capitalists and career concerns 
Career concerns have been cited as one of the important factors influencing the 
results of analysts and their forecasts and recommendations (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 
2000). Similarly, it has also been identified as an important factor that influences the 
results of venture capitalists’ decision making. Such decision making concerns IPO 
timing and underpricing. For instance, Gompers (1996) found that IPO companies 
supported by young venture capitalists tended to go public faster and had a larger 
amount of underpricing relative to those supported by established venture capitalists. 
In other words, stronger career concerns are likely to entail a lower level of underpricing. 
The related literature has also referred to such behavior on the part of venture capitalists 
as grandstanding (P. M. Lee & Wahal, 2004; Rosenbusch et al., 2013). The result 
obtained by Gompers (1996) was derived from a sample of 433 VC-backed IPO 
companies from January 1978 to December 1987, where younger venture capitalists 
were more likely to control smaller shares of the IPO companies and remain on the 
boards of directors of the IPO companies for shorter time. This phenomenon, in my 
opinion, reveals that these venture capitalists do not desire a strong psychological 
attachment with the firm, and thus they might have had speculative intentions before 
they decided to fund a firm.  
A larger subsequent study of 6,413 IPO companies from 1980 to 2000, 37 percent 
of which was VC-backed, was conducted by P. M. Lee and Wahal (2004). They found 
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that VC-backed IPOs had significantly larger first-day return, i.e., a greater level of 
underpricing, than non-VC-backed IPOs. This difference was found to be particularly 
pronounced during the internet bubble period (1999 to 2000). They found that the 
greater underpricing tended to provide venture capitalists with higher future cash flows, 
and the correlation between underpricing and venture capitalists’ future cash flows 
became stronger after 1996. In my opinion, this result shows that venture capitalists 
might not only be influenced by career concerns but also by the wealth effect that 
accompanies the issuance of IPOs. 
Consequently, venture capitalists serve value-adding functions for IPO companies 
under most circumstances, but their decisions are also influenced by factors such as 
career concerns and the wealth effect. When venture capitalists have speculative 
intentions before investing in the companies, VC-backed IPO companies tended to go 
public in a shorter period of time and exhibit a larger amount of underpricing. Such 
speculative intentions might include creating reputation or obtaining quick payoffs.  
1.2 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors begin to influence the IPO process when they indicate their 
willingness to purchase shares during the book-building process and cease influencing 
the IPO process when they sell all of the shares that were distributed in the primary 
market or purchased in the secondary market. The approach institutional investors use 
to influence IPO shares is based on their abundant capital. Institutional investors receive 
IPO shares before the initial date; how they subsequently trade the shares (keep, sell or 
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repurchase) in the secondary market exerts a considerable influence on the stock price 
regarding both short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance. In the short 
term, IPO underpricing can be caused by substantial repurchasing by institutional 
investors in the secondary market. Specifically, if institutional investors flip 
immediately after the initial date, the first day return might be low due to the excessive 
number of shares available in the market, and thus the underpricing will be less 
significant. Conversely, the first-day return will be driven up if institutional investors 
purchase a large number of shares after the initial date. For instance, when underwriters, 
especially lead underwriters, have a quid pro quo arrangement with institutional 
investors, institutional investors have to purchase the shares and maintain the secondary 
market price at a high level even if the IPO is a cold issue (Degeorge, Derrien, & 
Womack, 2004; Griffin et al., 2007). In the long term, underperformance can result 
from institutional investors engaging in excessive selling activity. In other words, if 
institutional investors intend to decrease their level of control in the IPO and cash out, 
the excessive supply of shares will certainly result in declining prices and thus 
underperformance. The effect of selling shares can be stronger in the long term than in 
the short term because individual investors’ purchasing of IPO shares will decrease over 
time (M. Baker & Wurgler, 2007; Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006). The following 
subchapters will introduce institutional investors and their influence on the three 
aspects, which are IPO allocation, IPO underpricing and IPO underperformance. 
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1.2.1 Institutional investors and IPO allocation 
As stated in previous chapters and at the beginning of this chapter, institutional 
investors are usually allocated a large number of initial shares in the primary market, 
directly from the underwriters (R. Aggarwal, 2003; Bertoni & Giudici, 2014).  
As stated in Chapter 4, underwriters primarily allocate IPO shares to institutional 
investors for the following reasons. First, underwriters want to compensate the 
institutional investors for giving away their accurate demand information during the 
book-building stage (Ritter & Welch, 2002). Second, underwriters want to maintain 
certain relationships with institutional investors as their long-term clients (Sherman, 
2000). Third, underwriters attempt to avoid flipping activities due to penalty bids, and 
thus they tend to distribute the initial shares to institutional investors that did not engage 
in flipping activities in their previous collaboration, i.e., to the loyal clients (R. 
Aggarwal, 2003). Fourth, institutional investors are considered sophisticated investors 
that might be less likely to engage in irrational investment behaviors than are individual 
investors (Field & Lowry, 2009).  
This allocation decision is made by lead underwriters during the book-building 
process, as described in Chapter 4 (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001, 2003). Lead 
underwriters usually ask institutional investors about their intention to dispose of the 
shares after the initial date, and some quid pro quo arrangements are likely to be 
reached at this stage if an IPO turns out to be a cold issue (Degeorge et al., 2004). A 
quid pro quo arrangement is an arrangement in which “underwriters require or induce 
clients to buy aftermarket shares” (Griffin et al., 2007, p. 519). Thus, institutional 
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investors are likely to be the purchaser, seller or keeper of the initial shares in the 
aftermarket, which consequently leads to different extents of underpricing or 
underperformance.  
1.2.2 Institutional investors and IPO underpricing 
As previously analyzed, there are several possible reasons that IPO are 
underpriced. Among these reasons, those related to institutional investors can be 
divided into three categories as follows.  
First, underwriters compensate institutional investors with underpricing for the 
information the latter provide during the book-building process (Benveniste & Spindt, 
1989). This argument has been supported by Stoughton and Zechner (1998), whose 
model suggested that underpricing would disappear if lead underwriters were not 
allowed to distribute the initial shares in favor of certain institutional investors. They 
also noted that in the presence of such favoritism in the distribution of initial shares, 
IPO companies would have higher intrinsic value due to monitoring by underwriters. 
This reasoning was explained in Chapter 4 and thus will not be restated here.  
Second, underpricing is compensation for the risk that institutional investors take 
by holding extra shares because IPOs might underperform shortly after the initial date. 
Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al. (2006) proposed a model in which initial shares were first 
allocated to institutional investors, and then institutional investors gradually sold these 
shares to individual investors in the aftermarket after the initial date. Ljungqvist, Nanda, 
et al. (2006) referred to institutional investors as regular investors and individual 
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investors as sentiment investors. They argued that market sentiments would not be 
permanent. Furthermore, Mikhail et al. (2007) found that individual investors became 
net buyers when the return of a stock was either extremely high or low. Hence, by 
combining their results, it can be assumed that when individual investors’ sentiments 
are less pronounced, the accumulated effect on individual investors would be a decrease 
in demand. Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al. (2006) explained underpricing as a breakeven for 
institutional investors because they believe that a decrease in sentiment of individual 
investors will decrease prices. However, in my opinion, this is more akin to 
compensation for risk, as a decline in demand can decrease the rate of price increases, 
but it is not necessarily strong enough to create a decline in a stock price. In my opinion, 
if the entire stock market is observed from the macroscopic level, where institutional 
investors and individual investors are treated as the only two parties in the market, but 
jointly, a decline in demand by one party means there will be extra supply for the other 
party. In the case of institutional investors, this means that they have to take on the risk 
of holding extra shares in the market that are likely to suffer a price decline in the future. 
Hence, to help institutional investors to break even, or more likely, to compensate for 
their inventory risk, the initial price should be lower, i.e., the IPO shares should be 
underpriced.  
Third, underwriters use underpricing to favor their clients, i.e., institutional 
investors. R. Aggarwal et al. (2002) provided empirical support for this by reporting 
that the first-day return of IPOs was positively correlated with the proportion of 
institutional allocation, i.e., the larger the amount of underpricing there was, the greater 
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the number of shares allocated to institutional investors. The authors also explicitly 
noted that part of the underpricing was correlated with book building, as stated in the 
first reason for underpricing above, but book building was not necessarily the only 
explanation for underpricing. Specifically, underwriters were found to allocate more 
IPO shares with strong first-day performance and fewer IPO shares with weak first-day 
performance to institutional investors relative to individual investors. This effect, as 
suggested by R. Aggarwal et al. (2002), can be interpreted as: 1) either institutional 
investors acquired private information concerning the value of IPOs, which was likely 
to occur during the book building or even one-on-one meetings, or 2) underwriters 
intentionally distributed IPOs with high underpricing to favor their institutional clients. 
Both of these interpretations can be interpreted as underwriters intentionally favoring 
their institutional clients by providing them with favorable information or directly 
providing them with hot IPO shares.  
To conclude, the reasons for underpricing connected with institutional investors 
can primarily be summarized into the above three categories. Following these three 
reasons, institutional investors are not the direct creators of underpricing, but they are 
the influential parties in the primary market that have the strongest bargaining power 
with underwriters according to various perspectives. They are capable of influencing or 
pressuring underwriters through underpricing because they are the underwriters’ more 
stable clients, purchase the majority of shares, and most important, have strong 
purchasing power, which can change the trend in price development in the stock market. 
All of these characteristics make them, on the one hand, superior to individual investors 
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and, on the other hand, influence the pricing decisions of underwriters. Thus, in my 
opinion, underwriters cause underpricing in the primary market, but the more radical 
reason for such behavior by underwriters is to benefit the interests of institutional 
investors. 
1.2.3 Institutional investors and IPO underperformance 
The previously mentioned model developed by Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al. (2006) 
suggested that when the net purchasing behavior of the individual investors declines 
(due to the temporary nature of investors’ sentiments), the market would underperform 
for the first 6 to 12 months after the initial date. This can be interpreted as indicating 
that the decreased individual purchasing behavior was one of the main reasons for the 
long-term underperformance. To my understanding, this model suggests: 1) in the short 
term, individual investors’ sentimental purchasing behavior amplifies the real demand 
for IPOs, and thus the price of IPOs in the secondary market might be correspondingly 
higher than its true value; 2) in the long term, the sentimental purchasing behavior 
declines, and thus the price of IPOs will be influenced accordingly, and the 
underperformance will be the result.  
However, as stated previously, in my opinion, a mere decrease in net purchasing 
behavior might not necessarily be strong enough to create such universal 
underperformance as suggested by the long-term effect. In other words, a decrease in 
otherwise increasing demand might only slow price increases but will not create a 
significant price decline. Hence, underperformance should be a combined effect of 
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decreased demand and increased supply. According to R. Aggarwal (2003), most of the 
IPO shares, approximately 73 percent, in their sample were initially allocated to 
institutional investors. This finding, together with the assumption that individual 
investors are mostly net purchasers (Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006), it is possible to 
assume that an increase in supply might be primarily the result of institutional investors’ 
selling behavior in the long term. In my opinion, it can thus be assumed that institutional 
investors’ selling behavior is the main and most significant reason for long-term IPO 
underperformance. This assumption can be supported from the following two 
perspectives. 
First, institutional investors’ selling activities might increase the supply of the IPO 
shares, thus creating underperformance. Indirect empirical support for this assumption 
is that, in both the short and long term, IPO companies with a large amount of 
institutional investment were found to outperform comparable IPO companies with a 
small amount of institutional investment (Field & Lowry, 2009). In other words, when 
institutional investors retain a large proportion of shares in IPO companies, the IPO 
companies ought to outperform and not underperform. Specifically, using a sample of 
5,907 IPOs covering 21 years, Field and Lowry (2009) found that the IPO companies 
with the largest amount of institutional investment have significantly higher returns 
than do those with the smallest amounts, on a quarterly basis. In my opinion, 
institutional investors’ having a large stake in a company can be interpreted as either a 
result of outperformance or as a reason for it. Specifically, when it is interpreted as a 
result, as explained by Field and Lowry (2009), this means that some IPO companies 
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outperform others and that institutional investors are better at identifying these 
companies than are individual investors. However, when it is interpreted as a reason, as 
in the assumption stated in the beginning of this paragraph, institutional investors’ 
selling activities might cause the underperformance of certain IPO companies. One 
logical way to differentiate such factors that might be reciprocal is to detect the potential 
reasons of one of the factors. For instance, a study could be conducted by focusing on 
the reasons for institutional investors’ selling activities. As there might be numerous 
reasons that are difficult to observe in the market, such as the decision making of 
institutional investors due to the influence of private information, conducting a survey 
on institutional investors’ IPO selling behavior is a promising approach. Because it is 
possible that few institutional investors would be willing to supply such information, it 
remains unclear whether institutional investors have caused underperformance or vice 
versa. 
Second, some individual investors’ selling activities might be derived from the 
selling activities of institutional investors, which also increases the supply of IPO shares 
and thus creates underperformance. As stated by Field and Lowry (2009), institutional 
investors were perceived as better information processors and hence were better able to 
identify the quality of IPO companies than were individual investors. Based on this, 
institutional investors’ holding activities can be interpreted as a positive signal 
concerning the quality of IPO companies, whereas, conversely, selling activities can be 
interpreted as a negative signal. A small proportion of individual investors who have 
superior information relative to their peers might act upon such signals. Thus this 
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proportion of individual investors is likely to follow the selling activities of institutions, 
and accordingly increase the supply of IPO shares. If one considers the concept of an 
information cascade, whereby peer investors follow the first movers who sell the IPO 
shares, the supply of IPOs will further increase (Amihud et al., 2003). Because this 
assumption is based on the belief that individual investors are net purchasers, and 
because the primary market might not be ideal enough to create an information cascade, 
I assume that only a proportion of individual investors would sell. Consequently, further 
price declines follow the creation of additional supply, and then the underperformance 
occurs.  
In my opinion, increased supply is more likely to be the main reason for 
underperformance instead of decreased demand in the secondary market, which is 
mostly caused by institutional investors. In addition to the abovementioned two reasons, 
two additional conditions that need to be noted are 1) institutional investors control a 
large proportion of IPO shares before the secondary market becomes active, and 2) the 
underwriters discourage institutional investors from engaging in flipping activities 
shortly after the initial date (CFA Institute, 2014). Thus when they have no intention to 
control the shares of a given IPO company for long time, the proper time for 
institutional investors to sell might be after the IPO price stabilizes, i.e., in the relatively 
long term. There have been no recent studies focusing on institutional investors’ selling 
behavior in the relatively long term or before IPOs begin to underperform. Thus this 
hypothesis can be tested by focusing on the correlation between institutional investors’ 
selling behavior and the return on IPOs.  
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 If one wished to summarize the impact of institutional investors on the entire IPO 
process, then, in my opinion, this summary should be “money talks”. They have large 
purchasing power, and are thus considered the most important clients of underwriters, 
who are willing to allocate hot initial shares to them, maintain the long-term 
relationship with them and even provide them with private information. They have large 
capital, and thus when they sell their shares, a price decline is likely. They are also able 
to provide generous compensation to their professional employees, and thus they are 
better at processing public information and considered sophisticated investors. In very 
long term, it is possible that the trend will be that individual investors will be no longer 
active in the stock market because they might be better off becoming clients of 
institutional investors, i.e., investing in institutions such as pension funds, hedge funds 
or institutional investment advisors. However, individual investors remain extremely 
active, which in my opinion, might be related to the current method of distributing IPO 
shares and to the asymmetric information between individual investors and institutional 
investors, both of which will require market efficiency. Besides the inefficient market, 
which is considered one major challenge to the traditional finance, the other major 
challenge, irrational investors, will be discussed in the following subchapter. 
Specifically, irrational trading behaviors caused by cognitive biases such as 
overconfidence or familiarity bias; affective factors such as pride and regret; and social 
factors such as media influence and interpersonal communication will be all further 
analyzed, together with the IPO phenomena of underpricing and underperformance. 
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2. Individual Investors 
Some, or even the majority, of individual investors have been described as 
irrational investors (Verma & Soydemir, 2009), naïve investors (Hirshleifer et al., 2008) 
or unsophisticated investors (Mahani & Poteshman, 2008); according to the efficient 
market hypothesis, these individuals should not be participating in a perfect stock 
market (Basu, 1977; Fama, 1970). In other words, in an efficient market, all investors 
should be perfectly rational. From the perspective of economists, for instance as stated 
by Hirshleifer (2001), even if irrational investors exist in the stock market, the results 
of their irrational trading behaviors should balance out because different individuals 
tend to make different and independent mistakes.  
However, psychologists, especially evolutionary psychologists have argued that 
human beings share common cognitive biases, which have been accumulated over 
human evolutionary history (K. P. Lim & Brooks, 2011; Lo, 2004). Hence, traders’ 
irrational trading behavior ought to be similar and hence cannot be balanced out, such 
as overconfidence (Gervais & Odean, 2001), herd behavior (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 
2000), the disposition effect (Kaustia, 2004), and so forth (Daniel et al., 1998a; 
Hirshleifer, 2001). For instance, using information from the German stock exchange 
(Deutsche Boerse), Dorn (2009) showed that individual investors tended to trade a 
similar way. In general, individual investors overpaid for IPOs in the primary market. 
In this study, the special trading rules in the German stock exchange provide the 
possibility to analyze individual investors’ transactions in the primary market, 
beginning with book building. This is considered a novel perspective, as in most stock 
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markets worldwide, individual investors are only allocated with small proportion of the 
initial shares. This is reflected, for example, in the descriptive statistics, where 
individual investors were allocated from 10 to 20 percent, or slightly more than 20 
percent, from the studies of R. Aggarwal (2003), and R. Aggarwal et al. (2002), 
respectively. According to Dorn (2009), his method was possible because since 1 
August, 1999, both individual and institutional investors could purchase IPOs in the 
primary market at the initial price in the German stock exchange. The primary-market 
purchasing begins on the same day as the book building process, continues until the 
shares are tradable in the secondary market, and usually lasts for one week. Specifically, 
individual investors were found to be consistently overpaying for IPOs in the primary 
market (from the beginning of book building until trading began on the secondary 
market) and not in the secondary market, with a difference of 13 percent between the 
medians of the samples. Dorn (2009) suggested that this consistent overpaying was due 
to individual investors’ irrational trading behavior in the primary market. In my opinion, 
when initial share allocations are not restricted to institutional investors, as in Dorn 
(2009), individual investors in the primary market could be representative of general 
individual investors in the overall stock market. Hence, it can be assumed that 
individual investors in general exhibit other biased trading behaviors beyond 
overpaying for IPOs.  
Indeed, there are several psychological factors that influence individual investors’ 
trading activities. K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) summarized the reasons for investors’ 
common trading mistakes into cognitive factors (how investors think), affective factors 
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(how investors feel) and the influence of social factors. Similarly, Hirshleifer (2001) 
categorized the irrational factors that influence asset pricing into four categories: 1) 
heuristic simplification, 2) self-deception, 3) emotions and self-control, and 4) social 
interactions. In my opinion, these four categories can be classified with respect to the 
three types of factors that K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) proposed, which are 1) 
cognitive factors (heuristic simplification, self-deception and self-control), 2) affective 
factors (emotions), and 3) social factors (social interactions). According to K. Baker 
and Nofsinger (2002), cognitive factors are related to how people think. For instance, 
overconfidence, as discussed in Chapter 3, is a typical cognitive factor that influences 
people’s decisions (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005; Klayman 
et al., 1999). Affective factors are related to people’s emotions, such as greed, fear, 
hope, pride and regret. For example, those authors explained one of the common 
phenomena in investment, the disposition effect, with affective factors such as pride 
and regret. The disposition effect describes a phenomenon whereby people tend to sell 
winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long (Weber & Camerer, 1998). 
Social factors are those related to surrounding of human beings, such as herding 
behavior (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Shiller, 1995).  
Consequently, in the following part, the three abovementioned factors will be 
introduced according to the sequential stages of individual investors’ IPO purchasing 
process. These stages include 1) the stage of paying attention to and being interested in 
IPOs, 2) the stage of investing in or purchasing IPOs in the short term after the initial 
date, and 3) the stage of trading IPOs in the long term after the initial date. Because the 
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psychological factors mentioned above have different degrees of influence on the three 
stages, they will each be addressed separately.  
2.1 Individual investors and initial investment in IPOs 
The psychological factors that influence individual investors’ decision making can 
be traced back to the stage at which individual investors begin to be interested in IPOs. 
In my opinion, at this stage, cognitive factors and affective factors both have a 
significant influence on investor behavior. For instance, in the general stock market, the 
investing behaviors of major individual investors are related to overconfidence; in the 
IPO market, hot and cold IPO markets are related to the overall mood of the investors 
during a certain period of time; and the interest in one particular IPO stock can be 
related to investors’ familiarity with the IPO company. Hence, this subchapter will 
describe the influence of cognitive and affective factors at a larger scale, stock market 
participation, and a smaller scale, investor interest in specific IPOs. In most cases, these 
steps are necessary for an individual investor who is willing to purchase IPO shares, 
and hence it is logical to present them according to the sequence of stock market 
participation, IPO market participation, and specific IPO purchasing behavior. Social 
factors will be introduced in Subchapter 2.2 because I consider them to be stronger 
factors affecting investors’ final purchasing decisions.  
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2.1.1 Influence of cognitive factors 
Overconfidence 
Overconfidence was discussed previously in Chapter 3 when comparing the 
performance of overconfident CEOs and their less confident peer CEOs. In general, 
overconfidence is a trait that has been found not only among CEOs but also among 
average individuals (De Bondt & Thaler, 1994). Regarding investors, overconfidence, 
in my opinion, has a direct influence on their participation in the stock market.  
The extant literature on overconfidence holds that overconfidence tends to appear 
in two forms: the better-than-average effect and miscalibration. Specifically, the better-
than-average effect describes the scenario in which people overestimate their own 
ability in comparison to that of others; miscalibration describes the scenario in which 
people overestimate the reliability of their own knowledge (De Bondt & Thaler, 1994; 
Glaser, Langer, & Weber, 2010; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005). In my opinion, both of 
these forms of overconfidence could be positively correlated with the likelihood that 
investors will participate in the stock market. For instance, when the better-than-
average effect is considered as a type of overconfidence, it can be assumed that 
individual investors will overestimate their ability to obtain profits in the stock market; 
when overconfidence is considered in the form of miscalibration, it can be assumed that 
individual investors will overestimate the reliability of their own knowledge relating to 
the stock market, which might be obtained from their peers’ outcomes in the stock 
market or from their own deductions based on public information such as that presented 
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by the media.  
The psychological factors related to overconfidence, according to K. Baker and 
Nofsinger (2002), are illusion of control and illusion of knowledge. The former can lead 
to the better-than-average effect, and the latter can lead to miscalibration. The extant 
literature on overconfidence and stock market investors focuses on investors’ trading 
behaviors in the stock market, instead of the correlation between overconfidence and 
stock market participation. The reason that I believe that it is important to study this 
correlation is that the number of newly opened trading accounts has been found to be 
positively correlated with the stock market index. For instance, data from the Finnish 
stock market from 1995 to 2002 showed that the cumulative market return peaked at 
5000 points in 2000, in comparison to less than 1000 points in 1995 and less than 1000 
points in 2002. Comparably, investors’ entry rate also peaked in 2000 and was five 
times larger than the average figure from 1995 to 2002 (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2012).  
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that when overconfidence encourages 
participation by irrational investors, the underpricing phenomenon in the secondary 
market can be partly attributed to overconfidence. This assumption is based on the 
following: 1) irrational investors are the main purchasers of the IPO shares in the 
secondary market, and 2) the stock market index of IPOs is likely to be driven up by a 
high participation rate. In other words, it can be assumed that overconfidence on the 
part of individual investors in the secondary market aggravates IPO underpricing if 
overconfidence encourages stock market participation. Hence, in the following part, 
whether overconfidence encourages individual investors to participate in the stock 
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market, particularly regarding IPO purchasing, will be the focus of discussion. 
 Relatedly, Kumar (2009) conducted a study on the similarities between lottery 
players and lottery-like stock investors. Based on this study, future research could be 
conducted on the similarities between lottery players and IPO investors. Because 
lotteries and IPOs are comparable, based on the results of Kumar (2009), it should be 
possible to identify common features between lottery players and lottery-like stock 
investors.  
The salient features of lotteries, as Kumar (2009) stated, included high risk, an 
extremely small likelihood of reward, low price, and small negative expected returns. 
In my opinion, most of these features can also be found in IPO shares. For instance, on 
the one hand, there might be high risk might in the form of operating risk, which reflects 
the unpredictability of IPO companies’ future operating performance (Jain & Kini, 
1994); on the other hand, there might be high risk in the form of performance risk, 
which reflects the high probability that IPO stocks will underperform in the long term 
(Brav & Gompers, 1997; Espenlaub et al., 2000). IPOs could be considered to have a 
low probability of reward because of the low likelihood that individual investors will 
be allocated IPO shares in the primary market (R. Aggarwal, 2003). In special cases, 
IPO shares possess further common features with lotteries. For example, some IPO 
shares are issued at an extremely low initial price, for instance, $5 or even lower per 
share in the U.S., which are also known as penny stock IPOs (Bradley, Cooney Jr, 
Dolvin, & Jordan, 2006; Fernando, Krishnamurthy, & Spindt, 2004). Another similarity 
is that, in some countries’ stock markets (e.g., China), the distribution of the initial IPO 
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shares follows a lottery scheme, whereby a random number is created for every 1,000 
subscriptions, and only those investors who have the chosen numbers will be allocated 
the initial shares at the end of the subscription (Coakley, Instefjord, & Shen, 2007). 
Hence, to some extent, it might be reasonable to regard IPO shares as lottery-like stocks, 
especially for the penny stock IPOs or IPOs using the lottery allocation mechanism.  
Kumar (2009) noted that individual investors who invest in the lottery-like stocks 
shared strong behavioral similarities with lottery players, at both the macro level and 
micro level. At the macro level, the results showed that, in general, individual investors 
preferred stocks with lottery-like features, especially during economic downturns. At 
the micro level, lottery-like stocks were found to be invested in more frequently by 1) 
investors who earned relatively lower salaries than their neighbors and 2) investors 
from countries with a higher unemployment rate (Kumar, 2009).  
Consequently, in my opinion, it is reasonable to assume that a certain number of 
individual investors in the IPO market also share strong behavioral similarities with 
lottery players. Lottery players have been found to exhibit several cognitive biases, such 
as the gambler’s fallacy, near misses, the rollover effect, the illusion of control, and so 
forth (Rogers, 1998). One of these cognitive biases is unrealistic optimism, in other 
words, overconfidence (Rogers, 1998; Weinstein, 1980). Hence, it can be assumed that 
individual investors exhibit different levels of overconfidence in the IPO market. 
Because, in essence, overconfidence bias makes it more difficult for both investors and 
lottery players to estimate the likelihood of a future event (Glaser et al., 2010; Rogers, 
1998), it is important to differentiate investors (lottery players) that exhibit a higher 
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level of overconfidence relative to others. Based on extant studies, in general, two 
factors are directly correlated with the level of overconfidence among investors (lottery 
players).  
First, experience was found to be positively correlated with overconfidence, in 
both the stock market and gambling. In the stock market, Glaser et al. (2010) found that 
professional bankers had a higher level of overconfidence than laymen. In their study, 
the sample comprised 123 bankers from a large German bank and a control group of 
advanced students majoring in banking and finance at the University of Mannheim. The 
results showed that professionals had significantly more overconfidence and stronger 
biases in their judgments. Similarly, in gambling, Rogers and Webley (1998) found 
regular lottery players to be more optimistic about winning a jackpot than occasional 
players and non-lottery players (as cited in Rogers, 1998). This is similar to the case of 
CEO overconfidence, as stated in Chapter 3, where more experienced CEOs tend to be 
more overconfident, as overconfidence can be accumulated over time (Billett & Qian, 
2008). 
Second, education was found to be positively correlated with overconfidence. One 
study that surveyed approximately 2,000 participants showed that higher education had 
significant positive correlations with overconfidence (Bhandari & Deaves, 2006). 
“Those with formal education do not know more about investments, but they think they 
do: thus they are overconfident” (Bhandari & Deaves, 2006, p. 10); in my opinion, this 
is the most vivid description of the group of irrational individual investors. One recent 
survey on the general educational background of Chinese stock market investors 
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published by Bloomberg attracted considerable attention. In this survey, Orlik (2015) 
noted that among the new investors in the Chinese stock market at the end of 2014, 
approximately 80 percent had a high school education or below. The mainstream media, 
for instance Bloomberg, argued that these investors were primarily responsible for the 
surge in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index from 2,300 points in 
September 2014, to 3,300 points in March 2015. However, as Bhandari and Deaves 
(2006) noted regarding overconfidence bias, it is more difficult for investors with higher 
formal education to predict future events. Hence, it is insufficient to argue that the surge 
in the market index is attributable to investors with low formal education.   
Therefore, combining the two abovementioned subgroups gives rise to the 
following question: if investors with higher formal education tend to be more 
overconfident, and advanced finance students tend to be less overconfident, what is the 
correlation between an investor’s level of finance or investment knowledge and the 
investors’ level of overconfidence?  
This correlation has been studied by Bhandari and Deaves (2006), who obtained 
no significant result regarding the correlation between investment knowledge and 
overconfidence. However, their method of measuring investment knowledge is, in my 
opinion, questionable: two multiple-choice questions relating to the Canadian asset 
market were asked, one asked for “the average return on the Canadian stock market 
between 1982 and 2001”, the other asked for “the average long-term Government of 
Canada bond yield during the same period” (Bhandari & Deaves, 2006, p. 11). The 
reasons that I believe that those authors’ method is questionable are as follows: 1) the 
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number of questions they asked could be insufficient to obtain an overview of 
participants’ investment knowledge; 2) the experience was not included as a control 
variable. They mentioned that the age distribution of their sample was close to that of 
the general Canadian labor force, and hence experience should be controlled for in their 
sample because it is correlated with the level of overconfidence, according to Glaser et 
al. (2010). In my opinion, because the source of overconfidence lies in the false 
understanding of the probability of a future event (Rogers, 1998; Weinstein, 1980), it 
is reasonable to assume that when experience is controlled for, individuals who have 
more financial knowledge tend to be less overconfident.  
As a result, at the micro level, there are eight groups of individual investors who 
exhibit different levels of overconfidence and thus have different investment 
performance. These eight groups are divided according to the high and low levels of 
the three factors abovementioned factors: 1) experience, 2) investment knowledge, and 
3) formal education (Table 3). For instance, professional bankers would be classified 
in the group of investors who have a high level of experience, high level of formal 
education and high level of investment knowledge; investors exhibiting a gambling 
attitude toward the stock market would be placed in the group of investors who have 
low levels of all three factors. 
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Table 3 
Groups Formal 
education 
Investment 
knowledge 
Experience Example 
1 High High High Professional bankers 
2 High High Low Advanced finance students 
3 High Low High Experienced stock market 
gambler (with high education) 
4 High  Low Low Advanced non-finance students 
5 Low High High Experienced stock market 
investors (with low education) 
6 Low High Low Finance news lovers (with low 
education and low experience) 
7 Low Low High Experienced stock market 
gambler (with low education) 
8 Low Low Low Newly entered stock market 
gamblers (with low education) 
It would be meaningful for future studies to compare the levels of overconfidence 
level exhibited by these eight groups and to study the combined results of the three 
factors. Another way to study these three factors is to estimate a regression with 1) the 
level of experience, 2) the level of investment knowledge, and 3) the level of formal 
education as independent variables and the level of overconfidence as the dependent 
variable. Such studies could offer important insights from both the economic and 
regulatory perspectives. In practice, people tend to have the plausible impression that 
more educated and experienced investors tend to perform better in the stock market; 
however, it is highly likely that empirical results would contradict this impression. For 
instance, when more experience leads to stronger overconfidence bias, which in turn 
results a lower investment return, as Glaser et al. (2010) noted, from a regulatory 
perspective, policies that encourage the fresh finance graduates to be involved in 
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significant investment decisions should be adopted.    
To conclude, for future studies seeking to analyze the relationship between 
overconfidence and IPOs, three hypotheses can be formulated based on the theories and 
empirical results mentioned above: first, individual investors’ overconfidence is 
positively correlated with their likelihood of IPO subscription; second, individual 
investors’ overconfidence is positively correlated with their likelihood of penny stock 
IPO subscription; and third, individual investors’ overconfidence is positively 
correlated with their likelihood of IPO subscription where a lottery scheme is used. 
Among all of the potential variables, formal education, income, gender, experience, and 
investment knowledge should be included as controls because they are correlated with 
the level of overconfidence (Barber & Odean, 2001; Bhandari & Deaves, 2006; Glaser 
et al., 2010; Kumar, 2009; Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćcohaŕ, 1994). The three hypotheses 
mentioned above were developed based on the correlation between individuals’ 
overconfidence and their likelihood of purchasing a lottery as a reference, as Rogers 
and Webley (1998) showed that frequent lottery players tended to be more 
overconfident in their belief of winning a jackpot. Hence, when there is a positive 
correlation between overconfidence and the likelihood of IPO subscription, one can 
conclude that the overconfidence of individual investors contributes to IPO 
underpricing. The specific contribution of individual investors’ overconfidence is to 
drive the secondary market price higher than it would be in the absence of overconfident 
investors. According to economists, the level of IPO underpricing is usually measured 
by the price difference between the initial price and the first-day closing price in the 
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secondary market, for instance, the first-day return (Asquith et al., 1998; Hanley, 1993; 
Rock, 1986; Zheng & Li, 2008). Additionally, as stated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 
underpricing can be categorized into two parts. The first is necessary underpricing (or 
unavoidable underpricing). This part of underpricing is created by the information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors. The second is intentional underpricing. This 
part of underpricing is created by underwriters for various purposes (as stated in 
Chapter 4), due to the information asymmetry between underwriters and issuers (R. 
Aggarwal, 2000; Sherman & Titman, 2002). Hence, although the first-day return has 
been considered the major factor driving underpricing, existing studies have solely 
focused on underpricing that occurs in the primary market. However, the price 
difference generated in the secondary market on the first day after the initial date has 
often been neglected. As stated in this subchapter, individual investors’ overconfidence 
is also highly likely to contribute to the first-day return. A potential reason that 
economists have neglected this factor is that they assume that investors are completely 
rational, and hence cognitive biases such as overconfidence would be ignored.  
As such, in my opinion, underpricing in the secondary market is should be termed 
overpricing, as this part of the price difference is driven up by individual investors’ 
irrationality relative the case in which they are rational. In other words, I believe the 
total difference between the initial price and the closing price on the first trading day 
can be separated into two parts. The first part is created in the primary market, where 
both issuers and underwriters set the price lower during the book-building process, and 
thus can be called underpricing. The second part is created in the secondary market, 
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where the individual investors drive the market price up due to their irrationality, for 
example, in the form of overconfidence, and thus should be termed overpricing. 
Although several scholars have noted that IPOs are overpriced (such as Derrien, 2005; 
P. D. Drake & Vetsuypens, 1993), they used the term to simply mean the opposite of 
underpriced, instead of studying the reasons for overpricing from all three perspectives 
(issuer, underwriter and investors) and in both markets (the primary and secondary 
market). By conducting an analysis from the three perspectives and two markets, one 
can examine the reasons for the price difference between the initial price and the first-
day closing price in a thorough and complete way. This argument is new in explaining 
the IPO underpricing phenomenon because previous studies have tended to isolate the 
primary market and secondary market when analyzing underpricing; in other instances, 
the perspectives of the three parties were considered interchangeably without 
emphasizing the different underlying mechanisms. This argument is based on the fact 
that the IPO prices (both the initial price and the market price) cannot simply be decided 
by one party or in one market. Thus IPO underpricing is a result of the combined effects 
of all three parties and two markets, where all contribute to the price difference in 
various ways. Hopefully, this argument can provide new insight for underpricing 
studies and improve understandings of the IPO underpricing phenomenon. 
Familiarity bias 
Familiarity bias is a cognitive bias that makes people favor things that they are 
familiar with more than those they are not (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Several 
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studies have found that the familiarity of certain stocks influences individuals’ 
decisions while betting, trading stocks or constructing their portfolios (Chew, Ebstein, 
& Zhong, 2012; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001a; Huberman, 2001; Massa & Simonov, 
2006).  
For instance, a study using a sample of Finnish investors showed that they tended 
to trade more stocks from companies that were closer to them on a geographical, 
linguistic and cultural dimension (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001a). Specifically, these 
three dimensions were referred to as 1) the distance between the company and the 
investors, 2) whether the language used by the company was the same as that of the 
investors, and 3) whether the CEO was from the same cultural background as the 
investors. The abovementioned trading behaviors include buying, holding and selling 
behaviors. In other words, such familiar stocks essentially attract more attention from 
investors and are more successful at attracting investors’ funds. This study can be used 
as a good example of the influence of familiarity bias. For instance, according to 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a), the marginal effect of distance decreased for the 
stocks of companies that were nationally popular. Because both the proximity and 
popularity of a company increase investors’ familiarity with it, the effect of familiarity 
bias influenced by one factor (distance) can be weakened when both factors (distance 
and popularity) exist. Similarly, a study using data from the U.S. showed that investors 
tend to construct their portfolios using stocks of the firms located in the investor’s home 
region and using the stocks of firms that produce the products that investors are 
accustomed to purchasing (Huberman, 2001). Furthermore, Huberman (2001) 
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explicitly noted that when exhibiting familiarity bias, investors tended to neglect 
expected-utility-based portfolio theory, which emphasizes portfolio risk diversification. 
In other words, this study is direct evidence that familiarity bias affects irrational 
investors.  
One of the possible reasons for familiarity bias is the illusion of control. As 
previously introduced in the subchapter on overconfidence, the illusion of control 
describes the phenomenon whereby people overestimate the expected influence they 
can exert over an uncontrollable event (Harris & Osman, 2012; Langer, 1975). The 
reason that it is considered one of the causes of familiarity bias is that studies have 
found that the illusion of control was positively correlated with factors such as 
familiarity and personal involvement (Langer, 1975; Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo, 2014). 
A set of classic studies conducted by Langer (1975) proposed that some factors relating 
to individuals’ skills would lead to an increase in personal confidence. These skill 
factors included: competition, familiarity, choice and involvement. A recent study 
focused on one of the factors, personal involvement, and showed that the more people 
were involved in obtaining their objectives, the stronger was their illusion of control 
(Yarritu et al., 2014). Yarritu et al. (2014) proposed that the illusion of control is 
exacerbated by people’s confusion between personal involvements and the probabilities 
of acting. In other words, in my opinion, this phenomenon can be interpreted as 
indicating that people tend to have the illusion that all the effort will pay off, and neglect 
the fact that some events are actually uncontrollable or that their effort is not necessarily 
contributing to achieving their objectives. Hence, this might be one of the reasons that 
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the customers of a certain company tend to invest in its stock (if the customers invest 
in the stock market) or, more directly, that the employees of a certain company also 
tend to invest in its stock (if the employees invest in the stock market). 
Another argument regarding familiarity was proposed by Massa and Simonov 
(2006). In their study, they showed that familiarity influenced investors along two 
dimensions: first, the effect of familiarity outweighs investors’ hedging intentions such 
that their portfolios tend to include more familiar stocks; second, it influenced the 
investors’ general risk preferences. Specifically, they defined familiar stocks as those 
that 1) were geographically proximate to investors, 2) were proximate to investors with 
respect to industry, or 3) were invested in by investors for a certain period of time. 
However, they argued that “familiarity is not a behavioral bias, but is information 
driven” (Massa & Simonov, 2006, p. 633). This conclusion was obtained by analyzing 
a sample of Swedish investors. The empirical results showed that investors with more 
information were less affected by familiarity and their stocks performed better than 
would have been the case if they had hedged, i.e., if they had invested without the 
influence of familiarity. Hence, Massa and Simonov (2006) argued that familiarity was 
driven by information and should not be considered a bias.  
In my opinion, it is possible that investors exhibit familiarity bias when they 
participate in the stock market for the first time. The more experienced they become, 
the more likely they are to focus on the stocks they have chosen, and the more 
information they will receive related to their chosen stocks. In other words, I believe 
that familiarity bias and the familiarity effect, which is driven by information, occur at 
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different stages for a stock market investor. Because there is always information 
overload in the stock market (Agnew & Szykman, 2005; Paredes, 2003), it can be 
challenging for beginners to thoroughly investigate each stock that is available in the 
stock market. Hence, familiarity bias plays a role at this stage, which helps investors to 
simplify the selection process and provides them with “an easy way out” (Agnew & 
Szykman, 2005, p. 57). Subsequently, as investors gain experience related to the stocks 
they hold, they become better informed and more experienced observers of such stocks, 
which can be regarded as the stage where information driven familiarity is established. 
The stage is similar to the saying from Mark Twain, “Put all your eggs in one basket, 
and watch that basket” (as cited in P. A. Samuelson, 1994).   
Regardless of whether familiarity is a bias or is driven by information, one overall 
conclusion is that investors invest in the stocks with which they are familiar, with 
respect to geography, occupation and previous investment experience. Hence, for a 
specific IPO, it is possible that investors with related IPO investment experience are 
more likely to invest in another IPO. Additionally, investors are more likely to invest 
in a certain industry, or even a certain company, that is closely related to their job. Thus, 
it can be assumed that the popularity of an IPO in the stock market is ultimately a 
question of how much influential power it has, including domestic influence, 
occupational influence and product influence. For instance, from an individual 
investor’s perspective, a famous football club’s IPO is more likely to attract its fans to 
hold shares, while Twitter’s IPO would be more appealing for an active Twitter user 
than for a football fan. From an institutional investor’s perspective, an IPO with a more 
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influential roadshow or a more successful one-on-one meeting can attract more of its 
funds due to the effect of familiarity. Thus, the familiarity factor can be considered one 
of the nonfinancial reasons that some IPOs are more popular than others, in other words, 
why some IPOs gather substantial funding and are significantly underpriced, while 
other IPOs are considered cold issues and occasionally have negative first-day returns. 
Additionally, when individual investors exhibit familiarity bias toward a certain IPO 
stock, they are more likely to purchase its shares immediately after the initial date and 
less likely to flip the shares relative to speculative investors. As a result, familiarity bias 
might increase the level of underpricing in the secondary market and decrease the 
likelihood of underperformance in the long term for IPOs with which investors are 
familiar.   
2.1.2 Influence of affective factors 
Mood 
Affective factors, as previously stated, are about how people feel. Emotions such 
as greed, fear, regret and pride are affective factors (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002).  
Similarly, many psychologists also consider mood to be one of the affective factors 
(Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983). Some scholars (such as K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002) also categorized it as a 
cognitive factor, due to the mechanism through which it influences decision making. 
For instance, K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) stated that investors in a good mood tend 
to be optimistic, which is “one of the precursors to overconfidence” (p. 103).  
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Regardless of the different categorizations, mood has been considered one of the 
factors that significantly influence investment decisions (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; 
Bollen, Mao, & Zeng, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2001). Previous studies have used the weather, 
specifically the amount of sunshine or the season, as a general mood detector to study 
investors’ decisions. The use of these weather-related factors as mood detectors has 
been supported by several empirical studies, and positive correlations have been found, 
for instance between the amount of sunshine and mood (Cunningham, 1979; Howarth 
& Hoffman, 1984; Sanders & Brizzolara, 1982; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In an 
experiment by Schwarz and Clore (1983), participants were interviewed by telephone 
on sunny and rainy days. Significant differences were found between mood 
(momentary happiness) in sunny and rainy weather, and similar results were obtained 
for well-being (general happiness, life-satisfaction and desire to change). Specifically, 
on sunny days, participants were significantly happier (from both the momentary and 
general perspectives), had higher life-satisfaction and less desire to change than on 
rainy days.  
Using weather as a mood detector, scholars found that investment decisions and 
the consequent returns in the stock market varied on days with different weather. 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), using a sample of 26 stock exchanges from around 
the world, found that stock returns were negatively correlated with the amount of 
cloudiness. In other words, the stock returns on sunny days were found to be 
significantly higher than on days with unpleasant weather. Studies that have focused on 
weather conditions in a given region have shown similar results in selected countries, 
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for instance, the weather in New York City was found to have a long history of 
influencing major stock price indexes (S.-C. Chang, Chen, Chou, & Lin, 2008; 
Saunders Jr, 1993); the temperature and cloud cover in Taiwan were found to influence 
that country’s stock returns (T. Chang, Nieh, Yang, & Yang, 2006); and some weather 
factors (rain and daylight savings time changes) were found to have a minor but 
significant influence on the Irish stock market (Dowling & Lucey, 2005). Daylight 
savings time changes (DTSC), which take place twice per year (expect for certain Asian 
countries such as Japan and China). The change in time usually occurs in spring and 
autumn, when the clock time goes forward or backward for one hour, respectively 
(Dowling & Lucey, 2005). Coren (1997) found that DTSC caused anxiety due to the 
interruption of sleeping patterns (as cited in Dowling & Lucey, 2005). Besides the 
abovementioned studies, one exception was Spain, where no significant influence of 
weather on stock prices was found (Pardo & Valor, 2003). This exception might be 
explainable by a study on the subject of seasonal affective disorder (SAD). SAD is a 
condition that affects people due to the different hours of daylight in different seasons. 
Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003), after controlling for other seasonal factors affecting 
the stock market, found a significant and substantial SAD effect in stock market returns. 
Interestingly, stock markets in countries located at higher latitudes showed stronger 
SAD effects, and a six-month synchronized lag was found in stock markets located in 
the Southern Hemisphere. Hence, this result indicates that the more significant 
differences there are between the seasons, the greater the extent to which people are 
influenced by the SAD effect. In my opinion, the influence of weather can be similar: 
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in countries where weather differs substantially, the effect of weather on the stock 
market ought to be significant. Thus, it is possible that, in Spain, where there is 
generally sufficient sunshine, the effect of weather on investors’ mood is weakened. 
This contrasts with Pardo and Valor (2003) proposed conclusion for their study, as I 
believe that without excluding the possibility that Spanish investors might be 
insensitive to the weather, their conclusion that the Spanish stock market is efficient 
cannot be considered a solid argument.  
Hence, most of the studies listed above have shown that investors’ trading 
behaviors were generally influenced by mood, using weather as a proxy. With the 
development of computer science and social networks, it later became possible to 
employ other more direct mood detectors, namely, based on people’s expressions of 
mood. For instance, what people post on Twitter has been used as a mood detector. One 
application of this mechanism is to detect the general mood on Twitter, an approach 
used by Bollen et al. (2011). They collected approximately 10 million tweets from 
approximately 2.7 million users covering the period from 28 February, 2008 to 19 
December, 2008. Their sample excluded spam accounts and was collected by sorting 
for all tweets containing key words such as I feel, I am feeling, and I’m feeling. Two 
assessments of the public daily mood (mood detectors) were generated accordingly: 
OpinionFinder was used to assess positive and negative mood, and GPOMS was used 
to measure mood along six dimensions, which are calm, alert, sure, vital, kind and 
happy. OpinionFinder is a software package that can be used to identify whether a 
sentence is positive or negative in terms of emotional polarity. GPOMS is short for 
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Google-Profile of Mood States, which contains 964 terms computed by Google in 2006. 
These 964 terms were pulled from 1 trillion word tokens from public webpages (Bollen 
et al., 2011). By using these two mood detectors, Bollen et al. (2011) were able to 
predict daily ups and downs in the closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) with an accuracy of 86.7 percent. Another similar study that used tweets as a 
mood detector was conducted by X. Zhang, Fuehres, and Gloor (2011). They tracked 
tweets from a list of IP addresses for 6 months, from 30 March, 2009 to 7 September, 
2009. The number of tweets posted from this sample varied from 8,100 to 43,040 per 
day. The authors counted all the tweets containing mood-related terms, such as hope, 
happy, fear, and anxious. Their result showed that mood of these selected tweets had a 
significant correlation with the Dow Jones, S&P 500, NASDAQ and VIX, especially 
mood descriptions involving the terms hope, worry and fear. Among these indexes, the 
Dow Jones and S&P 500 are calculated based on the stock prices of a certain number 
of representative companies and are supposed to represent U.S. stock market quotes. 
NASDAQ is one of the U.S stock markets and is also considered the second-largest 
stock exchange in the world (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000). VIX, however, is short for 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index and is used to measure 
stock market volatility in the short run (Whaley, 1993). Among these indexes, negative 
correlations were found between the extent of twitter mood and the first three indexes, 
and a positive correlation was found between mood and VIX with a one-day lag. For 
instance, when a strong mood was detected on twitter, through terms such as hope, fear 
and worry, the Dow Jones index was lower on the next day. Studies extending this 
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approach demonstrated that public mood detected via peoples’ daily tweets were 
significantly correlated with various aspects of events concerning economics, politics, 
and culture (Bollen, Pepe, & Mao, 2009; Thelwall, Buckley, & Paltoglou, 2011). For 
instance, these events include the election of the U.S. President and Thanksgiving Day, 
and the indexes affected include the stock market index and crude oil price index 
(Bollen et al., 2009).  
Consequently, regardless of which detector is used to detect public mood, 
numerous studies have demonstrated the aggregate influence of mood on stock market 
indexes. Because existing studies have solely focused on the stock market in general, 
in my opinion, a set of new studies could be conducted using well-developed social 
media platforms. The first study proposal addresses the correlation between individual 
investors’ mood and a stock market index. In my opinion, the two abovementioned 
approaches to detecting mood covered different individual pools in their samples. For 
instance, when using weather, which is a cause of public mood, as a mood detector, the 
population represented by the sample was more likely to be the investors involved in 
the stock market. However, when using tweets, which are the result of the public mood, 
as a mood detector, the population represented by the sample was likely Twitter users. 
With a sufficiently large sample, Twitter users can represent the public mood; however, 
is it necessary to include everyone in the sample to forecast the stock market? Because 
public mood as indicated by tweets, including from non-investors, has already been 
found to have a high predictive accuracy for the DJIA (Bollen et al., 2011), what would 
the result be if the sample only contained stock market investors?  
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Hence, my first suggestion for future studies is that, when sampling from Twitter, 
a pre-selection procedure could be employed that identifies certain Twitter users who 
have previously posted terms related to the stock market prior to period of analysis. 
Because these are the individuals whose decisions have a direct influence on the stock 
market index, theoretically, by using these individuals’ aggregated mood as the 
independent variable, the correlation should be more robust and the forecast should be 
more accurate than in prior studies.  
The second proposal is related to public attention and the IPO market. The 
principle behind it is similar to the abovementioned one, which is that public attention 
paid to IPOs should have a significant influence on the popularity of the IPO market. 
Previous studies have shown that that IPO market can be categorized into a hot market 
and cold market, where in the former, underpricing is more robust and the number of 
IPO companies is significantly higher than in the latter (Derrien, 2005; Ibbotson & Jaffe, 
1975; Ljungqvist, Nanda, et al., 2006). Consequently, a positive correlation might be 
detected between how often people tweet about IPO-related terms and the general 
popularity of the IPO market.  
Technological developments and the accessibility of big data facilitate scholars’ 
efforts to develop new ways of detecting peoples’ mood and even provide the 
possibility of making short-term predictions of future stock market performance. 
Information has long been regarded as one of the scarce sources in asset pricing (see 
Detemple, 1986; L. P. Hansen & Richard, 1987), but what if modern technology makes 
all types of information accessible and processible? The boundary between public and 
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private information will be eliminated, information asymmetry might be reduced, and 
consequently, the market will be more efficient. An alternative outcome would be that 
information remains scarce and simply shifts from being in the hands of insiders to 
being in the hands of data processors. At present, it is difficult to predict what will 
happen; however, in my opinion, one main theme for future study will be related to big 
data and the analysis of the massive amount of information generated by the public. 
2.2 Individual investors and IPO short-term underpricing 
This subchapter, as stated at the beginning of Subchapter 2, will introduce the 
cognitive and social factors that influence individual investors’ decisions to participate 
in the stock market and invest in IPOs after the initial date. Because the affective factors 
primarily played a role in the last stage, when individual investors became interested in 
stock market investment or, further, in IPO investment, these factors will not be further 
discussed in this subchapter.  
2.2.1 Influence of cognitive factors 
Cognitive factors were found to have significant influences on stock market 
participation. For instance, Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011) showed that 
intelligence quotient (IQ) was positively correlated with stock market participation. By 
using a Finish sample of 158,044 males, significant differences in stock market 
participation were found between individuals who had higher IQ and lower IQ. Based 
on the different IQ levels, Grinblatt et al. (2011) categorized their sample into 9 groups, 
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from IQ=1 to IQ=9. A decomposition analysis between groups IQ=1 and IQ=9 was 
made. In general, the former group had a stock market participation rate of 9.8 percent, 
and the latter group had a participation rate of 46.52 percent. Of the 36.72-percent 
difference between these two groups, 23.33 percent can be explained by other factors 
such as education, income, and wealth, leaving a 13.39-percent otherwise 
unexplainable difference that can be attributed to the influence of IQ. Similarly, a 
29.45-percent participation difference was found between the IQ=2 group (13.07 
percent) and IQ=8 group (42.52 percent), of which 17.88 percent can be explained by 
the other abovementioned factors and 11.57 percent cannot.  
In the following parts, cognitive factors that exert direct influences on stock market 
participation will be introduced. These factors include cognitive dissonance, cognitive 
trust and other cognitive factors.  
Cognitive dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance, as applied to the investment field, was proposed by Shiller 
(1999). It describes the conflicts that occur in individuals’ minds when new information 
demonstrating that their previous opinions or beliefs were wrong. One reason that 
cognitive dissonance is important is that, as Festinger (1962) noted, dissonance is 
difficult to avoid in everyday life. Another reason is that cognitive dissonance was 
found to influence individuals’ behavior in several respects, such as consuming, 
commitment, and investment (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Prast & De Vor, 2005; 
Shiller, 1999; Thøgersen, 2004).  
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 Festinger (1962) offered two possible explanations for the occurrence of 
dissonance. First, new information might emerge and challenge individuals’ existing 
opinions, which creates a temporary cognitive dissonance. Second, even without new 
information, dissonance could be difficult to avoid because most matters involve 
combinations of conflicts. Consequently, individuals might frequently find themselves 
suffering from cognitive dissonance.  
Indeed, studies on cognitive dissonance have been conducted in several disciplines 
other than investment. For instance, from the perspective of consumption, Cummings 
and Venkatesan (1976) reviewed consumers behaviors from two perspectives: 1) 
dissonance might lead to a complete change in attitudes, and 2) dissonance might cause 
individuals to neglect certain information that contradict their beliefs. In general, 
cognitive dissonance can lead consumers to engage in repurchasing behavior (Yi & La, 
2004), to intentionally stop reading commercials related to brands other than the brand 
they have purchased (Shiller, 1999), or to post-purchase regret when consumers 
experience feelings that conflict with their previous opinions (Graham, Stendardi Jr, 
Myers, & Graham, 2002). From the perspective of commitment, Langevoort (1997) 
noted that people tended to think, believe and act consistently once a commitment was 
made. Interestingly, Graham et al. (2002) found that females in general experienced 
stronger cognitive dissonance than did males.  
From the perspective of investment, cognitive dissonance has been studied in the 
contexts of mutual fund investment, foreign currency investment, and stock market 
investment (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Kaustia & Torstila, 2011; Prast & De Vor, 
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2005). In the area of mutual fund investment, Goetzmann and Peles (1997) noted that 
investors tended to have a positive bias when evaluating their past performance, even 
if they were informed that their performance was poor. The authors argued that such 
positive bias was caused by cognitive dissonance whereby individuals tend to alter or 
adjust their memories to make their memories consistent with their beliefs. Moreover, 
investors were found to react slowly to information regarding past poor performance, 
meaning that they prefer to hold a losing investment for a relatively long time. 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) explained such slow reactions by the endowment effect 
and cognitive dissonance. The endowment effect describes the phenomenon whereby 
individuals demand greater compensation for giving up an item than the amount that 
they would pay for it (Thaler, 1980). This effect will be introduced in Subchapter 0 in 
terms of passive stock holding behaviors. Cognitive dissonance, in such a context, 
prevents investors from selling losing mutual funds due to the possibility that investors 
might have adjusted their behaviors to fit their biased beliefs concerning their mutual 
fund investment (Goetzmann & Peles, 1997). Similarly, cognitive dissonance was 
reported in the foreign currency exchange context by Prast and De Vor (2005). They 
noted that investors reacted differently to good and bad news, which can be explained 
by cognitive dissonance because investors tend to filter news reports according to their 
biases.     
Specifically, in the case of stock market participation, investors’ prejudices 
concerning stock market investment can be separated into two categories: positive 
prejudice and negative prejudice. Hence, cognitive dissonance can have either a 
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positive or negative effect on the likelihood of stock market participation. The positive 
effect can be interpreted as cognitive dissonance encouraging individuals to participate 
in the stock market. For instance, investors who have positive prejudices regarding the 
stock market or individuals who have decided to participate in the stock market and 
invest in a certain stock tend to neglect the negative information or bad news concerning 
stock market investment due to cognitive dissonance (Prast & De Vor, 2005; Ricciardi 
& Simon, 2000). In this context, dissonance exerts a positive influence on investors’ 
stock market participation because it prevents them from being affected by relevant 
negative information. However, the negative effect of cognitive dissonance can be 
interpreted as discouraging individuals from participating in the stock market. For 
instance, Kaustia and Torstila (2011) argued that, for investors suffering from stock 
market aversion, cognitive dissonance should be considered an additional cost of stock 
market investment. The authors did explicitly explain why cognitive dissonance should 
be considered an additional participation cost, but in my opinion, this can be explained 
from the perspective of utility. According to Gilad, Kaish, and Loeb (1987), cognitive 
dissonance should be considered a factor that decreases individuals’ utility. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that factors that decrease investors’ utility encourage 
investors to seek higher returns to compensate, for example, for risk (Pratt, 1964). 
Hence, cognitive dissonance reduces one’s return on investment, which from another 
perspective should be considered an additional cost. The result of an additional cost is 
that it increases the difficulty of stock market participation for investors who have a 
negative prejudice concerning stock market investment.  
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In my opinion, in most circumstances, for investors who have certain and clear 
prejudices concerning stock market investment, the function of cognitive dissonance is 
similar to that of a catalyst that accelerates the decision-making process and amplifies 
investors’ prejudices concerning stock market investment. It encourages those who 
wish to invest and discourages those with stock market aversion (Kaustia & Torstila, 
2011) or, further, IPO aversion. The influence of dissonance on IPO underpricing and 
underperformance can be positive or negative because, as stated above, cognitive 
dissonance functions as a catalyst: it either accelerates the IPO investment decision-
making process and amplifies the amount of an IPO purchase, or it discourages 
individuals from engaging in IPO investment and encourages those who hold IPO 
shares to sell. Investors with negative opinions on IPO investment engage in behaviors 
that conflict with their original opinions, but they will have to shift their original 
opinions to reduce the cognitive dissonance, as Ricciardi and Simon (2000) have 
suggested.  
Cognitive trust 
There are two types of trust, according to D. Johnson and Grayson (2005), 
cognitive trust and affective trust. Cognitive trust can be defined as the confidence to 
depend on the other party’s reliability, which is based on knowledge of the other party 
and is considered a rational approach (M. H. Hansen, Morrow, & Batista, 2002; 
Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). However, affective 
trust can be defined as one’s confidence in the other party based on the feelings and 
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emotions such as security (Erdem & Ozen, 2003; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Swift 
& Hwang, 2013). The reasons that these two concepts are differentiated here are, first, 
that it is imprecise to categorize trust simply as a cognitive factor or a social factor; 
second, existing studies on trust and stock market participation have not explicitly noted 
which type of trust influences individual investors’ decisions concerning stock market 
participation.  
Generally, studies have found that trust exerts a significant influence on stock 
market participation. For instance, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) found that 
investors who were less trusting were less likely to participate in the stock market, and 
if they did, they purchased fewer stocks. In their study, trust was defined as “the 
subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated” (Guiso 
et al., 2008, p. 2557). Trust was also measured by a question regarding whether 
participants believed that people could be trusted. Their sample comprised 1,943 Dutch 
households. Their results showed that, for those who trust others, were 6.5 percentage 
points more likely to participate in the stock market, which 50 percent higher than the 
average sample probability of stock market participation. Another study on trust and 
stock market participation was conducted by Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), where 
sociality was also considered as an independent variable in addition to trust. Sociality, 
which will be discussed in Subchapter 0, was found to have a positive influence on 
stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2004). When sociality and trust were 
examined jointly, the combined effect showed that sociality could partially offset the 
negative effect of low trust on stock market participation. Hong et al. (2004) measured 
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trust by historical changes in political institutions, and sociality was measured by the 
frequency of contacts with grandchildren, at the macro level. Interestingly, the 
influence of trust was found to be stronger in countries with both a low level of stock 
market participation and a low level of trust. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) argued that 
this explained the phenomenon of low stock market participation in wealthy countries. 
Hence, it can be assumed that when individual investors have higher cognitive trust in 
the IPO market, they are more willing to invest in IPO shares, especially when IPO 
begin to be publicly purchasable in the secondary market after the initial date. This can 
increase the demand of IPO shares in the secondary market and hence create a larger 
amount of underpricing in the short term. In the long term, investors having cognitive 
trust in certain stocks might attenuate the level of underperformance of these stocks. 
This is because stronger trust might lead to investors having a positive expectation 
regarding a stock’s future performance, and hence they tend to hold the stocks for a 
relatively longer period.  
I would like to extend these conclusions to propose a further hypothesis regarding 
the Chinese stock market, as the stated in Subchapter 0, where approximately 80 percent 
of participants in the stock market had a high school education or below, as of the end 
of 2014 (Orlik, 2015). However, Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) found that 
financial literacy was positively correlated with stock market participation. In other 
words, people who know little about financial matters were less likely to invest in the 
stock market. If one assumes that people with a lower level of education are less likely 
to have high financial literacy, as they might have lower literacy in general, then it 
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would be difficult to explain Chinese stock market participation based on the results 
obtained by Van Rooij et al. (2011). Hence, what would be found if all the three factors, 
financial literacy, sociality and trust were considered? As Chinese society has a highly 
collective culture (Fan, 2000), sociality could be very high if measured using the 
approach of Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) that considers the frequency of contacts 
with grandchildren. Trust, however, might vary across different regions in China, due 
to the significant different levels of urbanization in various regions. For instance, 
political trust was found to be differ between village and city residents (L. Li, 2004). 
Hence, one could hypothesize that in countries with a higher level of sociality, the 
effects of financial literacy on stock market participation will be lower. Such effects 
will stronger in regions with a higher level of trust than in those with a lower level of 
trust.  
Another proposal for future research is to separately test the effects of cognitive 
and affective trust. It is likely that more specific results will be found, and based on 
these results, policy suggestions can be offered regarding stock market participation. 
For instance, in countries where the government interferes with the stock market, such 
as China, if investors are to be encouraged to participate in the stock market, policies 
that encourage trust should be promoted. If the results of such studies were to suggest 
that cognitive trust has an influence on stock market participation, investors should be 
provided with further knowledge about the stock market to increase cognitive trust. 
However, if affective trust were found to influence stock market participation, policies 
such as increasing investors’ feelings of security with respect to the stock market should 
252 
 
be considered.   
Other cognitive factors 
According to the literature, there are other cognitive factors that influence 
individuals’ investment decisions. For instance, K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) noted 
that the representativeness heuristic affected individuals’ short-term investment 
behavior; Hirshleifer (2001) stated that individuals tend to sharpen and level while 
processing information.  
Specifically, the representative heuristic describes an approach to thinking 
whereby individuals estimate the probability of an event based on its resemblance to 
another event (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The direct effects of the 
representativeness heuristic on individuals’ behaviors include different outcomes. For 
instance, individuals might underweight older information and overweight recent 
information, as they believe that the former is less representative than the latter (De 
Bondt & Thaler, 1994; Grether, 1980); individuals might tend to underweight large 
numbers and overweight small numbers, as they believe that the former are less 
representative than the latter (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). One example stated by Tversky and Kahneman (1971), was the “law of small 
numbers”, which means that individuals tended to falsely view a randomly selected 
sample as highly representative of the population. Pham (1998) argued that evaluation 
based on the representativeness heuristic is actually made according to whether 
individuals believe that an event can be considered representative of another event. In 
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other words, this heuristic might be highly subjective because it depends on what an 
individual prefers to believe. Hence, the way in which representativeness influences 
investment decisions can vary: one might choose to believe that the past returns of a 
stock represent its future return (G.-M. Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007), or one 
might choose to believe that the return on a stock from a certain industry represents the 
return on all the companies from that industry (M. Baker & Wurgler, 2007). Both of 
these subjective beliefs concerning representativeness might lead to an increase in stock 
market participation or simply increase individuals’ investments in a given stock.  
Another cognitive factor, as Hirshleifer (2001) stated, was sharpen and level. It 
indicates that while communicating or processing information, individuals tend to 
emphasize the information that they believe to be the main point and deemphasize other 
information that might confuse the main point (Hirshleifer, 2001). To my understanding, 
sharpen and level means that people tend to only listen to what they believe is important 
and neglect other information that challenges their beliefs. For instance, an experiment 
reported by Allport and Postman (1947), which required participants to describe the 
content of pictures, showed that women tended to pay more attention to clothes in the 
pictures while describing the pictures to others than did men. Sharpen and level has also 
been considered a psychological mechanism for how rumors are spread (R. A. Drake, 
1989; Nkpa, 1975). Studies from various periods have found that rumors can 
significantly affect the stock market, especially when investors are unsure of the 
intrinsic value of a certain stock (R. K. Aggarwal & Wu, 2006; DiFonzo & Bordia, 
1997; Rose, 1951). Specifically, R. K. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) noted that intentionally 
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spreading rumors was one method of stock market manipulation, which could increase 
the volatility, liquidity and returns of stocks. Furthermore, stock prices rise during the 
process of manipulation and fall afterwards. No empirical studies have been conducted 
to analyze how rumors might influence stock market participation. One of the existing 
studies that came the closest to directly addressing this issue was conducted by 
Antweiler and Frank (2004), who found that messages posted on message boards hosted 
by Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull had a significant correlation with the stock market 
volatility, including during the internet bubble period. Antweiler and Frank (2004) also 
noted that the business press (Wall Street Journal), which represented the control group 
in their study, also used rumors from the message boards to craft eye-catching stories 
in their columns to win attention. Hence, in my opinion, it might be reasonable to 
assume that rumors have a significant influence on stock market participation for the 
following two reasons. First, those investors who are considering whether to participate 
in the stock market might also be unsure of the stocks’ intrinsic value, which according 
to R. K. Aggarwal and Wu (2006), is the stage of the investment process that can be 
easily influenced by rumors. Hence, it is quite likely that rumors might encourage 
individuals to engage in stock market investment and hence increase aggregate stock 
market participation. Second, the media can influence stock market participation, which 
will be described in Subchapter 0. When the media is also involved in the spreading of 
rumors, the influence of rumors on stock market participation can be magnified.  
The reasons that these two factors are not listed separately as cognitive dissonance 
and cognitive trust is that both representative heuristics and sharpen and level do not 
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necessarily have a direct impact on stock market participation. In the following 
subchapter, social factors that do have a direct influence on stock market participation 
will be discussed.  
2.2.2 Influence of social factors 
It can be challenging to strictly differentiate which factors make individual 
investors interested in stock market investment and which factors urge them to make 
the final decision and make the purchase. Based on observations of the large ups and 
downs in the financial market, such as market bubbles and financial collapses, what 
ultimately drives people to engage in purchasing or selling behavior is more related to 
social influence and less related to individual biases. Hence, in the following part, two 
social factors, 1) media and 2) interpersonal and group communication, will be 
presented. The mechanisms whereby social factors affect individual investors will also 
be discussed.  
Media 
Most extant studies on media and the stock market can be divided into two streams. 
One stream holds that the media influence investor emotions and their trading behavior 
and, in turn, the stock market. This stream is essentially in agreement noise trader theory 
and takes investors’ irrationality into consideration (such as K. Baker & Nofsinger, 
2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Tetlock, 2007). To differentiate between the two, below, this 
first stream will be referred to as the media information influences stock performance 
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stream. The second stream holds that the information disclosed by the media forms part 
of the fundamental value of stocks. This stream supports the opinion that public 
information itself conveys the inherent value of stocks and considers that the reason 
that individual investors have failed to perform well in the stock market is their lack of 
information (such as Amihud et al., 2003; L. X. Liu, Sherman, & Zhang, 2009). This 
stream will be referred to as the media information conveys stock value stream below.  
Generally, studies from these two streams have covered topics concerning the 
information coming from the media and its influence on stock market prices, expected 
stock returns, IPOs during the internet bubble, IPO underpricing, etc. (see Bhattacharya, 
Galpin, Ray, & Yu, 2009; L. Fang & Peress, 2009; L. X. Liu et al., 2009; Tetlock, 2007). 
For instance, a study from the media information influences stock performance stream 
focused on media pessimism and stock market prices (Tetlock, 2007). In the study, a 
popular Wall Street Journal column Abreast of the Market from 1984 to 1999 was used 
to detect pessimism in the media. The results showed that 1) high media pessimism led 
to significant declines in stock prices, 2) both high and low media pessimism led to 
high trading volume in the stock market, and 3) low market return led to high media 
pessimism. Media pessimism was defined as the share of pessimistic words used in the 
column, and the reason that Tetlock (2007) chose this column was because it has been 
considered as the longest accessible column among all the columns in the Wall Street 
Journal. Tetlock (2007) explicitly noted that these results supported the theory of noise 
traders in the stock market, which was in contrast to the theory of rational traders. The 
concept of noise traders was developed by Kyle (1985) and describes traders who 
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neglect the intrinsic value of stocks and trade randomly and irrationally based on noise 
(also see F. Black, 1986; De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990). Noise 
traders are portrayed similarly to irrational individual investors, which have been 
mentioned many times in this dissertation.  
Another study from the media information conveys stock value stream focused on 
media information and stock market return. L. Fang and Peress (2009) found that stocks 
with no media coverage had significantly higher returns than stocks with high media 
coverage. They explained this phenomenon as follows: information disclosed by the 
media should be regarded as one determinant of the intrinsic value of stocks, such that 
a high stock return represents compensation for low investor recognition. Interestingly, 
in my opinion, their results could also be explained from the perspective that 
information influences stock market performance. L. Fang and Peress (2009) 
considered stock returns on a monthly basis, meaning that their calculations were based 
on the different stock prices observed over a one-month period. In other words, such a 
measure of return does not include dividends, which can be influenced by issuers (or 
the companies) but are highly dependent on the market situation, which issuers (or 
companies) have little power to influence. As a result, in my opinion, the explanation 
that the media influences noise traders’ behavior and, in turn, influences stock returns 
makes better sense than the explanation that issuer compensates its investors through 
stock returns. If the media coverage of a certain stock is high, it consequently attracts 
the attention and interest of a number of noise traders. Combined with the results of 
Tetlock (2007), namely, that both high and low media pessimism lead to large amount 
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of trading, it is possible to conclude that high media coverage leads to a high volume 
of trading. A high trading volume, in general, might lead to low stock returns (Campbell, 
Grossman, & Wang, 1992). Once a low market return is observed, this might trigger 
high media pessimism and lead to a large amount of trading (Tetlock, 2007). 
Consequently, in my opinion, high media coverage might place related stocks in a loop 
where pessimism and low return occur in a cyclical pattern.  
Regarding IPOs, the media have been found to have a direct impact on 
underpricing and trading volume. For instance, public information influenced investors’ 
decisions regarding IPO stocks (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). By studying 225 IPOs, 
Pollock and Rindova (2003) showed that underpricing was negatively correlated with 
the volume of media-provided information and that stock trading volume was positively 
correlated with the volume of media-provided information; both of these correlations 
decreased over the long term.  
However, less universal findings were provided by L. X. Liu et al. (2009). By 
using the number of articles and the amount of underpricing, they studied IPOs with 
offer prices that were revised after the initial filling range had been published. They 
found that for IPOs that had a revised price that was higher than the midpoint of the 
initial filling range, the number of articles was positively correlated with the amount of 
underpricing. This correlation was found to be insignificant for IPOs that had a revised 
price that was lower than the midpoint of the initial filling range. They attribute this 
phenomenon as indicating that issuers use underpricing to compensate investors for 
their information. This result is similar to that of Hanley (1993) that underpricing was 
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more significant for IPOs that had a revised price above the initial filling range. 
Interestingly, Hanley (1993) did not include media information as a variable.  
Whether the media information really play such a role in underpricing as reported 
by L. X. Liu et al. (2009) is questionable. Moreover, as argued previously, it is quite 
unlikely that issuers or companies can precisely control the extent to which they 
compensate their investors, provided that they wished to. One example is the 
extraordinary returns on IPOs during the internet bubble period from 1999 to 2000, 
when the IPOs’ mean first-day return was over 50 percent (Ritter, 2014a). Numerous 
studies have been conducted to analyze the reasons for the internet bubble phenomenon 
(e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2009; DuCharme et al., 2001; O’Brien & Tian, 2006; Ofek & 
Richardson, 2003). Among these contributions, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) focused on 
the media’s effects on the internet bubble. Their results showed that, in general, the tone 
of media coverage was positively correlated with the ups and downs of the prices of 
internet IPO share prices. Specifically, media coverage had a more positive tone when 
addressing internet IPOs when their stock prices were rising and a more negative tone 
when their stock prices were falling. Bhattacharya et al. (2009) included a massive 
amount of data, for instance, 171,488 news items were categorized into three groups: 
positive, neutral and negative news. 458 internet IPOs from 1996 to 2000 were studied, 
together with a comparable group of 458 non-internet IPOs. Specifically, from 1 
January, 1997 to 24 March, 2000, the internet IPO sample earned cumulative return of 
2,016 percent and the non-internet IPO sample earned only 370 percent. Interestingly, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2009) concluded that of the 1,646-percent differences between the 
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return of the internet IPO group and the non-internet IPO group, only 2.9 percent can 
be attributed to the influence of the media. 
If the media can only be attributed a trivial influence on the abnormally high 
returns observed during the internet bubble period, it might be reasonable to assume 
that media also play a relatively small role in influencing IPO underpricing in general. 
In my opinion, media information is more likely to be the source of public information, 
which forms the bases for noise traders or irrational investors’ interpretations. These 
interpretations could vary: noise traders might believe media information and transmit 
to their peers, and the cumulative effect of such behavior might mean that the market 
moves according to the news (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Bondt & Thaler, 1985); 
alternatively, they might act in the completely opposite manner to avoid herding, as 
they believe that others would act in accordance with the news; finally, they could 
simply ignore such information, as they believe that the media offer irrelevant, 
storytelling and exaggerated information (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Hence, it is 
difficult to draw a universal conclusion regarding whether the media influence the stock 
market in a positive or negative way because, ultimately, stock prices are a consequence 
of aggregate demand and supply. While the media represent an information 
transmission channel, their influence tends to be dispersed rather than aggregated, 
especially when compared with the other information transmission channel: 
interpersonal and group communication, which will be discussed in the following 
subchapter.  
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Interpersonal and group communication 
The conclusions regarding the effect of interpersonal and group communication 
on stock market participation tend to be less varied than those concerning the effect of 
the media. In general, 1) the participation of neighbors, community members and family 
members, 2) peer performance in the stock market, and 3) the sociability of an 
individual all have a positive influence on one’s likelihood of participating in the stock 
market (J. R. Brown, Ivković, Smith, & Weisbenner, 2008; Hong et al., 2004; Kaustia 
& Knüpfer, 2012; G. Li, 2014).  
In my opinion, the existing studies can be viewed from three perspectives. First, 
the stock market participation of the group members. Second, the performance of the 
existing investors in the group. Third, the sociability of the potential investors. The 
participation of group members provides potential investors with an environment to 
familiarize themselves with, or even trust, the stock market; the performance of the 
peers in one’s group provides potential investors with a channel to obtain private 
information; and sociality could be used to describe the willingness of a potential 
investor to be involved in a group. Hence the following part will review the existing 
literature from these three perspectives.   
From the first perspective, two representative studies have been conducted on the 
effects of stock market participation by group members on the potential investors. One 
of which is J. R. Brown et al. (2008), which studied the effects of the community on its 
members. Specifically, they found that an individual’s likelihood of stock market 
participation was positively correlated with the fraction of stock market investors in the 
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local community. The correlation was higher in communities that were more sociable. 
The term sociable in their study was referred to “whether households are likely to be 
asked by neighbors for advice” (J. R. Brown et al., 2008, p. 1512). In other words, their 
results showed that the effect of participation in the community was driven by word-
of-mouth communication. The other representative study was conducted by G. Li (2014) 
and focused on a closer type of interpersonal group relative to the neighborhood. The 
factor that G. Li (2014) studied was the likelihood of stock market participation among 
direct family members, specifically between parents and children. The results showed 
that the likelihood of participating in the stock market increased by 20 to 30 percent in 
the 5 years following parents or children becoming stock market investors. These 
studies did not indicate whether the first movers in the stock market were winners or 
losers. In other words, the peers’ and family members’ participation exerts an influence 
on individuals regardless of the outcome of the investment. To my understanding, these 
results can be interpreted as indicating that some individuals are inclined to take actions 
that keep them involved in the group, even when such actions are potentially risky or 
costly.   
From the second perspective, Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) provided results 
regarding the performance of the existing investors within a group. By analyzing the 
local peers’ return in the stock market and the likelihood of an individual’s decision to 
enter the stock market, they found a significant correlation between these two factors. 
These two factors were found to be more strongly correlated in areas with more social 
learning opportunities. Interestingly, their findings also showed that when peers 
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experienced a negative return, this did not decrease individual participation. This result 
is in accordance with the studies mentioned above reporting that the investment 
outcome does not impact individuals being influenced by their peers. Kaustia and 
Knüpfer (2012) explained this through people’s tendency to not discuss situations with 
poor results, such as losses in the stock market. In my opinion, this explanation is 
sufficient for groups characterized by less open interpersonal relationships but might 
be insufficient to explain groups characterized by closer interpersonal relationships, in 
which people tend to share everything, including poor results, for instance, family 
members. Hence, the possibility that people tend to take action in accordance with other 
group members regardless of the cost should be considered.  
 From the second perspective, by accounting for the sociability of the potential 
investors’ in a group, Hong et al. (2004) found that the more social the households were, 
the more likely they were to participate in the stock market. They used the factors of 
whether participants knew their neighbors or went to church to measure sociability. In 
addition to the positive correlation between sociability and the likelihood of 
participating in the stock market, they also found that sociability influenced market 
participation to a greater extent in states with a higher stock market participation rate, 
in the U.S.   
In general, all of the three abovementioned perspectives have a positive influence 
on the likelihood of individuals’ participating in the stock market. The possible 
mechanisms driving these factors will be introduced in the following part.  
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The mechanisms underlying social factors 
There are several cognitive biases or effects that might cause individuals to 
participate in the stock market when they are exposed to the influences of social factors. 
For instance, as Hirshleifer (2001) noted, these effects include the conformity effect, 
cognitive overload, and the availability heuristic.  
The conformity effect, as noted in a set of experiments conducted by Asch (1951), 
argues that individuals tend to surrender their independent opinions in the face of group 
pressure, even if the general opinion in the group is incorrect. This is one possible 
reason that interpersonal and group communication affect individual investors’ stock 
market participation.  
Cognitive overload was explained by Hirshleifer (2001) as a cognitive mechanism 
that influences social factors. Cognitive overload belongs to cognitive load theory, 
which holds that the working memory of human beings is limited due to their cognitive 
capacity, especially while learning (De Jong, 2010). Thus, as its literal meaning, 
cognitive overload describes the scenario in which individuals’ cognitive processing 
exceeds their cognitive capacity (Mayer & Moreno, 2003). Kirsh (2000) suggested four 
reasons creating cognitive overloads in the workplace, two of which are universally 
applicable. These two reasons are 1) too many tasks and 2) too many interruptions. 
These traits fit the characteristics of the media, the effect of which is that 1) individuals 
receive massive amounts information and thus have too many tasks to process, and 2) 
currently, most media information appears on the internet, some even in the form of 
popup messages, which might interrupt and interfere with individuals’ attention. Indeed, 
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a study has found that, in regard to the influence of media information on cognitive 
load, media reports with rich information decrease information processing ability. In 
other words, media reports with rich information cause cognitive overload (Robert & 
Dennis, 2005). The direct result of cognitive overload is that it decreases learning 
efficiency (Mayer & Moreno, 2003). The application of cognitive load theory, in the 
content of consumer decision making, is that when the information is controlled, 
consumers can make decisions that better match their preferences and be more 
confident in their judgments (Ariely, 2000). To date, no study has been conducted on 
cognitive overload and its influence on individual investors’ decision making. However, 
it might be similar to the context studied by Ariely (2000), as stock purchases also 
reflect investors’ preferences and their reliance on their own judgments. Future studies 
could analyze the correlations between cognitive load and investors’ decision making. 
Such studies could be highly significant because investors are increasingly likely to 
consume news through the internet and mobile devices such as tablets and smart phones. 
This means of retrieving messages and news, in my opinion, creates greater cognitive 
overload than do conventional media outlets such as newspapers, radio and TV.  
The availability heuristic has been identified as another cognitive mechanism that 
influences social factors (Hirshleifer, 2001). Proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973, 1974), the availability heuristic describes how people estimate the likelihood of 
an event based on how easily it can be brought to mind. An example offered by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) was that one might estimate the likelihood of a heart attack by 
recalling the similar situations that occurred among one’s acquaintances. Similarly, an 
266 
 
investor might estimate the likelihood of winning in the stock market by recalling 
similar situations that occurred to his or her acquaintances. Thus, the more positive 
outcomes that an investor’s peers have, the easier it is for the investor to recall such 
situations, which leads to him or her to the conclusion that the likelihood of winning in 
the stock market is high. In other words, the availability heuristic leads investors to 
estimate stock market performance based on the experience of their peers.  
In addition to the factors mentioned above, Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) attributed 
the effects of interpersonal and group communications to two other reasons, namely, 
social learning and individual sentiment. Social learning provides individual investors 
with the occasion and possibility to form positive sentiments about the stock market, 
such as high expectations for the return on their own performance if they would have 
invested. The authors argued that such high expectations and sentiments drive potential 
investors to enter the stock market. Another aspect of social learning is called keeping 
up with the Joneses, meaning that individuals might simply wish to keep up with their 
peers financially. As cited by Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012), this effect usually leads to 
imitation behavior among peers, especially for behaviors relating to financial issues 
(also see D. C. Ling, 2009). 
Of course, there are other factors that cannot be categorized as cognitive factors or 
social factors but nevertheless influence individual investors’ participation in the stock 
market, such as income, age, and wealth. Furthermore, at the micro level, windfall gains 
are positively correlated with participation (Andersen & Nielsen, 2011). At the macro 
level, increased wage inequality was also found to affect stock market participation 
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(Favilukis, 2013). Additionally, the ease with which investors are able to access the 
stock market is also an influential factor, as Bogan (2008) found that, in recent decades, 
the popularization of computers and the internet significantly increased the likelihood 
of stock market participation, the effect of which is equivalent to a $27,000-increase in 
household income. 
All of the abovementioned factors have either a direct or indirect influence on 
stock market participation. Note that, in this dissertation, when referring to stock market 
participation, it is assumed that investors have already purchased at least one stock. In 
the following subchapter, these investment behaviors and factors relevant to them will 
be discussed.  
2.3 Individual investors and long-term IPO underperformance 
Once the investors have begun to participate in the stock market, it is assumed that 
they have purchased at least one unit of IPO stock. Hence, according to investor 
willingness to retain a stock, subsequent investment behaviors include: 1) sell the IPO 
stock they purchased when entering the stock market, 2) hold the IPO stocks they have 
purchased, and 3) repurchase the same IPO stocks that they purchased previously. The 
reason that this subchapter is presented in this manner is that, in the long term, selling 
behavior will increase the level of underperformance, repurchasing behavior will 
decrease the level of underperformance, and holding behavior will have no influence. 
This is a conclusion simply based on the law of supply and demand (Gale, 1955). Thus, 
the aim of this subchapter is not to explain how each factor influence long-term IPO 
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phenomena but to identify which factors cause these phenomena. Thus, in the following 
parts, cognitive factors and affective factors will be discussed with respect to these 
investment behaviors. Because social factors function similarly to how they were 
described in Subchapter 0, they will not be explained in detail.  
2.3.1 Influence of cognitive and affective factors in selling 
Selling behaviors in the stock market generally mean that investors change their 
paper gain or loss into a realized gain or loss (Odean, 1998a; Thaler, 1999). In other 
words, a true increase or decrease in one’s assets occurs when stocks are sold. A study 
by Thaler (1999) found that, emotionally, individuals reacted to these two types of gains 
and losses differently. Using loss as an example, Thaler (1999) noted that a realized 
loss was actually more painful than a paper loss. With the intention to avoid stronger 
pain, individuals tended to sell stocks when they were still winning. Existing studies on 
selling behavior have primarily focused on the timing of a sale. For instance, Odean 
(1998a) discussed whether investors were unwilling to sell losing stocks; Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) noted that investors were selling losing stocks too slowly and winning 
ones too quickly. The phenomenon whereby investors tend to hold losing stocks and 
sell winning stocks is called the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985; Weber & 
Camerer, 1998).  
Two studies have provided empirical evidence of the disposition effect. One was 
conducted by Odean (1998a). Using data from 10,000 trading accounts, the result was 
that from 1987 to 1993, for those trades involving the sale of an entire portfolio, the 
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aggregate realized losses equaled 15.5 percent of the total paper losses, and the 
aggregate realized gains equaled 23.3 percent of the total paper gains. In other words, 
the different between the percentage of realized gains and that of losses was 7.8 percent, 
which accounted for half of the total percentage of realized losses. The other study was 
conducted by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b). Their results showed that the larger a 
loss was, the less likely a sale would be made compared to the case of a corresponding 
gain. Specifically, by creating dummies for stocks that experienced losses greater than 
30 percent of total capital, a 0.32 decrease in the likelihood of selling was found relative 
to the baseline cases of a capital gain or no price changes. For stocks that experienced 
losses of less than 30 percent of total capital, a 0.21 decrease in the likelihood of selling 
was found relative to the cases of a capital gain or no price change. Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001b) used a dataset including 293,034 entries from Finnish stock market 
that covered nearly all Finnish investors.  
Although different scholars tend to attribute the delay in selling losing stocks to 
different reasons, the consensus is that investors exhibit the disposition effect. Hence, 
in the following subchapter, the possible theoretical reasons for disposition effect will 
be explained. 
Mental accounting: sell to avoid pain 
A thorough explanation of mental accounting was provided by Thaler (1999). It is 
defined as “the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to 
organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities” (Thaler, 1999, p. 183).  
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The financial decisions processed using mental accounting are usually different 
from those processed using financial accounting, as the cognitive activities involved 
are likely to make individuals less rational. For instance, for a given amount of money, 
checks that arrive in the mailbox are more likely to be spent than are paper gains 
because individuals tend to categorize these two forms of income into different 
accounts. Thaler (1999) called this the mailbox effect.  
As previously mentioned, Thaler (1999) also emphasized that the feelings created 
by a realized gain or loss differ from those generated by a paper gain or loss. This is 
because when the gain and loss are realized, the relevant tax needs to be paid, and 
relevant information has to be declared to others, such as family members or even 
clients whose money is involved (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). In other words, realized 
gains and loss are, to some extent, final. A realized loss triggers more pain for investors 
than does a paper loss, which leads individuals to have the tendency to sell stocks when 
they are still winning.  
Furthermore, an empirical study found that investors tend to treat one individual 
stock as one account instead of treating one portfolio as one account (Barberis & Huang, 
2001). Similar to the example offered by Shefrin and Statman (1985), if an investor has 
a portfolio composed of stock A and B, and assuming that stock A is losing and stock 
B is winning, a rational investor would sell stock A and use the proceeds to purchase 
more of stock B. However, investors who process information using mental accounting, 
selling stock A means, mentally, closing the account of stock A at a loss, despite that 
the portfolio as a whole might still be winning. The feeling that closing a mental account 
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at a loss can cause greater pain for these investors than they would experience if they 
simply left the loss on paper. Hence, even if the whole portfolio is winning, these 
investors would nevertheless be more willing to sell the winning stock (stock B) inside 
of a portfolio and keep the losing one (stock A).  
Pride and regret: sell to maintain pride or avoid regret 
In addition to mental accounting, Shefrin and Statman (1985) explained the 
disposition effect from the perspective of maintaining pride and avoiding regret. 
“Regret is an emotional feeling associated with the ex post knowledge that a different 
past decision would have fared better than the one chosen” (Shefrin & Statman, 1985, 
p. 781). Pride is the opposite feeling of regret.  
Gross (1982) noted that gaining positive returns in the stock market is interpreted 
as having made the right judgments and decisions, which creates pride; however, 
obtaining negative returns is interpreted as having made judgments and wrong 
decisions, which creates regret. Such feelings of regret might become more pronounced 
when investors have to announce their loss to others, such as the tax office, family 
members and clients (Gross, 1982, as cited in Shefrin & Statman, 1985). Hence, to 
maintain pride and avoid regret, investors have the tendency to sell winning stocks and 
hold losing stocks.  
Moreover, it has also been noted that regret is a stronger feeling than pride 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, investors might have the tendency to hold both 
winning and losing stocks for a longer time to avoid regret when the stocks’ prices rise 
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in the future (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). This type of regret, which is different from the 
ex post regret, is anticipated regret, which is based on individuals’ anticipation of how 
they might feel in the future (Muermann & Volkman Wise, 2006). Hence, one might 
ask what the future returns of winning or losing stocks might be. Interestingly, studies 
have argued that winning stocks generally tend to continue winning and that losing 
stocks tend to lose over relatively short period. However, over a longer period of time, 
reversals between winning stocks and losing stocks might occur. For instance, an 
empirical study by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) noted that, over a 3 to 12-month 
holding period, the strategy that obeyed the rule “buy stocks which have performed 
well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past” (p. 65) created 
significant positive return. However, over a period of 36 months, a losing portfolio was 
found to gain over 25 percent more than the previous winning portfolio, according to 
Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
In other words, investors whose decisions will be influenced by disposition effect 
will, over the short term (3 to 12 months), sell winning stocks that will continue winning 
and retain losing stocks that will continue losing. Both of these behaviors create regret 
among investors; however, the results of these two behaviors are different: one result 
is losing more (retaining the losing stock), while the other result is earning less (selling 
the winning stock). Indeed, Fogel and Berry (2006) found that there were more 
respondents who reported regret triggered by holding a losing stock for too long than 
those selling a winning stock too soon. According to Fogel and Berry (2006), this can 
be explained by individuals’ strong desire to avoid anticipated regret. Anticipated regret, 
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as stated above, is the anticipation of future feelings (Muermann & Volkman Wise, 
2006). Indeed, Cooke, Meyvis, and Schwartz (2001) also noted that when making 
purchasing decisions, consumers would rather forego the option that maximizes their 
expected value than increase the possibility of anticipated regret.  
Ultimately, maintaining pride and avoiding represent a further explanation for the 
disposition effect, which encourages individuals to hold losing stocks for too long and 
sell winning stocks too soon.  
Reference point: sell when it is above the reference point  
The reference point is the point based on which the losses and gains are calculated 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It has been argued that people tend to take more risks 
when there will be possible losses in the future, i.e., when the future amount is lower 
than the reference point, and people tend to take fewer risks when there will be possible 
gains, i.e., when the future amount is above the reference point (Weber & Camerer, 
1998). Such different risk taking preferences are due to loss aversion, which states that 
for a given amount of loss and gain, the negative feeling caused by the loss is stronger 
than the positive feeling brought by the gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). 
Indeed, when a share’s price is above the reference point, typically the purchasing 
price of a share (Weber & Camerer, 1998), investors tend to take less risk with the gains, 
and hence are willing to sell the shares. Conversely, when the share price is below the 
purchasing price, investors tend to take more risk with the loss, and hence are willing 
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to hold the shares in the hope that the share price will rise again.  
To conclude this discussion of the explanations for the disposition effect, most 
existing studies have adopted the reference point and loss aversion as the explanations 
for the disposition effect (Barberis & Xiong, 2009; Weber & Camerer, 1998; Youki, 
Mardyla, Takenaka, & Tsutsui, 2013). Furthermore, since the disposition effect was 
empirically verified, research has primarily focused on questions such as what types of 
people exhibit a stronger disposition effect than do others. For instance, a study using 
data from the Taiwan stock market showed that education and the status of a gain or 
loss were two important factors influencing the disposition effect: the disposition effect 
was found to be stronger in the group with lower education and facing the losing 
condition (Goo, Chen, Chang, & Yeh, 2010). Similarly, the disposition effect was found 
to be stronger among individuals who were less wealthy and had less trading experience 
(Dhar & Zhu, 2006).  
The reason that the disposition effect has been discussed as the main theme in the 
subchapter on selling is that this effect should be closely related to IPO flipping activity. 
This is because, on the one hand, many IPOs have been significantly underpriced, 
which means that if investors would have been allocated the IPO shares in the primary 
market, they would have been highly likely to sell the shares in the secondary market 
due to the disposition effect. On the other hand, if investors believe that IPOs might 
experience underperformance in the long term, according to the reference point and loss 
aversion, investors will be unwilling to take risks when they are already winning, and 
hence they will sell the stocks when they see the gain.  
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Empirical support for this position was found by studying the correlations between 
IPO trading volume and the disposition effect (Kaustia, 2004). The result showed that 
trading volume was significantly higher for IPOs with greater underpricing. In other 
words, IPO trading volume was significantly larger for IPOs with prices in the 
secondary market that were significantly higher than their initial prices. For IPOs with 
prices in the secondary market that were lower than their initial prices, trading volumes 
increased significantly on the day when the secondary market prices exceeded the initial 
prices. Kaustia (2004) explained this by the reference point, here, the initial price of 
IPOs.  
Hence, the disposition effect plays a role in flipping activities. As stated in the 
previously mentioned study from Dhar and Zhu (2006), professionals were found to 
exhibit less of the disposition effect than were investors with less trading experience. 
From the perspective of decreasing flipping activities, it is reasonable to include more 
professional investors, investors with more trading experience, or institutional investors 
in the IPO distribution in the primary market.  
However, the abovementioned approach is based on the assumption that investors 
treat the primary prices of IPOs as the reference point. What if the reference point were 
changed to another price, such as the expectation price? Odean (1998b) noted the 
likelihood of investors forming their reference point using their expectations of future 
stock prices. According to that study, it is possible that a reference point could be 
created based on the expected future stock price, which could thus be used as another 
method to decrease flipping activities to protect fragile IPO prices in the secondary 
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market. In other words, issuers and underwriters should create a convincing future price 
for investors to expect as a reference point, which should be higher than the initial price. 
Theoretically, this method might also attenuate flipping of IPO shares and prevent 
substantial selling volumes once the secondary prices exceed the initial prices, as stated 
by Kaustia (2004).  
Future studies could disentangle the relationship between the disposition effect 
and IPO prices by focusing on other possible explanations for selling behaviors, such 
as mental accounting and affective factors related to pride and regret. Surveys or lab 
experiments could be performed by simulating IPO prices in both the primary and 
secondary markets. Specifically, investors with IPO investment experience should be 
asked to participate in the survey, and questions related to mental accounting, 
anticipated regret and pride should be asked. The lab experiment should employ a 3-
by-2 design, which includes three subgroups under two conditions. Group One would 
cover IPOs that are underpriced, i.e., the IPOs with share prices on the initial date that 
are higher than the initial prices; Group Two would cover the IPOs that are overpriced, 
but their prices in the secondary market will exceed the initial price at some point after 
the initial date; Group Three would cover IPOs that are overpriced, but their prices in 
the secondary market will not exceed the initial price, i.e., IPOs with share prices on 
the initial date that are lower than their initial prices and will consistently be lower for 
the remainder of the experiment. The two conditions should be: a first condition under 
which participants are not allowed to change their selling decision once it is made; a 
second condition under which participants are told that they can change their selling 
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decision in a later time during the experiment. This control would be used to study 
whether regret plays a role in the disposition effect in the case of IPOs and the combined 
results of regret and the reference point.  
In addition to the disposition effect as the main psychological factor for selling 
behaviors, studies have found that another financial factor for selling behavior in the 
form of tax considerations. For instance, Odean (1998a) found that there was a reverse 
in the willingness to realize paper losses and paper gains in December in contrast to the 
year as a whole. As stated above, in his sample with over 10,000 accounts’ trading 
records, 15.5 percent of the total paper losses and 23.3 percent of the total paper gain 
were realized in the entire year; however, 19.7 percent of the total paper losses and 16.2 
percent of the total paper gains were realized in December. Odean (1998a) noted, “tax-
motivated selling is most evident in December” (p.1775). Due to the desire to pay less 
tax, people are more reluctant to sell winning stocks. Hence for IPO companies, it might 
be helpful to decrease flipping activities by setting the initial date in December. Thus 
far, tax considerations have not been studied in correlation with IPO flipping activities, 
and hence it could also be considered a promising subject for future study. Because this 
factor is non-psychological, further discussions will not be provided here.  
2.3.2 Influence of cognitive and affective factors in holding 
Among the three investment behaviors, holding can occur for various reasons. In 
other words, selling and repurchasing require investors to either sell or purchase to 
change the current holding situation. By contrast, holding behavior does not require 
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investors to do anything. Hence, in this dissertation, holding behavior will be 
categorized into two scenarios: 1) passively hold current stocks and 2) actively hold 
current stocks. Specifically, passive holding describes the scenario in which investors 
simply “do nothing” and no active decision-making process is involved. Active holding, 
on the contrary, describes the scenario in which investors decide to hold stocks after 
comparing the pros and cons of holding, which involves an active decision-making 
process. 
Passive holding behavior, the endowment effect, status quo bias, and loss 
aversion 
The term endowment effect was coined by Thaler (1980). As stated above, it 
describes the phenomenon whereby individuals demand more to give up an item than 
what they would pay for it. Thaler (1980) introduced the endowment effect from the 
perspective of consumer behavior and explained by consumers’ incapability of 
differentiating a sunk cost from an incremental cost and their desire to prevent regret. 
Specifically, a sunk cost refers to the historical cost that one has already paid in the past, 
which should be neglected when making rational decisions because it does not 
influence future income (Baumol & Willig, 1981). The primary applied areas of sunk 
cost are decision making in general project investment (Garland, 1990), decision 
making in risky situations such as gambling (Zeelenberg & Van Dijk, 1997), and 
strategy making in marketing (Kessides, 1986). Regret and anticipated regret were 
introduced in Subchapter 0 and hence will not be explained in detail here. Both the sunk 
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cost effect and regret avoidance have a tendency to increase the endowment effect and 
hence mean that investors will tend to retain current assets because they demand a 
higher bid than what they originally paid for them.  
Status quo bias, as noted by W. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), is the tendency 
of people to do “nothing or maintaining one’s current or previous decision” (p.7). In 
their experiments, participants were found to exhibit significant status quo bias in 
making various decisions. Specifically, the extent of status quo bias was observed to be 
positively correlated with the number of options and negatively correlated with the 
strength of an individual’s preferences. W. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) primarily 
applied status quo bias to consumer decisions and offered examples such as beer 
drinkers’ brand loyalty being primarily due to such bias. Theoretically, in the stock 
market, investors also tend to exhibit status quo bias because they are continually 
exposed to numerous choices. For instance, in mutual fund investment, status quo bias 
was found to be empirically significant in the U.S. equity mutual fund market, where 
investors tend to continue choosing what they have previously chosen, even when the 
choice was no longer optimal (Kempf & Ruenzi, 2006).  
Loss aversion means that for a given amount of loss and gain, the negative feeling 
caused by the loss are stronger than the positive feelings generated by the gain 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). As discussed in the 
previous subchapter from the perspective of selling, investors tend to sell winning 
stocks but hold losing stocks. Hence, combined with the results from Kempf and Ruenzi 
(2006), in general, investors tend to hold their current investment, regardless of whether 
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it maximizes their income or it starts to lose.   
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) used the word anomalies to describe the 
relationships among the endowment effect, status quo bias and loss aversion. They 
noted that these three factors are similar. For instance, status quo bias can be used as an 
example of the endowment effect, and it can also be considered an implication of loss 
aversion. Indeed, in the context of stock market investment, all three factors lead to 
passive holding behaviors, namely, doing nothing but maintaining status quo. Investors 
either have the intention to hold the shares in anticipation of receiving a higher price 
than they had paid (endowment effect), hold the shares because the situation has been 
relatively unchanged for some time (status quo bias), or hold the shares because losing 
might lead to greater pain than the pleasure generated by the same amount of winning 
(loss aversion).  
K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) noted the influences of such factors in the context 
of stock market investment. Specifically, the endowment effect encourages investors to 
avoid making choices, especially when there is a large quantity of other options in the 
stock market, and status quo bias encourages investors to hold what they obtain by 
default. Loss aversion, as noted, increases the tendency for investors to hold losing 
stocks that they have already purchased, as they become more willing to take risks when 
they are losing than they would be if they were winning (Hirshleifer, 2001).  
If these three factors are applied to IPO investment, a general picture of how 
investors would like to hold the shares can be depicted from various perspectives. 
Specifically, from the perspective of the endowment effect, investors prefer to hold 
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their IPO shares as long as the current market price is below the initial price, and they 
still tend to hold their shares even in some cases when the market price is higher than 
the initial price (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Kahneman et al., 1991). From 
the perspective of status quo bias, investors prefer to hold the shares in the secondary 
market, and they tend to hold share in current IPOs in proportion to the number of 
available options in the stock market. Status quo bias will be weaker if investors have 
strong preferences among the currently available options (Kempf & Ruenzi, 2006; W. 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). From the perspective of the loss aversion effect, 
investors tend to hold their shares, especially when the price in the secondary market is 
lower than the initial price, as they become more willing to take risks when facing 
losing situations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Youki et al., 2013).  
In general, passive holding activities are caused by investors’ biases that make the 
holding option attractive for investors, either from the cognitive perspective or the 
affective perspective. Conversely, active holding activities reflect the opposite 
scenarios from passive holding and will be introduced in the following part.  
Active holding behavior and self-control 
When investors are actively holding a stock, an active decision making process is 
involved, including comparing the pros and cons, even if such decisions might cause 
psychological discomfort. Specifically, according to the concept of cognitive 
dissonance as introduced by Festinger (1962), dissonance occurs when conflicts arise 
between what one knows or believes and what one does. For instance, if investors’ 
282 
 
cognitive bias leads them to intend to sell stocks while rationality or a new source of 
information leads them to the conclusion that they should hold the shares, this creates 
dissonance. Empirical studies have found that cognitive dissonance causes 
psychological discomfort, which can be decreased by using a dissonance reduction 
strategy (Elliot & Devine, 1994). 
Self-control, according to Muraven and Baumeister (2000), reflects one’s 
“attempts to change the way he or she would otherwise think, feel, or behave” (p. 247). 
The reason for exerting self-control is to optimize long-term outcomes (Kanfer & 
Karoly, 1972). For instance, deferring consumption is a typical example of self-control, 
which is perceived as a struggle between desire and willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 
1991). Desire represents the “initiating hedonic force”, and willpower represents the 
“strategies used to overcome desire” (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991, p. 498).  
Considering self-control and its relationship with the affective factors, Hirshleifer 
(2001) noted that self-control is usually involved when moods and feelings are related. 
Such moods and feelings are the affective factors mentioned in Subchapter 0. Moods 
and feelings such as greed and fear are often considered the main affective factors 
involved in a financial crisis (Reavis, 2009; Shefrin, 2002). At the macro level, a 
financial crisis occurs during a bull market and, usually, after an abrupt change in stock 
prices. In a bull market, the constant growth of stock prices encourages investors to 
purchase stocks, a behavior driven by greed, and abrupt price changes usually trigger 
large-scale selling activities, which are driven by fear (Westerhoff, 2004). At the micro 
level, by observing 80 traders on a daily basis for a five-week period, Lo, Repin, and 
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Steenbarger (2005) found that those traders who experienced certain emotions to a 
greater extent tended to have poorer performance in the stock market. These emotions 
include fear and anger in response to monetary losses and happiness or greed regarding 
monetary gains. Hence, from the perspective of affective factors, self-control can not 
only decrease the likelihood of a financial crisis by decreasing panic-driven selling 
behaviors in the stock market but also help investors to improve their performance in 
the stock market by reacting less strongly to their emotions. In other words, if investors 
exhibited self-control, acted against their initiating affective states and, therefore, held 
stocks for longer than they would if they were driven by their emotions, fewer financial 
crises would occur and better stock market performance would be achieved.  
Regarding self-control and its relationship with the cognitive factors, Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) explicitly argued that the disposition effect is closely related to self-
control. Specifically, they argued that investors have to control themselves and not hold 
losing stocks for too long. They used examples from Kleinfield (1983) involving 
frequent traders who strictly follow to their rules concerning losses: they sell stocks 
immediately once amount of the loss exceeds their limit, which can vary from 5 to 10 
percent of their original capital. A professional trader who had nearly 20 years of stock 
market experience stated: “when you’re breaking in a new trader, the hardest thing to 
learn is to admit that you’re wrong. It’s a hard pill to swallow. You have to be man 
enough to admit to your peers that you’re wrong and get out” (Kleinfield, 1983, as cited 
in Shefrin & Statman, 1985, p. 783). Analogously, investors should be self-controlled 
and defer selling when a stock is winning. For instance, Odean (1998b) noted that, in 
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general, investors traded too frequently in the stock market because, among other 
reasons, of overconfidence. This overconfidence means that investors tend to sell 
winning stocks too soon, with the result that the actual returns were less than their 
anticipation, sometimes even barely sufficient cover their costs. Hence, regarding the 
cognitive factors, self-control can help to improve investors’ performance by trading 
less frequently, specifically by holding winning stocks longer than they would were 
they affected by their cognitive biases. 
If active holding behaviors are applied to the IPO context, investors could be 
perceived as rational investors who will focus on the intrinsic value of the IPO shares 
and companies, instead of engaging in flipping activities.  
To conclude, self-control is principally reflected in active holding behaviors, in 
the form of controlling both affective factors and cognitive factors. Because the concept 
of self-control was defined as having a positive connotation, with the goal of optimizing 
long-term outcomes (Kanfer & Karoly, 1972), here, active holding behaviors are 
consequently also accorded a positive connotation. In the following subchapter, 
cognitive and affective factors will be introduced in a less positive way because the 
discussion of these factors below will be mainly about biases. 
2.3.3 Influence of cognitive and affective factors in repurchasing 
Most of the existing literature on repurchasing stocks has considered the issuers’ 
perspective, in which issuers repurchase the shares that they have issued in the market, 
for example, to change the proportion between equity and debt or to distribute excessive 
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debt (Dittmar, 2000; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1995; Netter & Mitchell, 
1989). However, in this dissertation, repurchasing behaviors are defined as investors 
purchasing stocks that they have previously purchased in the past, or even simply 
continuing to hold these stocks. This definition is adopted because the individual IPO 
investors considered in this dissertation are those who have already purchased IPO 
shares, either in the primary market or in the secondary market. What will be discussed 
in this subchapter is a sequential purchase, which comes after the first purchase, and 
hence it is termed a repurchase.   
Theoretically, relative to selling and holding behaviors, repurchasing can be 
interpreted as indicating that investors have the highest anticipation of the future 
development of stocks. However, repurchasing behaviors might also be driven by 
certain types of biases. In the following part, attachment bias and the gambler’s fallacy 
will be introduced as two of the primary factors affecting individual investors’ 
repurchasing behaviors.  
Attachment bias and psychological ownership 
Attachment bias, categorized by K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) as one of the 
affective factors, emphasizes how investors feel. Attachment bias describes when 
people overlook an object’s disadvantages and emphasize its advantages due to the 
emotional attachments people form during their interactions with the object. The object 
can be either a person, such as one’s family member or friend, or an asset, such as one’s 
home or stock (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). K. Baker and Nofsinger (2002) noted that 
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one direct result of attachment bias in the stock context is that investors tend to ignore 
negative news related to the stocks to which they are attached. This might lead to 
investors holding stocks for too long or even repurchasing the same stocks. Specifically, 
the function of attachment bias in human cognition can be compared to an information 
filter, whereby investors overweight positive information and underweight negative 
information; in turn, false preferences might be formed regarding stocks to which the 
investor is attached, and hence repurchasing behaviors might be triggered.  
Another factor that is similar to attachment bias is psychological ownership. Pierce, 
Kostova, and Dirks (2003) defined this as feelings of ownership towards other objects, 
both material and non-material. (Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). For 
instance, one might have psychological ownership of one’s own property, such as a 
house or apartment (Paré, Sicotte, & Jacques, 2006), or one’s career such as one’s 
specific position or employer (Pierce et al., 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
Psychological ownership can be interpreted as either a cognitive factor or an affective 
factor because it is perceived through the cognitive process, but emotions 
simultaneously are triggered by the feeling of ownership (Pierce et al., 2003).  
One of the motives to form psychological ownership, according to Pierce et al. 
(2003), is self-identity. Specifically, psychological ownership helps people to “deﬁne 
themselves, express their self-identity to others, and maintain the continuity of the self 
across time” (Pierce et al., 2003, p. 89). The conditions that help individuals to form 
psychological ownership include: 1) control over the object; 2) intimate knowledge of 
the object; and 3) investment and projection of the “self” on the object (Pierce et al., 
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2001).  
Because the abovementioned conditions are mostly likely to occur during 
interactions between individuals and non-material objects, the existing literature on the 
utility of psychological ownership concerns organizational psychology, such as 
individuals’ psychological ownership of their jobs or their firms (Culpepper, Gamble, 
& Blubaugh, 2004; Pierce et al., 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). For instance, Pierce 
et al. (2003) argued that psychological ownership, as one part of employee ownership, 
had a direct positive effect on employee performance. Similarly, Van Dyne and Pierce 
(2004) noted that psychological ownership had a positive effect on employees’ working 
attitudes and behaviors, including organizational commitment, job satisfaction, self-
esteem within the organization, and job performance.  
In contrast to psychological ownership, the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) 
has long been used in cooperation management as a scheme to incentivize employees 
and improve their job performance (Kruse et al., 2003). One study found that ESOP 
can improve companies’ operating performance, even when stock prices are falling 
(Iqbal & Hamid, 2000). This result might provide indirect evidence that individuals are 
incentivized when they have a feeling of ownership, which might have a stronger effect 
than their wealth status.  
In my opinion, the greatest similarity between psychological ownership and 
attachment bias is that they might both encourage individuals to overlook negative 
information or even neglect the financial benefit of the firm or stock involved. Hence, 
hypotheses that could be tested by future studies can be proposed that focus on 
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psychological ownership (or attachment bias) and stock repurchasing: the greater 
individuals’ psychological ownership (or attachment bias) regarding their firms is, the 
more likely they will be to purchase the stocks of their firms; in the case of IPO 
companies, the greater individuals’ psychological ownership (or attachment bias) 
regarding their firms is, the more likely they will be to repurchase the stocks of their 
firms in the secondary market. Consequently, such repurchasing behavior could 
decrease the likelihood of IPO underperformance in the long term.  
The hot hand fallacy  
If attachment bias and psychological ownership are understood to be formed over 
time due to non-financial reasons, then the occurrence of the hot hand fallacy can be 
attributed to financial considerations, i.e., the return on the stocks in which individuals 
have invested. 
The hot hand fallacy is rooted in the representativeness heuristic. The 
representativeness heuristic, as previously stated, is the heuristic employed when 
individuals fail to estimate the probability of an event (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
Specifically, people who believe in the hot hand fallacy tend to believe that their 
positive recent experiences will persist (Ayton & Fischer, 2004). The hot hand fallacy, 
according to Ayton and Fischer (2004), is caused by the positive recent experience of 
individual performance. It is antonymous with the term the gambler’s fallacy and is 
mostly studied in lottery play (Clotfelter & Cook, 1993; Croson & Sundali, 2005). An 
empirical study found that this confidence based on small numbers is related to “the 
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randomness of the underlying process generating the events” (Burns & Corpus, 2004, 
p. 179). In other words, when individuals are exposed to the implication that the 
incidents that generate outcomes are nonrandom, individuals tend to exhibit the hot 
hand fallacy.  
Investors also tend to exhibit such fallacies in the stock market. For instance, a 
typical example is that investors tend to predict future stock prices according to 
historical price information (Andreassen, 1988). Specifically, in an empirical study of 
314 business school students, J. Johnson, Tellis, and MacInnis (2005) showed that when 
purchasing stocks, participants tended to purchase stocks that had won in previous 
rounds and sell stocks that had been losing. A trading strategy called the momentum 
strategy exists in the stock market, according to which traders purchase portfolios that 
had been winning over the last 3 to 12 months and sell portfolios that had been losing 
during the same period of time (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, & Philipov, 2007; T. C. 
Johnson, 2002). This strategy was found to realize significant profits in firms with low 
credit ratings in the U.S. stock market (Avramov et al., 2007) but generated slight losses 
(approximately 0.5 percent per month) in the Japanese stock market from 1975 to 1997 
(C. Liu & Lee, 2001). Neither of these studies was able to explain why this strategy is 
only partly effective. Richard Driehaus, who is considered the father of the momentum 
strategy, stated the philosophy of momentum strategy as buying stocks at high prices 
and selling them at even higher prices (KiHoon Jimmy & Stephen, 2012).  
In my opinion, one of the reasons that this strategy could be effective in the stock 
market is because, in the stock market, many investors subscribe to the hot hand fallacy. 
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This fallacy encourages investors to believe that increases in stock prices are based on 
their previous experience and hence to neglect the intrinsic value of the stocks. As a 
result, it can be assumed that, the more believers in the hot hand fallacy there are among 
the investors of given stocks, the more likely the momentum strategy is to be effective 
when trading these stocks. This could be a possible explanation for the results of 
Avramov et al. (2007), indicating that significant profits were found only for stocks of 
companies with low credit ratings instead of those of companies with high credit ratings. 
Compared with stocks with high credit ratings, those with low credit ratings are more 
similar to lotteries (Kumar, 2009). The latter stocks might attract investors with a 
gambling attitude to participate in the stock market, and theoretically, such investors 
might be more likely to subscribe to the hot hand fallacy.  
Thus, in the case of IPO stocks, which as previously noted, share many features 
with a lottery, the momentum strategy might also produce a significant profit because 
there are believers in the hot hand fallacy. Hence, repurchasing will occur in the 
secondary market, especially if the IPO shares were underpriced. One advantage of the 
momentum strategy in IPO trading is that whenever it is employed, it can prevent IPO 
prices from dropping. For instance, if the momentum strategy were followed 
immediately after the initial date, it might reduce flipping activities or increase the first-
day return and lead to a high level of underpricing, and if the momentum strategy were 
applied in the long term, it might decrease the likelihood of IPO underperformance.  
To conclude, according to attachment bias, psychological ownership and the hot 
hand fallacy, the repurchase of IPOs in the secondary market is not completely 
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impossible. In addition to the abovementioned cognitive and affective factors, other 
reasons, such as the event that investors were allocated fewer initial shares then they 
desired to invest in the initial market, might also lead to repurchasing in the secondary 
market. In other words, not all initial investors have the tendency to flip IPO shares, 
and not all stock market investors tend to follow the buy low sell high trading strategy.  
De Bondt (1998) portrayed individual investors as having the following four 
characteristics while trading: “1) discover naive patterns in past price movements, 2) 
share popular models of value, 3) are not properly diversified, and 4) trade in 
suboptimal ways” (p. 831). These characteristics of individual traders demonstrate that 
most traders in the stock market are irrational, which is contrary to the assumption of 
the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). In this chapter, IPOs were reviewed from 
the perspective of investors and organizational investors and individual investors were 
discussed. Specifically, the differences in traits between actual individual investors and 
hypothetical rational men were reviewed in the subchapter relating to individual 
investors according to the process by which they engage in IPO investment. Cognitive, 
affective and social factors were analyzed throughout the process that influence 
investment decisions such as initial IPO investment and trading behaviors involving 
IPO stocks. The factors that might influence IPO underpricing and underperformance 
were also discussed (Figure 8). Many studies have been conducted on investment 
psychology in the context of investments in mature stocks, but very few studies have 
directly focused on investment in IPO stocks. This chapter also suggested several 
hypotheses, with the hope of informing future research.   
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Figure 8 IPO from the perspective of investors. The column in the middle represents 
parameters that influence underpricing and underperformance. Positive signs in the 
columns headed with underpricing and underperformance mean increasing the level of 
underpricing/underperformance, and negative signs mean the opposite. (H) represents 
“hypothetical”, and relevant hypotheses can be made for future research. “Loss 
aversion, etc.” stands for the first part of Subchapter 2.3.2, i.e., the endowment effect, 
status quo bias and loss aversion. “Attachment Bias, etc.” stands for the first part of 
Subchapter 2.3.3, i.e., attachment bias and psychological ownership.   
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation, research on IPOs is reviewed from the perspectives of the 
issuer, underwriter and investor. IPOs are the focus of this dissertation not only because 
IPO-related topics always raise abundant discussions in both research and practice but 
also because, in my opinion, IPO shares can be perceived as an initiation into the stock 
market. Each stock in the secondary market has been through the IPO stage; hence, 
studying the origination of stocks would provide a new approach to perceiving the stock 
market in general. 
In traditional finance, a great number of research has been conducted based on two 
major hypotheses, which are the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) and 
the rational man hypothesis (Mill, 1994; A. Smith, 1789). The EMH assumes that stock 
prices should reflect all available information in the market and hence follow a random 
walk pattern, in which price ups and downs should be equally distributed. The rational 
man hypothesis, when applied in the stock market, describes that investors are always 
able to make optimal decisions based on available information (Bak, Paczuski, & 
Shubik, 1997). The EMH and rational man hypothesis draw a picture in which the 
fallible nature of human decision-making is completely eliminated.  
Obviously, the abovementioned hypotheses are at odds with IPO phenomena 
observed in the market such as underpricing, flipping activity, underperformance, and 
cold and hot issues. In my opinion, these IPO phenomena can be attributed to two major 
reasons. First, from a financial perspective, the stock market is inefficient, and 
asymmetric information is one important cause of this inefficiency (F. Allen & Gorton, 
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1992; Mishkin, 1990). Second, from a psychological perspective, most investors are 
irrational and tend to be influenced by cognitive factors, affective factors and social 
factors when making decisions (K. Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001). Hence, 
these two reasons form the theoretical background of this dissertation whereby the IPO 
phenomena are reviewed based on both financial and psychological work.  
The pilot line of this dissertation primarily follows the sequential order of the IPO 
process, particularly from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5. Specifically, Chapter 1 provides basic 
concepts about public financing and IPO related concepts. The practical application is 
that it provides a standard procedure that issuers can follow when they consider 
financing and helps issuers to identify whether it is necessary for them to issue an IPO 
in the first place. Chapter 2 introduces the multiple agency theory and reveals the 
interest conflicts of the three parties. By differentiating the asymmetric information 
between investors and issuers and that between issuers and underwriters, two new 
approaches of defining underpricing are introduced as follows: 1) necessary 
underpricing, which cannot be controlled by any party and is mainly caused by market 
inefficiency, and 2) intentional underpricing, which is caused primarily by underwriters. 
The first two chapters primarily focus on introducing background information about 
IPO phenomena and the three parties from a financial perspective. In Chapter 3, IPOs 
are discussed from the issuer’s perspective. By analyzing the influence of CEO founder 
status and CEO overconfidence on underpricing and underperformance, it suggests to 
boards of directors which type of CEO should be hired when IPO companies are in a 
specific stage. In Chapter 4, IPOs are discussed from the underwriter’s perspective. By 
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following the sequential order of the IPO process and analyzing the parameters that 
influence underpricing and underperformance, this chapter offers issuers the potential 
factors that may lead to underpricing and underperformance in each stage of an IPO. In 
other words, the practical application is that it reduces the asymmetric information 
between issuers and underwriters and helps to decrease intentional underpricing by 
demonstrating the factors that issuers should pay attention to while collaborating with 
underwriters. In Chapter 5, IPOs are discussed from the investor’s perspective, 
including investors before companies start to issue IPO shares (venture capitalists), 
investors who purchase IPOs in the primary market (institutional investors) and 
investors who purchase IPOs in the secondary market (individual investors). 
Specifically, by presenting factors related to individual investors in a sequential 
decision making order, this chapter demonstrates the cognitive and affective biases that 
individuals tend to exhibit. From the perspectives of issuers and institutional investors, 
it indicates that they should avoid individual investors in IPO allocations under most 
circumstances. From the perspective of individual investors, it helps them to understand 
the psychological factors that influence their trading patterns, indicating that they 
should either be careful with IPO investments or try to avoid falling into biased 
judgments. 
One overarching contribution of this dissertation is that underpricing and 
underperformance are reviewed from a comprehensive level. In most of the extant 
literature, underpricing and underperformance were considered effects caused by one 
or two factors of one party. However, in this dissertation, it is clear that they should be 
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perceived as joint results from different factors of all three parties. Specifically, over 
20 parameters are found or assumed to exert influences on underpricing based on 
research in both financial and psychological work (Figure 9). Extant financial work 
explains underpricing from the perspective of asymmetric information among different 
parties and the inefficiency of the stock market. Extant psychological work explains it 
from a cognitive perspective, affective perspective and social perspective. This 
dissertation redefines how underpricing is perceived in traditional finance by 
emphasizing the lack of control in the secondary market and the irrationality of 
individuals. It suggests that the traditional research on underpricing should not only be 
extended to the secondary market but also incorporate psychological analysis of 
individual investors, who are the primary participants in the secondary market.  
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Figure 9 Underpricing phenomenon and its contributing factors. The grey bars in the 
middle are parameters that influence underpricing. Pluses in the column with 
underpricing mean increases in the level of underpricing, and minuses mean the 
opposite. (H) represents “hypothetical”, showing that relevant hypotheses can be made 
for future research. The abbreviations included are as follows: AI…asymmetric 
information; AR…analyst report; AF…analyst forecast; QP…quiet period; IP…initial 
price; Info…information; Rep…reputation; VC…venture capitalist; II…institutional 
investor. 
Similarly, over 20 parameters are found or assumed to exert influences on 
underperformance as well, which are, again, based on research in both financial and 
psychological work (Figure 10). One significant difference between underpricing and 
underperformance is that the latter is a long-term phenomenon and exists only in the 
secondary market. As previously stated, individual investors are the key party in the 
secondary market; hence, the parameters that influence underperformance can be easily 
perceived from a psychological perspective with a cognitive aspect, affective aspect 
and social aspect but remain difficult to categorize into a couple of universal aspects 
from a financial perspective. This dissertation offers an innovative perspective by 
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perceiving underperformance from the perspective of investors, especially individual 
investors. In particular, massive selling behaviors in the secondary market create 
underperformance, and vice versa. Hence, it shows that fundamental analysis by the 
traditional finance paradigm may be ineffective in analyzing underperformance, 
especially when the secondary market is packed with irrational individual investors. 
Similar to underpricing, underperformance is not only influenced by the behaviors of 
issuers or underwriters but also is stronger affected by the trading behaviors of 
individual investors. This dissertation suggests that it is insufficient to relate stock 
market performance, particularly long-term underperformance purely on the intrinsic 
value of the firms. Additionally, for future analysis the psychological factors that trigger 
the trading patterns of individual investors shall be implemented when explaining 
underperformance.  
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Figure 10 Underperformance phenomenon and its contributing factors. The grey bars 
in the middle are parameters that influence underperformance. Pluses in the column 
with underperformance mean increases in the level of underperformance, and minuses 
mean the opposite. (H) represents “hypothetical”, showing that relevant hypotheses 
can be made for future research. The abbreviations included are as follows: 
AR…analyst report; AF…analyst forecast; IP…initial price; Info…information; 
VC…venture capitalist; II… institutional investor.  
Another contribution of this dissertation is that several hypotheses are made for 
future research relating to the parameters and their influences on underpricing and 
underperformance. These hypotheses are supported by the extant literature together 
with suggestions on approaches to measuring some parameters. Specifically, the 
hypothetical relationships between the parameters and IPO phenomena can be found in 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 in the sectors marked with (H). Theoretically, it offers an 
overview about potential further research, and practically, it helps each party to 
understand how their behaviors may influence the IPO in both the short and long term. 
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One limitation of this dissertation is that due to the components of each party and 
the focus of extant literature being different, it is difficult to maintain an approach to 
disentangle the parameters in a consistent manner. In particular, the proportions of 
financial work and psychological work could be unevenly distributed among the 5 
chapters. Another limitation is that although due diligence has been conducted 
throughout the writing process, it is still possible that not every parameter that 
influences underpricing and underperformance has been included. 
The last practical contribution of this dissertation is that when disentangling the 
factors that may increase or decrease the two IPO phenomena, the order in which this 
dissertation is written makes it easy for decision makers to identify which factors they 
should control or influence at different stages of the IPO process. Additionally, special 
attention needs to be paid to parameters that (hypothetically) increase both underpricing 
and underperformance such as possible collusion between issuers and underwriters in 
the information integration stage or allocation to speculators in the stage of IPO shares 
allocation. 
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